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PREFACE
When in September 2008, during the first semester of my doctoral studies, I
read for the first time Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, I became
deeply concerned about its place and function in Kant’s oeuvre. It also caught my
attention since I had, for a long time, been considering a research project focused on
the limits of reason, a project that interested me not only for the sake of my own
academic development, but also because of its relevance to the apparent incapacity
of moral philosophy to rule practical life. Prior to my doctoral studies I had
developed an interest in psychoanalysis and had performed some sociological and
cultural research, with the aim of understanding better both the potential and
limitations of human rationality. The development of philosophy during the 20th
century contributed to my intellectual curiosity. Thus, encountering a book of Kant
that talked about the derangement of the cognitive faculties deeply aroused my
attention.
I began to research and surprisingly found that Kant had written on the topic
since 1764 in his “Essay on the Maladies of the Head.” His Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View, written in 1798, developed the ideas presented in this
essay in a more sustained philosophical manner. My interest was further developed
when in 2009 I took a seminar on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and another on
ix

Metapsychology and Philosophy. I began to ask myself fundamental questions: who
is the subject? How do the Kantian transcendental and empirical consciousness
relate to each other? What is the nature of the cognitive faculties? How can they be
deranged? How do mind and world relate to one another? Thus, the project had
arisen.
I have to say I was also challenged by the lack of secondary literature
concerning the topic that traced the problem back to the beginning from a
philosophical point of view. A review of the Kant literature in English, French,
German and Spanish brought back negative results, and thus I decided to begin the
enterprise, which eventually began to involve a much broader scope than initially
conceived, since I had to deal first with Kant’s theory of cognition, and thus deeply
enter into the Critique of Pure Reason, the primary basis on which this work is based.
This required a great deal of time and reflection, and it became necessary to curtail
my ambitious project; this is why I propose today a Prolegomena to Kant’s Theory of
the Derangement of the Cognitive Faculties rather than a systematic account of that
theory. After explaining the main elements of Kant’s theory of cognition, I propose
what I consider must be included in a critical theory of derangement that takes into
account Kant’s philosophical development. Such a task requires us to close certain
gaps and to draw connections not always made explicit by Kant himself.
It is my thesis that it is possible to construct a theory of derangement in Kant
that I present today in its initial stage; i.e., as a series of prolegomena that can
indicate to us a path to follow. It is my hope that I and/or someone else will follow
x

this path and build the total theory. A complete theory of derangement should not
only examine all of Kant’s works, but should focus especially on the roles played by
the reflective judgment and the imagination in the conception of purposiveness that
he develops in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. It will also require the
inclusion of the transcendental illusions of reason, about which extensive research
has been done. Among other topics, it is necessary to account for the fragile
boundaries that separate the normal and abnormal functioning of the cognitive
faculties. The concept of derangement presented in Chapter 5 is used in a general
way, as a concept that includes under it all possible and real manifestations of
cognitive deficiency and mental illness. When a particular cognitive deficiency or
mental illness is established we refer to it with the specific term Kant uses to
characterize it.
Since Kant situates the derangement of the cognitive faculties at the
intersection of two disciplines—pragmatic anthropology and empirical
psychology—our previous chapters deal with the relation between the mind and the
external world. This means that the cognitive faculties to be treated here are
sensibility, understanding and imagination, not only in their mutual relationship but
also concerning their relationship to the objects of outer sense. A careful reader will
perceive the point up to which the mind and the external world are interrelated, and
need each other. Therefore, we will not deal with reason in this dissertation, for—
even if reason is the highest faculty—it is not a constitutive cognitive faculty, since it
is the faculty of regulative principles, and, as such, its aim is to prompt the
xi

understanding to strive to unify its cognitions and principles. Thus, reason never
relates directly to any object of perception and by its own nature is necessarily pure.
Thus, the unavoidable and natural illusions of reason are not part of this
dissertation, despite their indirect relevance to Kant’s theory of mental
derangement. More precisely, the paralogisms of reason, the antinomies of reason,
and the ideal of pure reason will not be treated in this dissertation. We do not deal
either with any relations between reason and the understanding. Our interest in the
four initial chapters has been to keep as close as possible to the senses, and to attain
the relation to pure apperception as the original ground of experience.
It is worth mentioning that in our explanation of the deduction of the
categories of the understanding we have focused mainly on the A-Deduction, due to
the relevance the three-fold synthesis has to our topic. In the Preface to the first
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant mentions that the deduction of the pure
concepts of the understanding has two sides: an objective deduction that is
concerned with the objects of experience and a priori concepts of the pure
understanding, and a subjective deduction that has as its aim the pure understanding
itself, and that concerns the possibility of thinking itself (cf. Axvi-xvii). Most
commentators have focused more on the objective deduction which Kant himself
considered essential to his aims (cf. Axvi). Some commentators consider the BDeduction to be exclusively objective and/or more important. We agree, however,
with those commentators who think that both deductions are to be considered
together insofar as one complements the other; even if certain differences are
xii

encountered in them and if the B-Deduction disregards certain topics of the ADeduction that Kant’s later works show he still considered important. Accordingly,
our explanation of the A-Deduction is complemented by certain passages of the BDeduction that shed light on the topic we are dealing with and/or are necessary for
a complete understanding of Kant’s ideas.
Likewise, this dissertation talks about Kant from, so to speak, a Kantian point
of view, not from, say, a Humean, Wolffian, or Leibnizian point of view; neither do we
interpret Kant from the point of view of any particular commentator. We have
entered as deeply─and as unprejudiced─as possible into Kant’s own ideas,
searching always to understand what he was trying to convey, to achieve insight
into the core of each topic and the sense it has in the totality of his work. During this
long process of almost three years dedicated to full-time research, I have been
deeply nourished, not only from my long immaterial and atemporal relationship
with Kant, as well as by the commentators consulted, but from the discussions,
comments and revisions to my drafts performed by my dissertation director, Dr.
Andrew Cutrofello. Nevertheless, any fault the reader may find herein is only mine
and not his.
Finally, I have written this dissertation in the first person plural to include
the reader and invite him/her to think together with me, i.e., as a way to be more
communicative, since I think the critical aspect of philosophy has always to be
maintained, not only to preserve its initial sense, but to avoid the danger of
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destroying the human possibility to think, a vocation that by nature is free. History
has already taught us many lessons in this regard.

Chicago, February 28th, 2013
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CHAPTER I
SENSIBILITY AND SUBSTANCES AS MATERIAL OBJECTS
1.1. Sense, Appearance, Intuition and Manifoldness: Introducing Fundamental
Concepts
In its dealings with the external world the human ‘mind’ (Gemüt) relates to
something different from itself.1 Kant calls ‘affection’ (Affection) the relationship the
mind de facto has with things different from itself insofar as it is mere receptivity;
i.e., the mind has the capacity to be affected by things that come from outside itself
and that are not of its own generation. To the faculty that accounts for this
‘receptivity’ (Empfänglichkeit), or capacity of being affected by objects from outside
us, Kant gives the name of ‘sensibility’ (Sinnlichkeit): “The capacity (receptivity) to
acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is
called sensibility” (A19/B33). Sensibility then is a passive ‘faculty’ (Vermögen) that
allows the reception of that which affects us, i.e., of the impressions of the senses or
sensible impressions. Kant always links receptivity to the sensible faculty; e.g. “this
receptivity, which we call sensibility” (A27/B43), “this receptivity of our cognitive
1

The concept ‘mind’ will be used in this dissertation in the same sense in which Kant usually uses it;
i.e., as a generic concept that intends to convey our cognitive faculties but without specifying any of
them in particular or in its particular function. However, it is worth mentioning that in the Lectures
on Metaphysics Kant gives a definition of ‘mind’ in the context of Rational Psychology when talking
about the soul: “Mind <psyche> means butterfly <papillon>” (MK2 Ak. XXVIII: 753). The analogy with
the butterfly intends to convey that which is hidden preformed in the caterpillar, which is nothing
more than its larval form.
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capacity is called sensibility” (A44/B61), and sensibility is the receptivity of our
mind to receive representations insofar as the mind is affected in some way (cf.
A51/B75).
A first affection is the one that proceeds from the outer sense. Kant gives the
name of ‘outer sense’ (äußerlich Sinn, äussere Sinn) to the mental property that
relates to things outside the mind: “By means of outer sense (a property of our
mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us” (A22/B37).2 Kant also says
outer sense is where the human body is affected by physical things (cf. Anthr. Ak.
VII: 153). Specifically, outer sense refers to the five outer senses, i.e., sight, hearing,
touch, taste and smell (cf. ML2. Ak. XXVIII: 585; cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 154 ff.). Thus,
objects of the outer sense are all things that affect us through these five senses.
However, the mind can also be─and de facto is─affected by itself; more precisely,
by its own representations, whatever their origin and content; e.g., feelings, desires,
the effect of outer impressions on our self or whatever inner perceptions we may
have. Thus, there must be another ‘sense’ (Sinn) that accounts for the affection that

2 Here Kant is using the expression ‘outside us’ its empirical sense that accounts for appearances as
objects of the outer sense or of the external world that Kant also refers to as ‘empirically external
objects.’ The expression, however, is also used at times in a transcendental sense to refer to ‘things
in themselves’ that are the same external objects, but now not considered at an empirical level but at
a transcendental one. The double usage the expression ‘outside us’ is made plain by Kant in the
following passage:
But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it
sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself, exists distinct from us and
sometimes merely something that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape
uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance [as something that belongs to
outer appearance] . . . we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that
might be called ‘external’ in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them ‘things that
are to be encountered in space.’ (A373)
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proceeds from our inner self concerning our own inner state; to this sense Kant
gives the name of ‘inner sense’ (inner Sinn): “[i]nner sense, by means of which the
mind intuits itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37). Inner sense is only one (cf. ML2. Ak.
XXVIII: 585), since it is the intuition of our self and its states.
Now, the affection through the senses can be produced in an undetermined
way; this is why Kant uses the term ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) to account for the
sensorial impressions that affect the mind in an undetermined way: “The
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance (Der
unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung heißt Erscheinung)”
(A20/B34). It is part of the constitution of an appearance its empirical nature; the
existence of appearances cannot be cognized a priori (cf. A178/B221). The concept
‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) is always referred to (the affection of) the senses; e.g.,
“as each affects our senses, i.e., as it appears” (B69) and “all appearances in general,
i.e., all objects of the senses” (A34/B51). Appearance intends to convey the
(external) object of the (outer) sense prior to its conception as an object of cognition,
for appearance is basically the manifold of sensible impressions that is given to us in

4
certain relations.3 However, when the object is already determined it is called
‘phenomenon.’4
The fact that appearances are given in empirical intuition means that they
are representations of objects; i.e., that as intuition they belong to the subject, for all
intuition is a representation (cf. A92/B125, cf. A32/B47). However, since the
intuition is empirical, appearances are objects as well─even if (still) undetermined
ones. Kant explains well what he intends to convey by appearance when he speaks
about its two sides:
[A]ppearance, which always has two sides, one where the object is
considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited,
the constitution of which however must for that very reason always remain
problematic), the other where the form of the intuition of this object is
considered, which must not be sought in the object in itself but in the subject
to which it appears, but which nevertheless really and necessarily pertains to
the representation of this object. (A38/B55)
If Kant mentions here that the constitution of the object in itself must always
remain problematic, it is because we can only cognize “objects” as they appear to us,
i.e., as they are given to sensibility through intuition. Kant is clear about the fact that
the object in itself cannot be cognized; i.e., we cannot cognize the things in
themselves (cf. A30/B45) but only things as they appear to consciousness. This
3

It is worth mentioning that Kant also suggests that appearances presuppose an act of mental
synthesis. Thus, there is also a point of view in which appearances contain an aspect which is not
merely given. This will be understood in Chapter 3 when we explain how the synthesis allows us to
uphold a subjective constitution of experience.
4

The distinction appearance-phenomenon is treated in Chapter 3 when judgments of perception and
judgments of experience are explained. We note here that Kant restricts the concept ‘appearance’
mainly for objects of the outer sense and not for the representations of inner sense, as this
dissertation will make plain. E.g., “of the objects (of the appearances)” (A180/B222), and “objects as
appearances” (A143/B182).
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point is clearly stated in the following passage, where Kant also advances other
topics that we explain below:
What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this
receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us (Was es für eine
Bewandtnis mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser
Rezeptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit haben möge, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt).
We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is
peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every
being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned
solely with this . . . Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest
degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the
constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still
completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this
always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space
and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known
through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which alone is
given to us. (A42-43/B59-60)
The fact that we cannot cognize things in themselves but only as they appear
to us means that the cognition of objects requires that the intuited manifold
conforms to the formal constitution of the subject; i.e., to the conditions the subject
brings to cognition. It neither means that cognition is not truly possible, nor that
there are no objects that exist in an external world outside the mind. Kant explicitly
mentions “the external world of the senses” (A87/B120).5

5

This clarification is relevant since Kant’s Transcendental Idealism must be well understood. Kant
explicitly talks about this when he says:
Our transcendental idealism . . . allows that the objects of outer intuition are real too, just as
they are intuited in space, along with all alterations in time, just as inner sense represents
them. For since space is already a form of that intuition that we call outer, and without
objects in it there would be no empirical representation at all, we can and must assume
extended beings in space as real; and it is precisely the same with time. (A491-492/B520)
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Thus, Kant thinks we can know there are things in themselves but we cannot
know anything about their constitution. “For we have to do only with our
representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to
representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive
sphere” (A190/B235). As already anticipated, the thing in itself is the correlate of
the objects of the outer sense: “but rather that objects in themselves are not known
to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere
representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate;
i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them” (A30/B45). In
Kant’s terminology, the concept ‘noumenon’ accounts for the ‘thing in itself’ from a
transcendental point of view. He points this transcendental level by saying: “[t]he
concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the
senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through the understanding)”
(A254/B310).6 Therefore, the term ‘appearance’ is a sort of mediating concept
between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ and as such it is intended to convey features of both:
the form of the subject and the content i.e., the object.

6

The transcendental level will be made plain through our dissertation. We must avoid, however, the
error of considering the transcendental level as a sort of superior level that grounds the world of
senses or the external world in a Platonic sense. See: The Theory of the Forms in Book VI of Plato’s
Republic. Plato.1992. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. 2nd ed. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company.
Kant openly rejects this possibility. However, it is worth noting that Kant still upheld the distinction
between a sensible and an intelligible worlds in this Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. The
transcendental level will be a constitutive level only concerning the object(s) of cognition, not the
constitution of the object itself.
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Now, the affection sensible impressions induce in us can be in an
unconscious way; however, consciousness of this affection is called ‘sensation’
(Empfindung). “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as
we are affected by it, is sensation” (A19-20/B34). ‘Sensation’ (Empfindung) is also
defined as a representation through sense of which one is conscious (cf. Anthr. Ak.
VII: 153). Sensation then is consciousness of the affection of an object.
Sensation is a difficult concept to grasp; commentators have different
interpretations. Since sensation is immediately linked to the object of the outer
sense, there tends to be some confusion among both and their boundaries. We think
Dieter Henrich has the most accurate approach concerning this point. In Identity
and Objectivity he makes plain objects must satisfy the requirement of constancy,
and that their representations are those representations that repeatedly occur and
are in principle repeatable under certain circumstances (cf. Henrich 1994, 130). He
makes plain this goes from both sides, since we also attribute constancy to objects:
“[w]e hold that objects are those particulars to which continuity in existence is
fundamentally attributable” (Henrich 1994, 131). By contrast, sensations cannot
satisfy these requisites (cf. Henrich 1994, 132). “It makes no sense to assume that
the same sensory representations recur. Once gone, they can be replaced by others
of the same kind” (Henrich 1994, 132). Henrich states that sensible presentations
have to be distinguished from objects (cf. Henrich 1994, 132). Even if both appear
together, sensations are just presentations that appear in diffuse spatial
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juxtaposition, but are not structured in relations in space and time as objects are (cf.
Henrich 1994, 130-133). This point, i.e., that sensations are not structured in
spatio-temporal relations is fundamental, not only to distinguish them from the
objects they come with but also to understand their nature.
However, Henrich’s distinction accounts for the distinction between
sensations and objects but not for the effect sensations have on the self, since the
consciousness of being affected is an affection of the subject. This double aspect
concerning sensations is perceived in the third Critique, where Kant openly
recognizes the term ‘sensation’ creates confusion (KU Ak. V: 2050). Thus, in the
Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant distinguishes between an objective and a
subjective usage of the term ‘sensation.’ The passage says as follows:
If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation,
then this expression means something entirely different than if I call the
representation of a thing (through sense, as a receptivity belonging to the
faculty of cognition) sensation. For in the latter case the representation is
related to the object, but in the first case it is related solely to the subject, and
does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject
cognizes itself.
In the above explanation, however, we understand by the word
‘sensation’ an objective representation of the senses; and in order not always
to run the risk of being misinterpreted, we will call that which must always
remain merely subjective and absolutely cannot constitute a representation
of an object by the otherwise customary name of ‘feeling.’ (KU Ak. V: 206)
By ‘sensation’ in the sense in which Kant uses this term in the first Critique
we are to understand the objective usage of the concept; i.e., sensations as
immediately related to objects. This objective use then is what Henrich considers in
his explanation. It is worth mentioning that this type of sensation, which plays a
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role in the conveyance of appearances, correlates to matter. “I call that in the
appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter” (A20/B34), where “the
matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori” (A20/B34).7 Through this
association Kant makes clearer the usage of the term “sensation” in its objective
meaning by making plain that matter in the appearance is the correlate of the
sensation which affects us. This, united to the fact that the content is always a
posteriori, allows us to understand in turn an empirical intuition. Kant says: “That
intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical”
(A20/B34).
‘Intuition’ (Anschauung) is the immediate contact the mind has to something
that is given through the affection of the senses, for intuition is an immediate
representation of the object (cf. A19/B33, B41). An intuition is necessarily a
singular representation of an object (cf. A32/B47) for it represents a single object,
and cannot be, as such, universally communicable. What intuition brings to the mind
is a manifold: “[e]very intuition contains a manifold in itself” (A99). Therefore,
empirical intuition brings the manifold of sensible impressions to the mind. By
‘manifold’ (Mannigfaltige) Kant wants to convey the ‘multiplicity’ (Menge) of
sensible impressions that affects the mind through the outer sense. This manifold is

7

Further in this chapter we will deal with matter in the section on substances.
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really the ‘content’ (Inhalt, Gebalt) of cognition that customarily we call object, and
which ultimately refers to matter.8
Intuition for Kant is always sensible (cf. A35/B52) insofar as it is receptive of
the impressions the senses give us, and because it contains the way in which we are
affected by objects (cf. A51/B75). Kant denies to the human mind the possibility of
an intellectual intuition, for this would imply the cognition of things in themselves
via our understanding, without the mediating role played by sensibility. According
to Kant, an intellectual intuition could only be given to an original being whose
understanding would create the very objects it intuits, but not to finite rational
subjects such as human beings. This is why he states that the intuition of human
beings is derived, since it cannot be original and depends on the information the
senses give us; thus, it is not self-activity (cf. B68). Kant says:
[I]t may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with
human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this), yet even given
such universal validity this kind of intuition would not cease to be sensibility,
8 It is worth mentioning that the concept ‘matter’ has special connotations in Kant’s work. Kant uses
the concept ‘matter’ as a synonym of ‘content’ mostly when ‘matter’ is presented as opposed to ‘form’
(cf. JL Ak. IX: 33; cf. MAN Ak. IV: 481). However, the concept ‘matter’—even when it is conceived as
the mere material element of the object and has only the determinations proper to external relations
in space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 543)─is not the best synonym of ‘content.’ This is why Kant mainly uses the
concept ‘manifold’ when he refers to ‘content.’ Through this dissertation it will become clear why
Kant prefers the concept ‘manifold’ to account for the ‘content’ of cognition and in general.
For the explanation of matter in general and its relations in space see the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Sciences. Kant there explains matter related to motion, and in relation to the table of the
categories. This work contains the explanation of matter as the movable in space (cf. MAN Ak. IV:
480), the filling of space by matter (MAN Ak. IV: 496) through a moving force (and not through its
mere existence) (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 497), attractive and repulsive forces as the fundamental forces of
matter (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 498 ff., MAN Ak. IV: 508 ff.), the impenetrability of matter (cf. MAN Ak. IV:
503), bodies, in the physical sense, as matter between determinate boundaries which therefore has a
figure (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 525), the possibility of thinking an empty space prior to all matter (cf. MAN Ak.
IV: 534 - 535), the law of inertia as the lifeless of all matter as such (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 544), among other
topics.
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for the very reason that it is derived (intuitus derivativus) (derivative
intuition), not original (intuitius originarius) (original intuition), thus not
intellectual intuition, which for the ground already adduced seems to pertain
only to the original being, never to one that is dependent as regards both its
existence and its intuition (which determines its existence in relation to
given objects). (B72)
This said, Kant speaks at times of outer intuition and of inner intuition; by
outer intuition he refers to the intuition of the objects of outer sense, while inner
intuition refers to the intuition of the objects of inner sense: “of our kind of outer as
well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is not original, i.e., one
through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given” (B72).
1.2. Space and Time as the Forms of Outer and Inner Sense
To establish a connection between the subject and the object, it is not
sufficient to appeal to the receptivity of the mind; the mind itself has to bring
something into cognition, so that the reception of the manifold is (spontaneously)
organized: what the mind contributes is the way in which the reception of the
manifold is organized. This way is what Kant calls ‘form’ (Form): “form, i.e., the way
in which we cognize the object” (JL Ak. IX: 33). What we determine then is the form,
but not the content, of cognition. That is to say, the mind determines the way in
which an object, i.e., an appearance, is going to be received (and understood).
However, the content─the manifold of sensible impressions─cannot be
determined by the mind; the content is given to us.
This is why Kant states that the form of appearance must already lie ready in
the mind a priori (cf. A20/B34) for the form (of appearances) is brought into the
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cognitive process by the mind itself; more precisely, and in this case, by the faculty
of sensibility.9 Kant says “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be
intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance” (A20/B34).
The form then is what makes possible that manifolds can be intuited organized in
relations; this means then that that forms condition the possibility of objects of
cognition. Forms then have to be necessarily a priori; Kant justifies the a priori
nature of the forms when he says “since the receptivity of the subject to be affected
by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects, it can be understood
how the form of all appearance can be given in the mind prior to all actual
perceptions, thus a priori” (A26/B42). Likewise:
[T]hat under which alone objects can be intuited, in fact does lie in the mind
a priori as the ground of the form of objects. All appearances therefore
necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only
through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given (Mit dieser
formalin Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit stimen also alle Erscheinungen notwendig
überein, weil sie nur durch dieselbe erscheinen, d.i. empirisch angeschauet und
gegeben warden können). (A93/B125)
It is plain then that the form of appearances is the same form that lies a priori
in the mind. Both concern the formal constitution of the subject under which
objects are given to us. Now, the question arises about the nature of this form. As
mentioned above, the form is the way in which manifolds are received or intuited in
certain ‘relations’ (Verhältnissen). The form then is what spontaneously structures
manifolds in relations. Kant says: “the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is

9 It is plain we are talking here of sensible form. See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how the
understanding contributes the intelligible form of objects of experience.
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to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is
intuited in certain relations” (A20/B34). Kant upholds the idea that the a priori
forms of sensibility are space and time, since all objects have necessarily to be
structured in spatio-temporal relations; this can be made plain from the fact that all
actual objects are necessarily in a determinate space and in a determinate time (cf.
A23/B38, cf. A31/B46).
Indeed, ‘space’ (Raum) and ‘time’ (Zeit) are both forms that condition the
reception of objects: “Both [time and space] taken together are, namely, the pure
forms of all sensible intuition” (A39/B56). Space and time are then the pure forms
of sensibility insofar as they are subjective conditions under which the sensible
manifold has to be intuited. This makes evident then that space and time do not
exist outside the mind, but are conditions or forms the mind has that determine the
way in which objects are going to be received by it; i.e., that determine how the
‘multiplicity’ (Menge) of sensible impressions is organized in relations so it can be
received in an unitary way to constitute objects of cognition. These statements
make plain Kant is denying the absolute reality of space and time; his formalism
implies that space and time are real insofar as they are the condition for the
reception of objects; if we abstract from these subjective conditions nothing at all can
be given to us for cognition.10

10

A clarification concerning the usage of the terms ‘pure’ (rein) and ‘a priori’ is required here. Kant
uses the term ‘pure’ in contrast to what is ‘empirical’: what is pure is not empirical. Sometimes he
uses also the term ‘a priori’ instead of ‘pure,’ i.e., as synonyms, and at times he uses ‘pure a priori,’ i.e.,
both terms together one following the other. The difference between pure and a priori is slight: if
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Now, a distinction between the formal constitution of space and time is
required, since it is plain inner perceptions or representations that affect our inner
self, and account for our inner state, cannot appear in a spatial form, for they have
neither shape nor extension. Thus while space is the ground of all outer intuitions;
time is the ground of all intuitions in general; i.e., of all outer and inner intuitions.
Thus, space is the form of the outer sense since all objects of the outer sense must be
necessarily received under the conditions of space, i.e., they must appear in
relations in space. Kant points out:
Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer
sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer
intuition is possible for us (Der Raum ist nichts anders, als nur die Form aller
Erscheinungen äußerer Sinne, d.i. die subjektive Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit,
unter der allein uns äußere Anschauung möglich ist). (A26/B42)
However, time is the form of all objects of the senses in general, i.e., of the
object of the inner sense and of the objects of the outer sense, since it not only
conditions our inner representations but also the representations of the outer sense,
insofar as all intuition must necessarily be in us and, therefore, in time. Kant says:
Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions (Die Zeit ist
eine notwendige Vorstellung, die allen Anschauungen zum Grunde liegt). In
pure is opposed to empirical, a priori is prior to experience. Kant says: “a priori, i.e., prior to all
perception of an object” (B41); also “prior to all actual perception” (A42/B60). Thus, a priori has
more worth than pure, but both concepts are intended to avoid contingency, and convey that nothing
empirical must be designated through them. This takes us to a fundamental distinction: the relation
between a priori and transcendental. For Kant what is transcendental has necessarily to be a priori
but not the reverse, i.e., all a priori is not necessarily transcendental (cf. A56/B80-81). A priori
cognition is transcendental when it serves as a rule, i.e., when it acts like a principle in empirical
cognition. For example, mathematics is a non-transcendental a priori cognition. In this sense, what
pertains then to the possibility of mathematical cognition is transcendental, though mathematical
cognition itself is not. Mathematical cognition is only a priori cognition.
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regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can
very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given a
priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all
disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility)
cannot be removed. (A31/B46)
The distinction between space and time makes plain time has more
transcendental significance than space, since time is the condition of the possibility
of all appearances, i.e., of inner and outer representations; this is why time is the
universal condition of their possibility, whereas space is restricted to outer
appearances. The universality of time explains also why inner intuition is more
fundamental, and even grounds, outer intuition.11 Kant states these ideas in a
fundamental passage:
Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as
the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori condition merely
to outer intuitions (Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung a priori aller
Erscheinungen überhaupt. Der Raum, als die reine Form aller äußeren
Anschauung ist als Bedingung a priori bloß auf äußere Erscheinungen
eingeschränkt). But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or
not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of
the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs
under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a
priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate
condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate
condition of outer appearances. If I can say a priori: all outer appearances
are in space and determined a priori according to the relations of space, so
from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances
in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in
relations of time. (A34/B50-51)

11

For instance: “If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this
intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation” (A34/B51). (Emphasis
mine.)
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The passage adds that all representations belong to our inner sense, because
as such, i.e., as representations, they are determinations of the mind. However, we
cannot go further than this if we want to inquire about the nature of our
representations, for we cannot have more insight about them, but only grasp the
meaning of the concept ‘representation’ (Vorstellung) through the comprehension
of Kant’s philosophy. In the Jäsche Logic Kant refers to the non-explicative nature of
representations: “[b]ut representation is not yet cognition, rather, cognition always
presupposes representation. And this latter [representation] cannot be explained at
all. For we would always have to explain what representation is by means of yet
another representation” (JL Ak. IX: 34).
Now, if all representations as such necessarily belong to the inner sense for
they are determinations of the mind, it is plain then all representations in general
are conditioned by time and stand also in relations of time, for time is the form of
the inner state (cf. A33-34/B50-51). We can illustrate this by observing our own
representations and we will find that one follows another in consciousness; i.e.,
their relation to one another is successive as time itself is. That all representations
belong to inner sense is what justifies then the priority of time over space as the
condition of all appearances. It also explains why Kant says time is the immediate
condition of inner intuition but the mediate condition of outer intuition, since the
relation of time to outer sense objects is derived from the relation of time to our
inner sense representations.

17
Our inner state refers to the way in which our representations affect us, and
if our inner state belongs under the condition of inner intuition it is because only
through a sensible inner intuition─the intuition of ourselves as the object of inner
sense─can we cognize our inner state, i.e., the affection representations have on us.
For what has been stated, it is plain then time is the form of the inner sense.
Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense (Die Zeit ist nichts anders,
als die Form des innern Sinnes), i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner
state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs
neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the
relation of representations in our inner state. (A33/B49-50)12
The Transcendental Aesthetic stresses the subjective formal constitution of
space and time. As anticipated above, Kant is clear here that space and time are not
something attached to the objects themselves: “[s]pace represents no property at all
of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other, i.e., no
determination of them that attaches to objects themselves” (A26/B42). Likewise:
“[t]ime is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an
objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective
conditions of the intuition of them” (A32/B49). Kant also makes plain that space
and time are not empirical concepts:
Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer
experiences (Der Raum ist kein empirischer Begriff, der von äußeren
Erfahrungen abgezogen worden). For in order for certain sensations to be
12

Likewise: “Time is certainly something real, namely the real form of inner intuition. It therefore
has subjective reality in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of time and of
my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded really not as object but as the way of
representing myself as object” (A37/B53-54).
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related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space
from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as
outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in
different places, the representation of space must already be their ground.
Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of
outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first
possible only through this representation. (A23/B38)
Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience.
For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if
the representation of time did not ground them a priori. Only under its
presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the
same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively). (A30/B46)
(Emphasis mine)
These statements supporting space and time as pure sensible forms, make
clear that all cognition of objects of the outer sense requires both forms to be
presupposed as their conditions of possibility. Without these subjective forms
nothing at all will be given in an organized way through the outer sense, and less
cognized as an object of cognition. From the outset then Kant makes evident his
modern way of philosophizing, since he establishes that things can only be cognized
insofar as they are conditioned by forms of the subject.13 This new─modern─way of
thinking was precisely what he intended to convey through his famous ‘Copernican
Revolution,’ when in the Preface to the B edition of the first Critique he proposed to
adapt or “subordinate” the information of the external world to the anticipations of
the mind following the modern scientific method, to evaluate if in this way the
problems of traditional metaphysics could be solved and thus metaphysics could
13

These forms are not only space and time but also the categories. As anticipated in footnote 9,
Chapter 2 deals with categories as intelligible forms.
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still be considered a science or, better, as “the mother of sciences” as Aristotle
upheld (cf. Bxvi).14
However, as our last citation openly states, these sensible forms are
presuppositions since we cannot justify their (ontological) validity in any way.
Years after the publication of the second edition of the first Critique, Kant makes
clear this incapacity to go further concerning the “knowledge” of forms in a letter to
Marcus Herz dated May 26th, 1789:
[W]e are absolutely unable to explain further how it is that a sensible
intuition (such as space and time), the form of our sensibility, or such
functions of the understanding as those out of which logic develops are
possible; nor can we explain why it is that one form agrees with another in
forming a possible cognition. (LMH1 Ak. XI: 51)
Summarizing then, by form Kant intends to convey what the mind
contributes to cognition; i.e., the conditions the mind brings into the cognitive
process. Insofar as these conditions are subjective forms they have to be necessarily
pure (rein), for they lie a priori in the mind and are not in the objects themselves;
they neither attach to objects as their properties nor subsist by themselves apart
from the subject. Forms are the relational structures in which appearances are to be
organized when intuited by us. This means that the mind represents the manifold of
sensible impressions not haphazardly but organized in spatio-temporal relations
14

The main part of passage of the B Preface is as follows:
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all
attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our
cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we
do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must
conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a
priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given
to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus. (Bxvi)
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that are made possible by the forms of space and time. It is in this sense then that
Kant says space and time are the forms of sensibility; and, more precisely, that space
and time are the conditions of the possibility of appearances (cf. A24/B39, cf.
A31/B46). Kant says:
It is therefore indubitably certain, and not merely possible or even probable,
that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner)
experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to
which therefore all objects are mere appearances and not things given for
themselves in this way. (A48-49/B66) (Emphasis mine)
1.3. The Pure Intuitions of Space and Time and their Relations
Now, besides considering space and time as sensible forms, Kant also states
that space and time are ‘pure intuitions’ (reine Anschauungen): “[b]ut space and
time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as
intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold) (Aber Raum und Zeit sind nicht
bloß als Formen der sinnlichen Anschauung, sondern als Anschauungen selbst (die
ein Mannigfaltiges enthalten)” (B160). “Space and time and all their parts are
intuitions, thus individual representations along with the manifold that they
contain in themselves” (B136n). Likewise: “[s]pace is not a discursive or, as is said,
general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition” (A24-25/B39)
and “the representation of time is itself an intuition” (A33/B50). Kant also points
out that intuitions contain relations (cf. A48-49/B66). The question then arises
about how are we to distinguish space and time as forms from space and time as
pure intuitions. The key concept here is that of manifold, as our citations already
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anticipate, since only intuitions─not forms─contain manifolds, which in this case
have to be necessarily a priori since space and time are pure intuitions.
That space and time are pure intuitions then means that each representation
of space and each representation of time is already a representation of one unique
space and a representation of one unique time since both─space and time as
intuitions─are in turn parts of a larger space and a larger time which are intuitions
as well. Kant says: “[I]f one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only
parts of one and the same unique space” (A25/B39). The same is for time.
“Different times are only parts of one and the same time” (A32/B47). Thus, the
manifolds of space and of time are necessarily composed of spaces and times, since
each space and each time is already enclosed in another larger space and another
larger time. This means then that the intuition of an object implies immediately the
limitation of (a) space and of (a) time: this limitation implies then the establishment
of a determinate space and of a determinate time which are both parts of a larger
space and time themselves. It implies also that space and time can be divided
infinitely. This explains why Kant says that space and time are quanta continua.
Kant points out:
The property of magnitudes on account of which no part of them is the
smallest (no part is simple) is called their continuity. Space and time are
quanta continua (continuous magnitudes), because no part of them can be
given except as enclosed between two boundaries (points or instants), thus
only in such a way that this part is again a space or a time. Space therefore
consists only of spaces, time of times. Points and instants are only
boundaries, i.e., mere places of their limitation; but places always presuppose
those intuitions that limit or determine them. (A169/B211)
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The idea underlying here is that the whole is prior to the parts; this is why
points and moments can be conceived only as boundaries of space and time,
respectively; which implies the establishment of determinate spaces and times. This
idea complements Kant’s conception of space and time as infinite given magnitudes,
since its (possible) representations are beyond measure. Space is represented as an
infinite given magnitude for it is represented as having an infinite set of
representations within it, insofar as all the parts of space are simultaneous (cf.
A25/B40). Time itself is also conceived as infinite: “[t]he infinitude of time signifies
nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible
through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation time
must therefore be given as unlimited” (A32/B47-48). Otherwise stated, space and
time are infinite given magnitudes insofar as we represent space as a homogeneous
manifold beyond all measure, and time as a sequence progressing to infinity. The
only way we can determine a determinate spatio-temporal region is by establishing
boundaries through points and moments.
Thus what Kant intends to convey is that each representation or intuition of
space and of time is already a determination of space and a determination of time
with their relational properties; otherwise stated, that all parts of space and all parts
of time stand in relation to one another. In other words, the pure manifolds of space
and of time consist of parts all of whose properties are relational. This means that
space and time are pure intuitions.
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Therefore, while the forms of space and time refer to the conditions of
possibility for objects of cognition, as pure intuitions space and time refer to the a
priori representations of spaces and of times which means that a specific spatiotemporal region is determined through intuition and that its properties are
relational, for they are necessarily in relation with other spaces and other times.
This distinction, however, did not come easy to Kant. In the Lectures on
Metaphysics he deals with the distinction constantly; even the first Critique conflates
space and time as intuitions and as forms frequently; they also appear as synonyms
at times. In the first Critique we find, for instance: “[t]his pure form of sensibility
itself is also called pure intuition” (A20/B34-35, cf. A21/B35, cf. A33/B49). In
almost all the passages where form and pure intuition are presented as synonyms,
pure intuition appears only as relations without manifoldness; e.g., “[t]he constant
form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the
relations within which objects can be intuited as outside us, and, if one abstracts
from these objects, it is a pure intuition” (A27/B43). Other times the distinction
seems to be only that pure intuition is the immediate representation of the form:
Now how can an outer intuition inhabit the mind that precedes the objects
themselves, and in which the concept of the latter [objects] can be
determined a priori? Obviously not otherwise than insofar as it has its seat
merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects
and thereby acquiring immediate representation, i.e., intuition of them,
thus only as the form of outer sense in general. (B41)
Likewise, sometimes Kant seems to conceive the a priori determinations of
sensible contents to be pure manifolds. However, upholding this would be a
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mistake. The a priori determinations of things given in space (and in time) are
known by the mind a priori since we definitely possess an a priori cognition as the
case of mathematics makes plain (cf. A87/B120); e.g., in geometry we exhibit a
priori the qualities or shapes of objects. For instance, when we think of a triangle we
think of it as having three angles.15 This ability the mind has to intuit a priori shapes
and to invent figures is what allows Kant to establish the a priori determinations
that all things given through the outer sense must have as possible objects of
experience. It also justifies the application of mathematics to experience (cf.
A160/B199). ‘Extension’ (Ausdehnung) and ‘shape’ (Gestalt) are the a priori
determinations of space. However, the possibility to take these a priori
determinations as the manifolds of pure intuitions could arise due to the wording
Kant uses in certain texts. Kant’s wording in the following two passages gives us an
example of how this confusion─that would lead to a mistake─is possible:
So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the
understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as
well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness,
color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely
extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a
priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation. (A2021/B35)
[S]pace concerns only the pure form of intuition, thus it includes no sensation
(nothing empirical) in itself, and all kinds and determinations of space can
15

Likewise, we know a priori that two times cannot be concurrent and that between two points there
is only a straight line (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 832): thus we can cognize properties of space and time a
priori. The same: “I can know a priori the properties of things, just as well as the objects of pure
intuition . . . for I can say something a priori about space without an object being there” (MM Ak. XXIX:
798).
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and even must be able to be represented a priori if concepts of shapes as well
as relations are to arise. (A29/B44)16
It is worth mentioning here a comment on extension since it refers to the
filling of space. What we know a priori─ when we represent to ourselves any shape
whatsoever─is that shapes fill space whenever a manifold of sensible impressions
is empirically given to us. Extension means that the thing is immediately present in
all points of the space in question (though not in all of space taken as an infinite
whole). Kant uses the expressions “to occupy a space” or “to fill a space” to convey
this idea (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 497).17 A priori we know that a manifold given in empirical
intuition has to occupy space. Everything given to us in empirical intuition de facto
fills (a) space; we perceive that things fill space, but it is through pure intuition that
we know this determination, i.e., extension or the filling of space by matter is known
a priori. Thus, the manifold of space as pure intuition is not composed of extension
and shape, but both are a priori determinations all objects of the outer sense must
have, and we can know this a priori in intuition.
Two clarifications are relevant concerning space and time at this point of our
discussion. Our statements have made clear by now that forms are more
16

Concerning space as pure intuition Kant says: “it [space] is the formal aspect of outer appearances,
and thus properties of space can be cognized a priori. This condition under which appearances are
possible is pure outer intuition” (MM Ak. XXIX: 831). In the same tone Kant upholds that “[s]pace and
time give us a priori cognitions prior to all experience” (MM Ak. XXIX: 832).
17

“Filling a space” is just a more specific determination of “occupying a space” (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 497).
The filling of space by matter is explained in the Metaphysical Foundations. A major idea is that
matter fills space not merely by existing but through moving forces, which are considered
fundamentally two: an attractive force and a repulsive force. For this explanation see the chapter
Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics in the Metaphysical Foundations (MAN Ak. IV: 496 ff.).
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fundamental than pure intuitions insofar as they precede intuitions for they lie ready
in the mind a priori.18 A second important point to consider about this distinction is
that pure intuitions are not conditions in the sense of forms, for all pure intuition has
to be related necessarily to a possible empirical intuition:
[E]ven if a pure intuition is possible a priori prior to the object, then even this
can acquire its object, thus its objective validity, only through empirical
intuition (wenn eine reine Anschauung noch vor dem Gegenstande a priori
möglich ist, so kann doch auch diese selbst ihren Gegenstand, mithin die
objektive Gültigkeit, nur durch die empirische Anschauung bekommen).
(A239/B298)
Thus, a pure intuition is necessarily related to a possible empirical intuition
which, as already stated, gives us the manifold of sensible impressions. It is from
this empirical intuition that pure intuition gets is objective validity. Even in
mathematics, where the construction of the concept is simultaneous with the a
priori presentation of the object,19 Kant makes plain that empirical intuition has
always to be capable of accompanying a priori intuition for the latter to have
objective validity or at least significance. Kant points out:
One need only take as an example the concepts of mathematics, and first,
indeed, in their pure intuitions. Space has three dimensions, between two
points there can be only one straight line, etc. Although all these principles,
and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself,
are generated in the mind completely a priori, they would still not signify
anything at all if we could not always exhibit their significance in
appearances (empirical objects). (A239-240/B299)

18

Other statements stress this point in a different way; e.g., “time is nothing other than the subjective
condition under which all intuitions can take place in us” (A33/B49).

19 See Chapter 2 for the explanation of the simultaneity in the construction of concepts and objects in
mathematics.
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Kant’s favorite way of illustrating this point is to argue that in order to
represent a line it is necessary to draw it: “[t]hus the mere form of outer sensible
intuition, space, is not yet cognition at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition a
priori for a possible cognition. But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a
line, I must draw it” (B137). This passage stresses that the manifold of pure
intuition correlates to a possible cognition. However, in order for cognition to be
actual, empirical intuition is required.
Now, concerning the relations in which all parts of time and space stand to
one another, the Transcendental Aesthetic mentions several times the expressions
“relations in space” (cf. A27/B43) and “relations of time” (B47); e.g., “all relations of
objects in space and time” (A42/B59, cf. A33-34/B50-51, cf. A24n/B38n). However,
in that section of the first Critique Kant does not explain clearly what spatial
relations are. It is in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, written in
between the two editions of the first Critique, that Kant deals with them. As already
indicated, relations in space refer to the different ways in which an object of the
outer sense or body can be in space, and how each determinate space relates to
another enlarged space of which it is a part. More precisely, these treat such issues
as how a body can be at rest or in motion in a space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 481), how
bodies can move without changing their place but changing their relation to external
space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 482), when the motion of the body is considered only in
relation to the space and when the body is considered in active relation to other
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bodies in the space of its motion (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 488), the different (possible)
relations between line(s) and direction(s) (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 495), as well as the
changes of relation with respect to the external space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 557),
etcetera.20
Now, concerning the relations in time, we recall here that insofar as time is
the form of inner sense it is the condition of possibility of appearances in general,
and that only under its presupposition are the representations of ‘succession’
(Sukzession) and ‘simultaneity’ (Zugleichsein) as temporal relations possible.
Insofar as time is the form of inner sense, Kant will attribute persistence to time.
Kant defines time itself─that represents time in general (cf. B225)─as that which
persists where ‘persistence’ (Beharrlichkeit) is existence at all times and, thus, refers
to something lasting (cf. A182/B225). Now, as time is (also) a pure intuition, this
persistence cannot be cognized in itself but only represented a priori.21 Kant makes
clear that time itself cannot be perceived by itself (cf. B225); indeed, neither time nor
space can be perceived in themselves (cf. A166/B207) for we cannot perceive empty
time and empty space: “a proof of empty space or of empty time can never be
drawn from experience (es kann aus der Erfahrung niemals ein Beweis vom leeren
20

The explanation of the relations in space is outside the topic of this dissertation. However, we have
mentioned some of its relevant subtopics to have an idea about what Kant is talking about. For a
detailed explanation of the relations in space see the Metaphysical Foundations. Likewise, in his early
essay Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space, Kant explains the
three-dimensional nature of space through the image of a subject placed inside three planes, and
distinguishing the three directions in space: above-below, right-left, front-back.

21 “I call all representations pure . . . in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation”
(A20/B34). Space and time are both necessary a priori representations (cf. A24/B38, A31/B46-47)
insofar as all empirical data presupposes the representations of space and time as pure intuitions.
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Raume oder einer leeren Zeit gezogen werden)” (A172/B214). However, as we can
have a pure representation of them since they are pure intuitions; it is clear then we
can think of empty time and empty space. As we can preview, thinking of empty
time is the same as representing persistence a priori.22
Thus, due to the nature of time itself, it will only be through appearances that
time can be perceived, for appearances are given to us in a simultaneous or in a
successive way; i.e., in time-relations. By contrast, objects of the outer sense can
appear to us insofar as they are necessarily in time (cf. B225 ff.). Thus, on the one
hand, if time were not presupposed appearances could not be given to us (in
temporal relations; i.e., successively or simultaneously). On the other hand, it is
through appearances that we can perceive time; i.e., cognize time empirically.
Therefore, the form of inner sense, time itself, requires objects of the outer sense to
be cognized as the substratum under which such objects can enter in relations of
time. Kant says:
Now time cannot be perceived by itself. Consequently it is in the objects of
perception, i.e., the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered
that represents time in general and in which all change or simultaneity can
be perceived in apprehension through the relation of the appearances to it.
(B225)
Thus, time itself as the form of inner sense is the substratum insofar as it
lasts and does not change (cf. A182/B225 ff.), and allows the possibility of things to
enter into temporal relations. Time itself allows the representation of all relations in

22

Just to avoid confusion, empty time is time itself, i.e., time as the form of inner sense.
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time as its own determinations insofar as it is the substratum that persists. “The
time, therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does
not change; since it is that in which succession and simultaneity can be represented
only as determinations of it” (B225). ‘Succession’ (Sukzession) and ‘simultaneity’
(Zugleichsein) are then the determinations of time: more precisely, they are the only
relations in time (cf. 182-183/B226). Succession accounts for the existence of
appearances in time as a time-series, and simultaneity accounts for their existence in
time as a time-domain23 which refers to the existence of a body or object as part of a
whole, for only as parts of a whole in space can things be simultaneous in time (cf.
B225). However, it is important to stress that these relations are the ways in which
appearances are connected in time but not modi of time itself. Kant makes this clear
when he says:
For change does not affect time itself, but only the appearances in time (just
as simultaneity is not a modus for time itself, in which no parts are
simultaneous but rather all succeed one another). If one were to ascribe such
a succession to time itself one would have to think yet another time in which
this succession would be possible. (A183/B226)
Thus, time itself allows the possibility of appearances to enter into temporal
relations, since it persists and has succession and simultaneity as its own
determinations; however, we need appearances to actualize the relations and thus
to cognize time empirically.

23 This point is upheld in a footnote to B225 preceded by the letter d in the First Analogy in the
section of the Analogies of Experience in the B edition of the first Critique.
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Two final comments concerning the manifold of time seem unavoidable.
First, we have stated that the manifold of time is composed by times, insofar as all
time is necessarily enclosed in a larger time. However, since the ‘I’ is the object of
the inner sense (cf. A443/B471), wouldn’t the manifold of time also be composed of
the representations, feelings and affections of the self? This question is absolutely
valid, mostly since Kant considers inner sense to be constituted by the sum of all our
representations (cf. A177/B220). Kant would answer us in this way: such a
manifold; i.e., that of time concerning the self in inner sense, can only be an empirical
manifold; not an a priori one. This answer is satisfactory. Kant could remind us
that: “[t]ime, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the
connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition”
(A138/B177). He could also remind us that the ‘I’ is really only the transcendental
subject and that nothing can be predicated of ourselves conceived as souls beyond
saying that the soul is the organ of the inner sense (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161).24
This second point, however, is less convincing, mostly when we find
statements that uphold the total certitude of the ‘I’. For instance, “[t]he first thing
that is entirely certain is this: that I am; I feel myself, I know for certain that I am;
but with just such certainty I do not know that other beings are outside me”(ML1 Ak.
XXVIII: 206). Likewise, “[t]he reliability of inner sense is certain. I am, I feel that
and intuit myself immediately. This proposition thus has a reliability of experience.

24 See Chapter 4 for the explanation of the ‘I’ and its conception as transcendental subject, and the
chapter on The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first Critique for Kant’s conception of the soul.
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But that something is outside me, of that the senses can provide no reliability” (ML1
Ak. XXVIII: 206-207). Again, this could only convey an empirical manifold, but
maintaining the certitude of our self and of our inner states inevitably poses a
problem that Kant deals with only with difficulty. Even after having written the first
Critique we find statements like this one: “[t]he first original experience is: I am”
(ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 590).
In his pre-critical period Kant seemed to give more priority to the certitude
provided by the inner sense than to that of the outer sense. However, as his
thinking progressed, the certitude of the ‘I’ decreased until Kant finished upholding
that the outer sense was required for the cognition of ourselves.25 We think it is
possible that this progress came to be linked to the fact that the experience of
ourselves in time presupposes the experience of objects of the outer sense.
However, it is our impression that it was not until Kant wrote the chapter on The
Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first Critique that he took a final decision
concerning the problem of the priority between outer and inner senses. In the
Paralogisms Kant takes this discussion to its end by saying that everything in the
soul is in constant flux; this statement fits well with the conception of the manifold of
time composed by times succeeding one another. In a fundamental passage Kant
says:
[T]he appearance before outer sense has something standing and abiding in
it, which supplies a substratum grounding the transitory determinations . . .
25

See Chapter 4 for Kant’s conception of the ‘I’ to have a better comprehension of this problem.
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whereas time, which is the only form of our inner intuition, has in it nothing
abiding, and hence gives cognition only of a change of determinations, but
not of the determinable object. For in that which we call the soul, everything is
in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding. (A381) (Emphases mine)26
Second, the question about the manifold of time concerning of outer sense
also arises in us. Kant could have eventually considered this question unnecessary
due to time’s nature as a subjective form and a pure intuition, which implies that
only when the mind enters into contact with the external world do time and the
objects of the outer sense relate to one another. Another possibility for not raising
the question, however, is that Kant could have answered the same way as in the
previous point; i.e., that since impenetrability and motion are empirical
characteristics of matter, the manifold in question could only be an empirical
manifold. Finally, we think there is another possibility for not posing the question,
and it concerns our incapacity to account for how we relate to objects of the outer
senses. Kant says openly there is no way to explain how outer intuition is possible in
us, which makes evident there is a gap in cognition. The passage is as follows:
How is outer intuition─
─namely, that of space (the filling of it by shape and
motion)─possible at all in a thinking subject? But it is not possible for
any human being to find an answer to this question, and no one will ever fill
this gap in our knowledge, but rather only indicate it, by ascribing outer
appearances to a transcendental object that is the cause of this species of
representations, with which cause, however, we have no acquaintance at all,
nor will we ever get a concept of it. (A393).27

26

In another section of the first Critique we find statements in the same tone: “I can, to be sure, say:
my representations succeed one another; but that only means that we are conscious of them as in a
temporal sequence, i.e., according to the form of inner sense” (A37n/B54n).
27

See Chapter 4 for the explanation of the transcendental object.
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1.4. The Material Substratum: The Substance and its Accidents
Kant recognizes also a material substratum supporting the persistence of
substances (cf. B225). This substratum is presented as the counterpart and
complement of time─which can be considered a subjective substratum─in the
external world, insofar as both substrata need each other, for while time itself allows
the possibility of things to enter into temporal relations, there has to be something
material; i.e., something substantial, so that the relation in time is really possible,
and thus actual in existence.
We agree in general with Paul Guyer that the permanence of time requires
something permanent among appearances or empirical objects to represent it (cf.
Guyer 1987, 219). Guyer says: “[t]here must be permanence in what is actually
perceived – empirical objects – because the permanence of time itself is
imperceivable and needs to be represented by something which is both perceivable
and permanent” (Guyer 1987, 219).28 Where we do not agree with Guyer is in his
statement that the material substratum has to be inferred from the substratum of
time itself (cf. Guyer 1987, 217), for Kant does not question the existence of an
external world apart from the mind; he even at different points of his thought
considers the regularity of the external world serves and/or guides the mental
cognitive process. What could be said in this sense is that Kant assumes there is

28

We also agree with Guyer that Kant’s argument here has nothing to do with the measurement of
the duration of specific objects or events in time, as some uphold, but concerns only the permanent
duration of time itself (cf. Guyer 1987, 218).
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regularity in the empirical data of experience.29 It is our position that both
substrata complement each other; in this sense it is not so much a question of
“representation,” i.e., of the need of time to be represented so that it can be
perceived, as Guyer considers, that is at stake here, but rather it is fundamentally a
question of “making possible temporal relations” and “having something material
that can enter into those relations.” Both substrata are persistent and complement
each other.
It is precisely when explaining time that substances are introduced in the
first Critique, by using the term ‘however’ to mark the contrast to time. Kant says:
However, the substratum of everything real, i.e., everything that belongs to
the existence of things, is substance, of which everything that belongs to
existence can be thought only as a determination. Consequently that which
persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can
be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the
appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same
(Es ist aber das Substrat alles Realen, d.i. sur Existenz der Dinge Gehörigen, die
Substanz, an welcher alles, was zum Dasein gehört, nur als Bestimmung kann
gedacht werden. Folglich ist das Beharrliche, womit in Verhältnis alle
Zeitverhältnisse der Erscheinungen allein bestimmt werden können, die
Substanz in der Erscheinung, d.i. das Reale derselben, was als Substrat alles
Wechsels immer dasselbe bleibt). (B225)
Here Kant makes clear that there is a material substratum; he calls it
‘substance’ (Substanz) and says it is “the real in the appearance” or “substance in the
appearance.” This way of presenting substance is relevant since he wants to convey
the idea that the substratum is in the appearance, that it persists in the appearance.
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Concerning the regularity in the external world, see in this dissertation the synthesis of
reproduction, as well as the explanation of causality on purpose of the distinction between
judgments of perception and judgments of experience; both in Chapter 3.
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In other words, that substance is what is real in the appearance, but that it is not the
appearance as such. This subtle distinction is introduced to show that the ultimate
material element in the appearance always persists and never changes, and that it is
precisely this material element in the appearance that affects us, and that
corresponds to sensation.
The distinction goes further since, even if substance is in the appearance, we
do not perceive the substance as such, but only the appearance. This is why the
passage also makes clear that we cannot predicate existence of the substance; but
only of its determinations, which are appearances. This does not mean that the
material object is just a rational postulate, because for Kant it is something real; it
means that it can neither be cognized nor perceived in itself; i.e., as mere
substratum, but that it is in the appearances that are its determinations, and that it
ultimately affects us.30
Substances then are the material elements that ground perceptual objects or
appearances, and that persist whatever modification or change these objects
undergo. Thus, as substrata, substances always persist and suffer no change. This is
why Kant says “as the substratum of all change always remains the same.”
Kant’s point is then that in all that exists, in all appearances as objects of the
outer sense, there is something that always persists: “in all appearances there is
30

We could use a small ‘x’ to account for the substance in each appearance, since the upper case ‘X’ is
the transcendental object for Kant, and thus accounts for all substances ultimately. By contrast, we
can use a small ‘x’ to account for the material element in each object of the outer sense. We could
then call this substance in the appearance the ‘x’ in the appearance. For the explanation of the
transcendental object see the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept in Chapter 4.
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something that persists” (A184/B227). This “something that persists” is their
material substratum: “in all appearances that which persists is the object itself, i.e.,
the substance (A183/B227). By the object itself or substance Kant wants to convey
the persistence of matter (cf. A185/B228) that ultimately lies in or subsists in all
objects of the outer sense as their material ground.
Likewise, in between the two editions of the first Critique Kant reinforces
certain points; e.g., “[t]he appearance of a substance is not the substance itself, and
what is valid for it is not valid for the latter” (MM Ak. XXIX: 827).31 In the same
sense he states that: “[s]ince the substances by definition <ex definitione> are privy
to outer existence for themselves, one can remove all relation and the substances
remain” (MM Ak. XXIX: 827), and “[i]n appearance, substance is what remains there
while the determinations change” (MM Ak. XXIX: 826). This is stated similarly in the
first Critique: “in all appearances there is something that persists, of which that
which changes is nothing but the determinations of its existence” (A184/B227). In
this work Kant also speaks of “the everlasting existence of the proper subject of the
appearances” (A185/B228).
It is plain for what has been explained until here, that substance is not time
itself, but the correlate of time itself in existence, or that which persists in what exists.
This is why Kant says: “[s]ubstance is therefore also called the substrate

31

Kant will specify that substances are thought through the understanding (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 828) in
contradistinction with appearances that we already know are given to us in empirical intuition and
are objects of perception. For the explanation of the categories see Chapter 2 that accounts on how
substances are thought through the understanding.
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<substratum> of appearances” (MM Ak. XXIX: 769). Both─time itself and
substance─are then substrata and, as such, remain always the same through all
change, and are not directly perceivable as such. Kant claims: “To time, therefore,
which is itself unchangeable and lasting, there corresponds in appearance that
which is unchangeable in existence, i.e., substance, and in it alone can the succession
and simultaneity of appearances be determined in regard to time” (A144/B183).
The question arises about the reason Kant calls the material substrata substances
since the concept ‘substance’ is basically a pure concept of the understanding. Why
then does Kant use a fundamental concept of the understanding to refer to matter?32
In the chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics in the
Metaphysical Foundations, Kant gives us the answer:
The concept of a substance means the ultimate subject of existence, that is,
that which does not itself belong in turn to the existence of another merely as
a predicate. Now matter is the subject of everything that may be counted in
space as belonging to the existence of things. For, aside from matter, no other
subject would be thinkable except space itself, which, however, is a concept
that contains nothing existent at all, but merely the necessary conditions for
the external relations of possible objects of the outer senses. Thus matter, as
the movable in space, is the substance therein. (MAN Ak. IV: 503)
That the concept ‘substance’ (Substanz) refers to the ultimate subject of
existence; i.e., to that which can only be a subject and not a predicate, is a leitmotiv
in Kant’s philosophy. Kant reminds us of this traditional idea since now he intends
to convey that substances are the ultimate subjects of matter. He is then saying that
there is something also in matter which is to be considered as a ground insofar as it
32

See Chapter 2 for the explanation of the pure concepts of the understanding or categories.
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cannot be predicated of anything else, but of which it is definitely possible to
predicate something in turn. This explains the usage of the concept substance to
refer also to the material elements that ground the empirical objects or appearances
we perceive. The “ultimate subject of existence” is thus substance.
In the Metaphysical Foundations Kant upholds that substances as material
elements are to be conceived as composite and not as simple. He states that matter
is impenetrable and infinitely divisible, and that each part of matter is itself a
substance because we can say of these parts that they are subjects as well, and not
merely predicates of another matter. The only condition Kant attaches to these
parts of matter, that are themselves matter and substances, is that they must be
movable in themselves (cf. MAN. Ak. IV: 503 ff.)33 Even if the composite nature of
matter may fit well with the fact that it is a manifold or a multiplicity that is given in
empirical intuition, prima facie it is difficult to account for substances as ultimate
subjects. However, Kant solves this problem by stating that we cannot cognize the
substance itself except through its accidents, and that accidents inhere in the
substance.
As already mentioned, what belongs to the existence of things refers to the
determinations of the substance. Thus, what we find in existence are all
determinations of substances, not substances as such. These determinations are
33

It is worth noting, however, that Kant dealt for a long time with this issue, as the Lectures on
Metaphysics make plain. Shortly after the first edition of the first Critique, he stated also that
substances were simple material elements (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 828, MM Ak. XXIX: 827). The Lectures on
Metaphysics reflect, however, that Kant was trying to conceive a conception of substances as material
elements that could be distinguished from Leibniz’s monads and from material atoms as well.
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then the ways in which the substance exists. In traditional fashion, Kant calls these
determinations ‘accidents’ (Accidenzen): “The determinations of a substance that are
nothing other than particular ways for it to exist are called accidents”
(A186/B229). Likewise, “[a]ccidents are mere modes <modi> of the existence of
substance and these cannot be apart from the substance” (MM Ak. XXIX: 769).
However, accidents must not be understood as something separated from the
substance or just attached to it, for they inhere in it. This means that a substance has
a relation of inherence with its properties or determinations which are expressed
through predicates in judgments; that the accidents are the ways in which the
substance exists or expresses itself in appearances. Kant says: “In regard to
substance, however, they [accidents] are not really subordinated to it, but are rather
the way substance itself exists” (A414/B441). The accidents of a substance all have
to be coordinated among them: “accidents (insofar as they inhere in a single
substance) are coordinated with one another, and do not constitute a series”
(A414/B441). This means then that all the properties of a thing have to be
coordinated among themselves and not only each one to the thing they belong to;
otherwise stated, all the (possible) ways in which a substance exists have to be
related to one another, for each substance is to be understood as a unity (cf. MM Ak.
XXIX: 822). This is why Kant says this coordination cannot constitute a series, for an
accident cannot posit another accident in the same substance. Accidents then are
the properties of things as belonging to things as such. It is through their properties
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that things are cognized. We can understand now why Kant states that: “we cognize
nothing but accidents. For our understanding cognizes everything through
predicates; we never cognize that which underlies the predicate” (MM Ak. XXIX:
771). Likewise, it is clear that substances cannot be accidents in turn, for then they
would not be substances. Kant is clear on this point: “That which exists without
being the determination of another is substance; that which exists only as
determination is accident” (MM Ak. XXIX: 770).34 Thus, accidents refer to the way in
which a substance is made knowable to us; i.e. to how the substance exists.
The concept of ‘inherence’ is introduced to make clear that a substance can
only be cognized through its properties or predicates. In the following passage Kant
explains what he intends to convey by inherence:
With the expression inherence one imagines the substance carrying the
accidents, as if they were mere separate existences, but requiring a basis;
however that is simply a sheer misuse of speech; they are simply manners in
which things exist. – Insofar as a thing is determined positively, accidents
<accidentia> inhere in it; insofar as it is negatively determined, they do not
inhere in it. They do not exist for themselves and are not merely supported
by the substance like a book in a bookcase. (MM Ak. XXIX: 769 -770)
The passage adds a new idea: even if accidents belong to the substance, this
belonging or inherence is due to the positive determination in a thing. This idea also
appears in the first Critique since Kant states that accidents refer to the ways in
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Likewise, in judgments the relation of substance–accident will be represented as that of ‘subjectpredicate.’ This is why Kant explains at times the two topics in an interrelated way or through
analogies. For instance: “[t]hat which cannot exist otherwise than as subject is substance, what
cannot exist otherwise than as predicate is accident” (MM Ak. XXIX: 769). The verbal distinction,
however, responds to a double level: while substance-accident accounts for the objective level of
experience, subject-predicate accounts for the logical level.
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which the substance is positively determined (cf. A187/B230). What are we to
understand by this positive determination then?
1.5. The Reciprocal Causality of Substances: Interaction of Substances
The positive determination of a thing refers to what Kant calls “the causality
of a substance” (cf. A648/B676, cf. B111, cf. A203/B248 ff.). This means that
substances cause the way in which other substances exist; i.e., that substances posit
the accidents of other substances. Kant says: “[c]ausality <causalitas> is the
property of a substance insofar as it is considered as a cause of an accident
<accidentis>” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 565).
Thus, causality is attributed to a substance insofar as it is considered as the
cause of an accident in another substance. This explains why Kant understands the
causality of a substance as ‘power’ (Kraft) (cf. A648/B676). Power accounts for the
action of substances through which substances determine the ways of existence of
other substances (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 823). Since substances are movable in
themselves, they cause determinations in other substances by their action. We can
understand why then “[p]ower is merely the relation of the substance to the
accident, no thing in itself” (MD Ak. XXVIII: 671).
Thus by acting, the substance posits accidents and shows it is power. “Action
is the determination of the power of a substance as a cause of a certain accident
<accidentis>” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 564-565). A passage written three or four years after
the B edition of the first Critique summarizes well these ideas:
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The concept of cause lies in the concept of power. The substance is
considered as subject, and the latter as cause. Accident is therefore
something real because it exists by inhering <inhaerendo> and not for itself.
Causality is the determination of something else, by which it is posited
according to general rules.35 The concept of the relation <respectus> or of the
relation of the substance to the existence of accidents, insofar as it contains
their grounds, is power. (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 564)
This action is considered the empirical criterion of the substance (cf.
A204/B249) for by it accidents are posited. “Action already signifies the relation of
the subject of causality to the effect” (A205/B250). Action proves substantiality
insofar as the subject of action itself cannot change. Otherwise, another subject
would be required to determine change (cf. A205/B250). Kant says: “action, as a
sufficient empirical criterion, proves substantiality without it being necessary for
me first to seek out its persistence through compared perceptions . . . the primary
subject of the causality of all arising and perishing cannot itself arise and perish (in
the field of appearances)” (A205/B250-251). Thus, in experience action serves as a
35

By general rules Kant means laws of nature, the most general of which is the rule that all events are
causally concatenated. Laws of nature, however, are determined by the understanding; what the
external world exhibits is regularity and/or certain patterns to perception. Kant intends to show in
certain parts of his thought that both processes can be equated or considered as following similar
patterns to a certain extent. This is due precisely to the relationship mind – external world, where
the former determines the latter, but the latter indicates the former. See for instance this interesting
passage:
The law of nature that everything that happens has a cause, that since the causality of this
cause, i.e., the action, precedes in time and in respect of an effect that has arisen cannot
have been always but must have happened, and so must also have had its cause among
appearances, through which it is determined, and consequently that all occurrences are
empirically determined in a natural order – this law, through which alone appearances can
first constitute one nature and furnish objects of one experience, is a law of the
understanding, from which under no pretext can any departure be allowed or any
appearance be exempted; because otherwise one would put this appearance outside of all
possible experience, thereby distinguishing it from all objects of possible experience and
making it into a mere thought-entity and a figment of the brain. (A542-543/B570-571)
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sort of proof that the substantial persists through all change; these changes, like
arising and perishing, can only be proper to appearances or accidents but not to the
substance itself.
Now, the causality of the substance is to be understood as interaction.
‘Interaction’ (Wechselwirkung) is the mutual causality among substances; it is the
relation each substance has with all other substances insofar as they constitute a
whole. The ‘whole’ (Ganze) implies interaction: reciprocal connection is the
condition of the whole (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 852; ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 212).
Since his pre-critical period Kant conceives interaction as reciprocal
causality: “this is interaction <commercium>, where the state of the one depends
upon the state of the other, where one determines the other and is again determined
by it” (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 212). However, it is in the first Critique where the interaction
or community of substances is fully conceived. There Kant says:
[T]he relation of substances in which the one contains determinations the
ground of which is contained in the other is the relation of influence, and if
the latter reciprocally contains the ground of the determinations of the
former, it is the relation of community or interaction (und, wenn wechselseitig
dieses den Grund der Bestimmungen in dem anderen enthält, das Verhältnis der
Gemeinschaft oder Wechserlwirkung). (B257-258)
Thus each substance (since it can be a consequence only with regard to its
determinations) must simultaneously contain the causality of certain
determinations in the other and the effects of the causality of the other (Also
muß jede Substanz (da sie nur in Ansehung ihrer Bestimmungen Folge sein
kann) die Kausalität gewisser Bestimmungen in der andern, und zugleich die
Wirkungen von der Kausalität der andern in sich enthalten). (A212/B259)36

36

Likewise: “Interaction <commercium> is reciprocal influence <influxus mutuus>, for how else is the
interaction <commercium> of different substances possible than by one determining something in
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Thus, ‘influence’ (Einfluß) is not interaction or community since interaction
implies mutual influence. Kant makes this clear when he says “influence, i.e., how
one substance can be the cause of something in another substance” (B111), but
“community is the causality of a substance in the reciprocal determination of
others” (B111). Interaction then is the causal action of one substance on another
with the latter acting on the former as well. More precisely, it is the relation all
substances have with one another in which they are causes and effects of all others.
To explain this let us imagine we have a whole composed of three
substances─A, B, C─and that each has respectively, the properties e, f, g. Thus, A is
e, and B is f, and C is g. These are three substances with their own determinations or
properties. How the properties exist as accidents has already been explained. What
Kant is saying now is that A is e because B is f and because C is g. Likewise, B is f
because A is e, and because C is g. Finally, C is g because A is e and because B is f.
That is to say, each of the substances causes the determinations the other
substances have. This might seem to imply that it would be correct to say, for
example, that the sun is round because the lake is blue and the bird is flying; that the
lake is blue because the sun is round and because the bird is flying; and that the bird
is flying because the sun is round and because the lake is blue. Obviously, however,
this is not the case. The problem with the example is that it overlooks the vastly

the other, for the substances have an effect in each other, e.g., with a body all parts are in interaction
<commercio>; what is not in interaction <commercio> does not belong to it” (MM Ak. XXIX: 827).
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larger class of simultaneous states to which the shape of the sun, the color of the
lake, and the flight of the bird belong. One of the tasks of empirical science is to
strive to provide a maximal understanding of reciprocal causality, but this can only
be, for us, a regulative ideal. However, it is also necessary for us to posit reciprocal
causality, because this is the only way we can explain how things exist
simultaneously in time: “the simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognized
in experience otherwise than under the presupposition of an interaction among
them” (B258).
The intention here is to understand the co-existence of things but not in the
sense of a mere aggregate, i.e., as mere plurality of things in space (cf. A414/B441),
but rather in the sense of the coexistence of things in time; i.e., it is a simultaneity in
space and time. Kant says: “Things are simultaneous if in empirical intuition the
perception of one can follow the perception of the other reciprocally” (B256-257).
Likewise: “simultaneity is the existence of the manifold at the same time” (B257).
Finally, “[t]hings are simultaneous insofar as they exist at one and the same time”
(A211/B258). Going back to our example, this is how we can explain the fact that
we can perceive at the same time that the sun is round, that the lake is blue, and that
a bird is flying.
Kant is here evidently trying to justify the unity of perception, but also the
unity of our experience of an objective world, for he claims that thoroughgoing
interaction must hold among everything that comprises a single world. By ‘world’
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(Welt) he is thinking in the world-whole which is the only whole which is not part of
another (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 852). “The world is a whole of substances, which are in
reciprocal connection” (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 211). Kant claims:
An aggregate is still not a whole; here only many things <plura> that stand in
no reciprocal connection are thought. The difference of the world from every
other composite <composito> is: that the world is a substantial whole which
is not a part of another <totum substantiale, quod non est pars alterius>. (ML1
Ak. XXVIII: 196)
Kant wants to deny the possibility of there being more than one world; this is
why as his ideas progress he tends to use the concept of ‘whole’ as a synonym of
‘world’, and refers to ‘composite’, ‘aggregate’ or ‘multitude’ for apparent wholes
where no interaction exists. Likewise, his conception of the mutual causality of
substances constituting a whole makes it necessary for him to postulate the finitude
of substances; otherwise, they could not constitute a whole (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 852).
1.6. The Alteration of Substances and the Unity of Time
A second argument for the persistence of substance is introduced by Kant by
maintaining that substances never change but only alter in their states. The concept
‘state’ (Zustand) is used as a synonym of a determination or property of the
substance. As we have already seen, only the accidents of the substance change (cf.
A183-184/B227).
‘Alteration’ (Veränderung) means the combination of contradictorily
opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing (cf. B291). More
precisely, “[a]lteration is a way of existing that succeeds another way of existing of
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the very same object. Hence everything that is altered is lasting, and only its state
changes” (A187/B230). Kant says: “only what persists (the substance) is altered,
while that which is changeable (das Wandelbare) does not suffer any alteration but
rather a change, since some determinations cease and others begin” (A187/B230231).
Thus, the opposition of ‘alteration’ (Veränderung) to ‘change’ (Wechsel)
corresponds to the opposition of the substance that persists (neither arises nor
perishes) to the accidents that change (arise and perish), respectively (cf.
A186/B229, B233, cf. A187-188/B230-231).37 The key point here is, however, the
concept of ‘opposed determinations.’ Kant says: “the concept of alteration
presupposes one and the same subject as existing with two opposed determinations,
and thus as persisting” (B232-233). We can say then that while the substance of
water never changes, its freezing and melting are two opposed determinations, and
when it passes from one to the other the substance has been altered. It is plain then
that two opposed determinations cannot belong to the substance at the same time,
but they have to be successive in time. Kant says that only in time; i.e., successively,
can contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered.
The question then is how alteration occurs, and whether the succession in
time has a major role here or is merely a secondary issue. Kant explains how
alteration occurs in the Second Analogy of Experience:

37

“Origin from nothing <ortus ex nihilo> is the origin of substance” (MM Ak. XXIX: 826).
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The question therefore arises, how a thing passes from one state = a into
another one = b. Between two instants there is always a time, and between
two states in those instances there is always a difference that has a
magnitude (for all parts of appearances are always in turn magnitudes).
Thus every transition from one state into another happens in a time that is
contained between two instants, of which the former determines the state
from which the thing proceeds and the second the state at which it arrives.
(A208/B253)38
This passage by itself does not shed sufficient light on what Kant intends to
convey. However, shortly after he adds this:
That is, now, the law of the continuity of all alteration, the ground of which is
this: That neither time nor appearance in time consists of smallest parts, and
that nevertheless in its alteration the state of the thing passes through all
these parts, as elements, to its second state. No difference of the real in
appearance is the smallest, just as no difference in the magnitude of times is,
and thus the new state of reality grows out of the first, in which it did not
exist, thorough all the infinite degrees of reality, the differences between
which are all smaller than that between 0 and a. (A209/B254)
The text then says that there is continuity in all alteration; we know already
that time is a continuous magnitude, and thus that we can divide every time into
smaller times. Now, the passage just quoted states that the case is the same for
substances; this is what Kant means by “no difference of the real in appearance is
the smallest.” This means then that the substance itself also persists through the
alteration. However, at the same time, Kant says that nevertheless in its alteration
the substance passes through infinite degrees of reality; i.e., through infinite degrees
of being in time, where none of them however persists; this is why he says that the
difference is smaller than before the substance began its alteration and zero, for
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See MM Ak. XXIX: 863 - 864 for a similar answer to this question.
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zero will imply the negation of a being in time. Thus, what Kant is intending to
convey is that through its alteration the substance passes through infinite degrees of
reality none of which persists, but that the quantum of the substance is maintained
during all of the alteration.
A first observation then is that the quantum of the substance does not change
through its alteration, for the substance itself always persists; this is explicitly stated
by Kant when he says “[s]ince this [the substance in the appearance or the real in
the appearance] . . . cannot change in existence, its quantum in nature can also be
neither increased nor diminished” (cf. B225). Thus Kant is trying to convey the idea
that through alteration the quantum of the substance is always the same, even if
through the passage of one state to another the substance is altered; e.g. during the
freezing of water─the change from its liquid state to its solid state─the appearance
passes through an infinite number of intermediate states.
The explanation of the alteration of the substance has a second aim, since it
serves Kant to support additionally the persistence of time. Otherwise, the reality of
the quantum of the substance could not have persisted through all of the time in
which it changed from one state to another. Thus, through the alteration of
substances we perceive the unity of time. Kant uses here a double argument since,
on the one hand, the persistence of time explains how the reality of the quantum of
the substance stays the same throughout its alteration, while, on the other hand, the
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alteration of the substance reveals the unity of time; i.e., “the identity of the
substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity” (A186/B229).

CHAPTER II
CONCEPT FORMATION THROUGH THE UNDERSTANDING
2.1. On Concepts in General and on Empirical Concepts in Particular
2.1.1. The Understanding: The Faculty for Thinking Objects through Concepts
Our previous chapter explained how cognition requires the faculty of
sensibility; more precisely, how space and time function as a priori conditions for
the receptivity of sensible impressions. However, it is clear as well that cognition
cannot arise from sensibility alone, since, as such, the sensible faculty is unable to
produce a concept for the intuited manifold. Empirical cognition is always
dependent on the senses, but even if the forms of space and time determine a priori
all possible relations for the multiplicity of sensible impressions, no object of
cognition, properly speaking, can be determined until the mind gives unity to these
sensorial impressions that appear in certain relations. This unity is represented in a
concept. Sensibility therefore has necessarily to act in a conjoint─and
simultaneous─way with another faculty that produces the concept for the object, so
that an object of cognition can be (totally) determined through its relation to
consciousness.1

1

This chapter will introduce us to the relation to consciousness; Chapter 4 will explain it.
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Thus, the concept correlates with the object, and the faculty whose role is to
produce the concept is called by Kant ‘understanding’ (Verstand). Understanding is
the faculty that thinks objects: “[t]he faculty for thinking of objects of sensible
intuition . . . is the understanding” (A51/B75). Kant stresses that we think through
concepts. “Thinking is cognition through concepts” (A69/B94).2 Thus, thinking is to
be understood as the activity of the mind that produces concepts for objects or for
the intuited manifold. Cognition then is the conjoint activity of sensibility and
understanding, or of intuitions and concepts which are the two fundamental kinds
of representations for Kant. Kant points out:
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of
which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions),
the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these
representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is
given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation
(as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore
constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without
intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts
can yield a cognition. (A50-51/B74-75)
If Kant speaks here of ‘spontaneity’ (Spontaneität) it is precisely because the
mind has the capacity to produce a concept for the manifold of intuition; the act of
thinking is this spontaneous activity through which concepts originate in the
understanding. More specifically, the receptivity of the mind is immediately
accompanied by the activity of thinking; this means that when I think the manifold

2

In the Logic: “Cognition through concepts is called thinking (cognitio discursiva)” (L Ak. IX: 91) and
in the Jäsche Logic: “Cognition through concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva)” (JL Ak. IX: 91).
It is worth noting here that Kant sometimes identifies ‘thinking’ and ‘understanding;’ e.g.,
“understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive” (A68/B93).
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of intuition, it already appears in consciousness in a unified way; i.e., that the
relations in which the intuited manifold is given to us are united as being ordered
(in some way) in a concept and, at the same time, united to one consciousness.3 The
concept represents the unity of the manifold given in intuition, which implies that
intuitions must be brought under concepts. Kant is clear about the need of both
faculties for cognition, as well as the need of their conjoint action:
Neither of these properties [sensibility and understanding] is to be preferred
to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without
understanding none would be thought (Keine dieser Eigenschaften ist der
andern vorzuziehen. Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben,
und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden). Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is just as necessary to make
the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is
to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts).
Further these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions.
The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are
not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition
arise (Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen , und die Sinne nichts zu
denken. Nur daraus, daß sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntnis entspringen).
(A51-52/B75-76)
2.1.2. Forming Empirical Concepts through Reflection
The question now is how the mind produces the concept. How do concepts
arise? This question is then followed by another that requires us to explain what
kinds of concepts could be produced, since even to common understanding it is
plain that the concept ‘chair’ and the concept ‘God’ must be of a different kind. Let

3

See Chapter 4 for the explanation on consciousness.
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us first focus on the origin of concepts.4 However, to understand this it is necessary
first to define concepts.
Kant defines a concept as a universal representation or as a representation of
what is common to several objects: “[a] concept is . . . a universal representation, or
a representation of what is common to several objects, hence a representation
insofar as it can be contained in various ones” (JL Ak. IX: 91n). He also defines a
concept by saying that “a concept [is] a universal (repraesentatio per notas
communes) or reflected (reflectirte) representation (repraesentatio discursiva)” (JL
Ak. IX: 91). Concepts then imply a generalization of common marks and reflection.
In addition, concepts have matter and form, the former being the object and the
latter its universality. “With every concept we are to distinguish matter and form.
The matter of concepts is the object; their form is universality” (JL Ak. IX: 91). The
form of the concept is then its generality or universality; i.e., what accounts for the
common marks of various manifolds that are subsumed under a determinate
concept.
These definitions make clear that the main point here is the nature of
concepts as universal representations, and the fact that this universality is their
form. So, to account for the origin of concepts, we have then to understand how this
universality is produced and why it is the form of concepts. This places us directly
in Kant’s logic, since General Logic is what accounts for the form of concepts insofar

4

The second question will be answered through this chapter.

56
as its task is to account for concepts (and judgments and syllogisms) abstracting
from all of their content. Concerning the origin of concepts Kant says: “[t]his logical
origin of concepts─the origin as to their mere form─consists in reflection,
whereby a representation common to several objects (conceptus communis) arises”
(JL Ak. IX: 94). Kant says:
The origin of concepts as to mere form rests on reflection and on abstraction
from the difference among things that are signified by a certain
representation. And thus arises here the question: Which acts of the
understanding constitute a concept? or what is the same, Which are involved
in the generation of a concept out of given representations? (JL Ak. IX: 93)
The logical origin of concepts then accounts only for the form of concepts or
how concepts arise as universal representations. These citations introduce new
points to consider: that reflection and abstraction are involved in this logical
generation of concepts, and that these two mental activities work on given
representations; i.e., on the given manifolds in intuition. Otherwise stated, since
General Logic considers only the form of concepts (and not their matter), it
considers the origin of concepts that account for several similar objects; this is what
Kant means by “the difference among things that are signified by a certain
representation” (it is understood that this certain representation is the concept).
Kant answers the question about the acts of the understanding that constitute a
concept out of given representations as follows:
The logical actus of the understanding, through which concepts are
generated as to their form are:
1)
comparison (Comparation, d.i., die Vergleichung), of representations
among one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;

57
2)
reflection (Reflexion, d.i. die Überlegung), as to how various
representations can be conceived in one consciousness; and finally
3)
abstraction (Abstraction oder die Absonderung) of everything else in
which the given representations differ. (JL Ak. IX: 94)
To make concepts out of given representations, one must then be able to
compare, to reflect, and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the
understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every
(empirical) concept whatsoever. For instance, I see a spruce, a willow, and a linden.
By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from
one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on
that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches and leaves
themselves, and then I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I
acquire a concept of a tree (cf. JL Ak. IX: 94-95). Thus, the universality or form of a
concept is acquired through reflection; it refers to what is common to all given
representations, once we have abstracted from all its particular features.
Therefore, three activities of the understanding are involved in the logical
generation of concepts: ‘comparison’ (Vergleichung), ‘reflection’ (Überlegung) and
‘abstraction’ (Absonderung). Thus, I perceive several trees─i.e., several given
representations─and notice that they are different from one another. I compare
these several trees and I note they are different: this is the logical act of comparison.
In comparison the sensorial impressions are related to one another and to
consciousness as well. But then I reflect and, through this logical act of reflection, I
realize that they all have trunk, leaves, branches, etc. This is the logical act of
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reflection in which the similar features or common marks of the objects are
recognized and conceived in one consciousness. Finally, the mind abstracts from all
secondary characteristics of the trees, e.g., from their quantity, size, height, and
color, and this is how the concept ‘tree’ appears in consciousness. Therefore, the
understanding, by performing these three logical acts conjointly, gives rise to the
concept ‘tree;’ this is how the understanding produces a concept for various similar
given sensorial impressions.
Thus the concept─in this case the concept ‘tree’─is a universal (or general)
representation, since it contains the necessary characteristics or common features
of various objects of the senses that are given to us in empirical intuition. Thus,
through the logical acts of comparing, reflecting and abstracting, the understanding
is able to recognize the universal characteristics or determinations of similar
objects. This is how the concept is logically generated and why universality is the
form of concepts. This allows us to understand also why Kant states that “[t]he form
of a concept, as that of a discursive representation, is always made” (JL Ak. IX: 93),
since the concept as a universal representation is a product of the understanding’s
three activities, where only the empirical manifold is given through sensible
intuition. We can also say that if the concept is a universal representation it is
because it accounts for what necessarily is in the object, i.e., we cannot imagine a
tree that has no trunk, leaves or roots, etc.

59
It is important to stress the importance of reflection in this activity of
thinking performed by the understanding, and by which intuitions are brought
under concepts, since it is through reflection that universality appears. However, this
opens the question about the relevance of abstraction. Abstraction is important
insofar as it perfects the concept setting its limits: “[a]bstraction is only the negative
condition under which universal representations can be generated, the positive
condition is comparison and reflection. For no concept comes to be through
abstraction; abstraction only perfects it [the concept] and encloses it in its
determinate limits” (JL Ak. IX: 95). However, abstraction is important insofar as it is
through this activity that the concept of ‘something;’ i.e., the most abstract concept,
arises.5 It is worth citing a fundamental passage where Kant explains how the most
abstract concept is originated:
The expression abstraction is not always used correctly in logic. We must not
speak of abstracting something but rather of abstracting from something.
With a scarlet cloth, for example, if I think only of the red color, then I
abstract from the cloth; if I abstract from this too and think the scarlet as a
material stuff in general, then I abstract from still more determinations, and
my concept has in this way become still more abstract. For the more the
differences among things that are left out of a concept, or the more the
determinations from which we abstract in that concept, the more abstract
the concept is. Abstract concepts, therefore, should really be called
abstracting concepts (conceptus abstrahentes), i.e., ones in which several
abstractions occur. Thus the concept body is really not an abstract concept,
for I cannot abstract from body itself, else I would not have the concept of it.
But I must of course abstract from the size, the color, the hardness or fluidity,
in short, from all the special determinations of particular bodies. The most
abstract concept is the one that has nothing in common with any distinct

5 It is relevant know how the concept of ‘something’ arises, since it will be helpful to understand
Kant’s conception of the transcendental object. See Chapter 4 for this explanation.

60
from itself. This is the concept of something, for that which is different from it
is nothing, and it thus has nothing in common with something. (JL Ak. IX:95)
Finally, as stated above, concepts also have ‘matter’ (Materie): matter is the
content of the concept, i.e., the object. In this case the tree(s) we see; more
precisely, the matter accounts for the different but similar sensible manifolds we are
given in empirical intuition.
This is then how all our ‘empirical concepts’ or ‘concepts of experience’
(Erfahrungsbegriffe) are produced. Kant says: “[a]n empirical concept arises from
the senses through comparison of objects of experience and attains through the
understanding merely the form of universality. The reality of these concepts rests
on actual experience, from which, as to their content, they are drawn” (JL Ak. IX:
92).6 Concepts obtain their objective validity precisely by being derived from actual
experience, insofar as the empirical manifolds falling under them are given to us in
intuition. Thus, concepts that arise out of given representations have no need to
justify their origin since the possibility of their empirical content is never at stake.
2.1.3. The Limitations of General Logic and the Role of Transcendental Logic
While General Logic accounts well for how given representations can become
concepts in thought, Kant considers that it falls short to account for truth in
cognition, insofar as it leaves aside the content and focuses only on the form of

6

In the Logic: “The empirical concept springs from the senses through comparison of the objects of
experience and receives, through the understanding, merely the form of generality. The reality of
these concepts rests on actual experience, from which they have been extracted as to their content”
(L Ak. IX: 92).
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thinking (cf. A58/B83 ff.).7 Thus, Kant’s conception of a Transcendental Logic
implies that besides the foral aspects of thinking, the content of cognition is
considered as well. In this sense, a Transcendental Logic will have the role to
account for the origin of cognition insofar as this origin cannot be ascribed to
objects. More precisely, Kant proposes a logic that accounts for the manner in which
the formal structure of the mind can relate a priori to objects of intuition. Otherwise
stated, a Transcendental Logic must show how it is that subjective conditions can
have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions for the possibility of cognition that relate
a priori to objects (cf. A90/B122).
To attain this aim Kant will undertake an analysis of the faculty of
understanding, to determine, first, whether pure concepts have their birth in it, and,
second, whether such pure concepts can, or rather must, apply to intuition a priori.
This is why Kant proposes to isolate the understanding in order to seek which part
of our thought has its origin completely a priori. The Transcendental Analytic will
be thus the part of the Transcendental Logic that will expound the pure concepts of

7 Kant considers the nominal definition of truth; i.e., the agreement of cognition with its object, to be
granted and presupposed. In the general criterion of truth we are considering all cognition without
distinction among objects, but this implies abstracting from all content of cognition –the relation to
the object—and truth concerns precisely this content. The logical criterion of truth, i.e., the
agreement of cognition with the formal laws of the understanding and reason has a limitation; it can
only be the conditio sine qua non─and thus the negative condition─of all truth. In this sense also
the principle of contradiction is a conditio sine qua non and a negative criterion of all truth that
belongs to logic insofar as it holds of cognitions in general. However, it has also a positive use since it
is the universal and completely sufficient─supreme─principle of all analytic judgments (see
A151/B190 ff.). Kant’s point is that a criterion of truth needs to consider (also) the content of
cognition; this is why the criterion of truth of any cognition has to be found.
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the understanding as the elements of the pure understanding, or as the elements of
pure cognition of the understanding (cf. A63/B87). Kant says:
I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis . . . but rather the
must less frequently attempted analysis of the faculty of understanding
itself, in order to research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them
only in the understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in
general; for this is the proper business of a transcendental philosophy; the
rest is the logical treatment of concepts in philosophy in general. We will
therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first seeds and predispositions
in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity
of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity, by the
very same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching
to them. (A66/B91)
Thus, the task of transcendental philosophy is to seek these pure concepts of
the understanding. They will guarantee strict universality8 in cognition without
falling into the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics, one of which is to use
concepts without first demonstrating their origin and their legitimate applicability
to objects of possible experience. A critique of pure reason searches precisely to
determine the legitimate sphere human understanding and reason.
Kant intends then to keep the universality and necessity proper to
metaphysics through the possibility of encountering in our own human
understanding a priori concepts, that have not arisen from experience at all and
have nothing empirical in themselves, and that, nevertheless, govern a priori all
empirical intuition. He points out:

8

Strict universality is to be distinguished from relative universality, since the latter refers to the
universality grounded in experience through an inductive reasoning; e.g., the first level of the
Aristotelian scientific method and Francis Bacon’s inductive-experimental method. By contrast, strict
universality can never be grounded in experience.
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In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts that may be
related to objects a priori, not as pure or sensible intuitions but rather merely
as acts of pure thinking, that are thus concepts but of neither empirical nor
aesthetic origin, we provisionally formulate the idea of a science of pure
understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we
think objects completely a priori. Such a science, which would determinate
the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would
have to be called transcendental logic, since it has to do merely with the
laws of the understanding and reason, but solely insofar as they are related
to objects a priori and not, as in the case of general logic, to empirical as well
as pure cognitions of reason without distinction. (A57/B82)9
The Transcendental Analytic will be concerned with concepts that are pure
and not empirical; concepts that belong to thinking and understanding and not to
intuition and sensibility; and concepts that are elementary and so clearly
distinguishable from those which are derived from or composed of them. It is a
further requirement that the Analytic produce a table of these concepts that is
complete in the sense that they entirely exhaust the entire field of pure
understanding (cf. A64/B89).
Now, the idea of a Transcendental Logic or of a science of the pure
understanding is fundamental to the whole Kantian project. In the first and second

9

In the same sense, Kant says:
General logic abstracts, as we have shown, from all content of cognition, i.e., from any
relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to
one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general. But now since there are pure as well as
empirical intuitions (as the transcendental aesthetic proved), a distinction between pure and
empirical thinking of objects could also well be found. In this case there would be a logic in
which one did not abstract from all content of cognition . . . It would therefore concern the
origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects; while
general logic, on the contrary, has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather
considers representations . . . merely in respect of the laws according to which the
understanding brings them into relation to one another when it thinks, and therefore it
[general logic] deals only with the form of the understanding, which can be given to the
representations wherever they may have originated. (A55-56/B79-80)
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Introductions to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant states that his aim is to establish a
system of the principles of pure reason or principles of cognition absolutely a priori
(cf. A11-12/B24-25). This project is undertaken following an idea of the whole as a
regulative idea in the procedures of the understanding. Kant says:
Now this completeness of a science [of pure understanding] cannot reliably
be assumed from a rough calculation of an aggregate put together by mere
estimates; hence it is possible only by means of an idea of the whole of the a
priori cognition of the understanding, and through the division of concepts
that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their
connection in a system. (A64-65/B89)
Thus, having an idea of the whole beforehand benefits the inquiry insofar as it
delineates the completeness of the science of pure understanding in a system. This
systematic form is necessary for the completeness of a science; this is why Kant
considers a system to presuppose the idea of the whole. This idea, however, is to be
understood as merely regulative insofar as empirical investigation is still required;
empirical investigation specifies the whole in several interrelated ways. It would be
a mistake to take Kant as a thoroughgoing rationalist; Kant is neither a rationalist
nor an empiricist. As our dissertation will show in different ways, he draws on both
doctrines of thought but cannot be classified, strictly speaking, as adhering to either
of them.10 After these explanations, we can introduce ourselves into the discussion
concerning the pure concepts of the understanding.

10

The contrast between system and aggregate is helpful to understand why Kant finds relevant an
idea of the whole:
Science. A complex of cognition. Is divided into aggregate and system. An aggregate is a
common cognition. A system is a science. A system rests on the unity of the idea, namely,
how the manifold of a cognition is juxtaposed. It presupposes the idea of the whole, then, in
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2.2. The Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories
2.2.1. Judgments are Functions of Unity among Representations
As already anticipated, besides ‘empirical concepts,’ or concepts of
experience (Erfahrungsbegriffe), Kant upholds ‘pure concepts of the understanding’
(reinen Verstandesbegriffe) which are not abstracted from experience, but produced
by the spontaneity (Spontaneität) of the mind, and are the conditions for the
possibility of experience that relate a priori to objects (cf. A93/B126, B162,
A88/B120). This implies that these pure concepts will function as rules for the
empirical use of the understanding; i.e., for what is given in empirical intuition. It
also implies that without these pure concepts no cognition of empirical objects is
possible at all. Indeed, both implications are two sides of the same coin. Kant states
this clearly when he says:
The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same
time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience (Die
Bedingungen a priori einer möglichen Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich
Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung). Now I assert
that the categories . . . are nothing other than the conditions of thinking in
a possible experience (die Bedingungen des Denkens in einer möglichen
Erfahrung), just as space and time contain the conditions of the intuition
for the very same thing. (A111)

which the science is contained. With an aggregate one also intends to get to the whole by
constantly adding parts. With an aggregate the parts precede the whole, then; with a system,
the whole precedes the parts. This distinction is very important. All of metaphysics is
nothing but an aggregate and a rhapsody, because we have never yet had the idea of the
whole, [of] how far man can go beyond reason, and on what sort of means he builds what he
says. Hence metaphysics is a constant rhapsody. (VL Ak. XXIV: 891)
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The explanation of the so called ‘pure concepts of the understanding’ (reinen
Verstandesbegriffe) or ‘categories’ (Kategorien) is based on the logical functions of
the understanding in judgments (von der logischen Funktion des Verstandes in
Urteilen) since Kant considers that we have in these logical functions the clue for
their discovery (A70/B95). An important passage, where Kant clarifies the relation
between, concepts, intuitions and judgments, is useful to introduce us to the topic:
[A] concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always
related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or
itself already a concept)11. Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an
object, hence the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment
there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also
comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to
the object. So in the judgment, e.g., ‘All bodies are divisible,’ the concept of
the divisible is related to various other concepts; among these, however, it is
here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to
certain appearances12 that come before us. These objects are therefore
mediately represented by the concept of divisibility. All judgments are
accordingly functions of unity among our representations (Alle Urteile sind
demnach Funktionen der Einheit unter unsern Vortellungen), since instead of
an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and
other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and
many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can,
however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the
understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging. For
according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. (A6869/B93-94)
This passage gives us important information. Concepts are never
immediately related to an object because only intuitions are immediate
11

In the first edition of the first Critique the information inside the parenthesis appears differently
and appears outside the parenthesis as well. It says: “which itself contains intuition only mediately
or immediately.”
12

Kant’s copy of the first edition says ‘intuitions’ instead of ‘appearances’, which is more specific.
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representations of objects.13 Thus, a concept relates to another concept or to an
intuition.14 Judgments then are necessarily mediate representations of objects
insofar as they are composed of concepts. However, Kant adds that in judgments
not only concepts are at stake but also intuitions; that is what he means when he
says that “in every judgment there is a concept that holds of many;” i.e., in a
judgment a concept relates to other concepts but also to the intuitions (of objects)
that correspond to those concepts. For example, ‘divisibility’ does not only relate to
the concept ‘body’ but also to all concepts falling under it, such as the concepts of a
corpse or a cake. Thus, when we apply a concept such as ‘divisibility’ to a general
concept such as that of a body, we are indirectly attributing the predicate to all of
the concepts included in the subject. This is one aspect of Kant’s view that a concept
is a rule (cf. A106). Kant writes:
Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer
appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that it thought through it .
. . Thus in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of
body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of
impenetrability, of shape, etc. (A106)
And each of these other concepts includes their corresponding intuitions at
the same time. This explains why Kant states that “all judgments are functions of
unity among our representations;” where ‘function’ (Funktion) is to be understood
as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common

13

See Chapter 1 for Kant’s conception of intuition.

14 A concept can relate to another concept insofar as it can be subsumed under another concept; e.g. a
concept can be a higher or a lower concept of another (concepts as genus or as species).
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one” (A68/B93). Judgments are functions of unity because under them different
concepts and their corresponding intuitions are united.
This explanation is relevant insofar as the categories will spring up from the
logical functions of the understanding in judgments (cf. A70/B95 ff.). Kant is
advancing this point when he states that “we can trace all actions of the
understanding back to judgments;” which in turn allows us to conceive also the
understanding in general as a faculty for judging.15 This conception of the
understanding as a faculty of judging is reinforced when Kant states that “the
understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by
means of them” (A68/B93). Now, three questions arise here: What are judgments?
What are the logical functions in judgments? And how do these logical functions
allow the discovery of the categories? Let us begin by the first question.
2.2.2. Determining the Moments of Thinking in General through the Logical
Functions of the Understanding in Judgments
To understand what a judgment is, it is important to clarify Kant’s distinction
between ‘judgment’ (Urteil) and ‘power of judgment’ (Urteilskraft). The following
citations account for this:
If one thinks two representations as they are combined together and
together constitute one cognition, this is a judgment. In every judgment, then,
there is a certain relation of different representations insofar as they belong
to one cognition. E.g., I say that man is not immortal. In this cognition I think
the concept of being mortal through the concept of man, and it thereby
15 We can also specify here that the higher faculties of cognition for Kant are the understanding, the
power of judgment and reason, which at times are broadly referred to as the understanding in
general (cf. A131/B169).
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happens that this cognition, which constitutes the unity of two different
representations, becomes a judgment. (VL Ak. XXIV: 928)
If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the
power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under rules (Wenn der
Verstand überhaupt als das Vermögen der Regeln erklärt wird, so ist
Urteilskraft das Vermögen, unter Regeln zu subsumieren), i.e., of determining
whether something stands under a given rule (casus datae legis) (in case of
the given law) or not. (A132/B171)
Understanding is the faculty of rules. The power of judgment is the faculty for
deciding whether a rule ought to be used at this place, hence it is the faculty
for subsuming under a rule. I cannot give this faculty mere rules that are set
over it. (VL Ak. XXIV: 883)
A judgment, then, is the relation of two (or more) representations, i.e.,
concepts, that are united in such a way as to produce a cognition. The power of
judgment is the faculty we have to subsume a subject under a predicate. The concept
that we predicate of the subject acts as a principle or rule. This is why a judgment
can play the role of the major premise in a syllogism. The power of judgment is an
activity we perform following certain rules or principles. In the Critique of the
Power of Judgment Kant elaborates further on this point, making clear that the
universal is the rule or principle under which the particular is to be subsumed:
“[t]he power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as
contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is
given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it . . . is
determining” (KU Ak. V: 179). We have to add here that the representations united
in judgments via the power of judgment have also to be related to the unity of
consciousness. “A judgment is generaliter the representation of the unity in a
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relation of many cognitions. A judgment is the representation of the way that
concepts belong to one consciousness universally[,] objectively” (VL Ak. XXIV:
928).16
Now, all the possible ways in which representations can be united together
to give a cognition─i.e., all of the possible relations representations or concepts can
have in a judgment─account for the form of judgments: “[t]he form of judgment is
the relation” (BL Ak. XXIV: 274). As Béatrice Longuenesse points out: “[a]s beings
endowed with understanding we relate our concepts to one another in judgments
and inferences. These modes of ordering representations are what Kant calls the
‘forms’ of each capacity” (Longuenesse 2007, 136). By ‘form’ Kant is thinking here
of ‘logical forms’ for it is clear that sensible forms are not at stake here. Through an
analysis of the formal structure of judgments Kant will say judgments have four
logical forms, for there are four principal moments of thinking under which we can
subsume all the possible ways in which representations are united in judgments. More
precisely, all judgments stand under four titles that account for their logical form.
These logical forms are ‘quantity’ (Quantität), ‘quality’ (Qualität), ‘relation’
(Relation) and ‘modality’ (Modalität). Kant points out:
Logical forms of judgments: Quantity, quality, relation and modality
The distinctions among judgments in respect to their form may be traced
back to the four principal moments of quantity, quality, relation and modality,
in regard to which just as many different kinds of judgments are determined.
(JL Ak. IX: 102)

16

See Chapter 4 for the relation between judgments and the unity of consciousness.

71
Each of these four logical forms can be expressed through one of its three
possible moments in all judgments, and accounts for the way in which the specific
form determines the judgment. For instance, if we say “John is smart” we are
affirming a quality about John, i.e., its logical form concerning quality is determining
the judgment as an affirmative judgment. But if we say “John is not smart” we are
denying John the quality of being smart, i.e., its logical form concerning quality will
be determining the judgment as a negative judgment. Finally, stating that “John is
non-smart” asserts that the quality of being smart is not able to be predicated of
John, i.e., that John does not belong to the class of objects to which this quality
pertains; thus, its logical form concerning quality will determine the judgment as an
infinite judgment. These three examples show that quality is always one of the
logical forms a judgment has, but that it can appear only in one of its possibilities in
each judgment, i.e., as affirmative, as negative, or as infinite. Otherwise stated, we
cannot, without contradiction, predicate of John that he is smart, and at the same
time that he is not smart or that smartness is not a quality that can be predicated of
John. The only way in which we can put two or more of these three possibilities
together is through a disjunctive judgment; e.g., “John is smart, or John is not smart
or John is non-smart.” However, here the disjunctive judgment is composed of three
subsidiary judgments, and it is clear that only one of these judgments can be true;
i.e., that all the three judgments can be together insofar as one excludes the other
two.
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It is worth mentioning that the three moments of each of the logical forms
cannot appear together due to the demand of logical perfection in cognition as well.
Logical perfection is the perfection of cognition according to the laws of the
understanding, that considers a cognition to be perfect if it is thorough (cf. VL Ak.
XXIV: 806). It rests on the agreement of cognition with the object (cf. VL Ak. XXIV:
806). Kant says: “[l]ogical perfection is the conditio sine qua non and the basis of all
thought” (VL Ak. XXIV: 808). Logical perfection is concerned with the understanding
and is the cognition of objects through it (cf. VL Ak. XXIV: 809); Kant considers it is
the skeleton of our cognitions (cf. VL Ak. XXIV: 811). Concerning the four logical
forms, cognition must be universal concerning quantity; distinct concerning quality;
objectively true as to relation and necessary in modality (cf. VL Ak. XXIV: 809-810).
Perfection contains manifoldness and unity, but manifoldness has to have unity;
otherwise, things would not be connected among themselves (cf. VL Ak. XXIV:
810).17
Thus all judgments have four logical forms, but each of these forms can
appear only in one of its moments; otherwise, the judgment would be contradictory
or mere nonsense. Some examples can illustrate how the four forms appear in every
judgment:
(1) If we say “All dogs are brown” we are stating a universal judgment (for totality
is the quantity of the judgment); but we are also stating an affirmative judgment

17

See Chapter 3 for the explanation of how manifoldness attains unity.
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concerning its quality (for an affirmation is being made about dogs), and it is also a
categorical judgment concerning its relation (since the judgment has a subjectpredicate form). Finally, the judgment is also assertoric concerning its modality
(since it purports to be contingently true).
(2) If we say, “Necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4” the judgment will still be universal concerning
quantity (since all 2 + 2 equal 4), it will still be categorical (since the judgment has a
subject – predicate form), and it will still be affirmative (for an affirmation is being
made about two plus two things), but it will now be an apodictic judgment
concerning modality (since the relation between the subject and the predicate is
affirmed to be necessary). As Kant points out, the modality of judgment does not
add anything to the object being judged but rather specifies our cognitive relation to
the object.
(3) By contrast, if we say “Susan did not do her homework”, the judgment will be a
singular judgment concerning quantity (since it is about one person, Susan), also a
negative judgment concerning quality (since no homework was done). It will still be
a categorical judgment concerning its relation (since the two concepts follow the
subject (Susan) – predicate form (homework united by the verb ‘to do’ as copula).
Finally, the judgment is assertoric concerning modality (since it expresses actuality).
Now, the question is how we know that each logical form has three moments.
The logical functions of the understanding in judgment will allow us to understand
this point. This will answer the second question. Kant points out:
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If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to
the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking
in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself
three moments (Wenn wir von allen Inhalte eines Urteils überhaupt
abstrahieren, und nur auf die bloße Verstandesform darin Acht geben, so finden
wir, daß die Funktion des Denkens in demselben unter vier Titel gebracht
werden könne, deren jeder drei Momente unter sich enthält). (A70/B95)
What Kant is saying here is that if we abstract from the content of all possible
judgments, we can find the logical function of the understanding in judgments. This
means that instead of stating that “All men are mortal,” we think now in terms of “All
X are Y.” Thus, by abstracting from the content of judgments we will be able to
determine the bare form of judgment in general, and thus how judgable objects can
be related to one another. These then are all the moments of thinking─i.e., the
moments of thinking in general─that are conveyed through all our possible
judgments and expressed in the Table of Judgments (cf. A71/B96). By abstracting
all content from judgments we come to find all the mental activities we perform
through judgments.
Thus through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments we find
that a quality can be predicated of an object (affirmative judgment), can be also
denied of an object (negative judgment), and besides may not belong to an object,
i.e., that the object may be excluded from the class of things that have that quality
(infinite judgment). Likewise, something can be predicated of all things of a certain
sort (universal judgment), or merely of some things of that sort (particular
judgment), or solely of one thing (singular judgment). In addition, something can be
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predicated of another thing, and thus the two are related as subject and predicate
(categorical judgment), or something can produce another thing and thus be related
to it as cause to effect (hypothetical judgment), or a thing can be related to other(s)
as part(s) of a whole, and thus the relation among them can be one of community
(disjunctive judgment). Finally, through thinking; i.e., here through judging, we also
find that we are able to determine whether our judgments are necessary, possible or
actual. These are then what Kant calls the moments of thinking in general.
Thus, ‘logical functions’ are the acts of the understanding that account for all
the possible ways in which something can be predicated of an object and related to
other things as well. Kant says: “[a]ll relations of thinking in judgments are those a)
of the predicate to the subject, b) of the ground to the consequence, and c) between
the cognition that is to be divided and all of the members of the division”
(A73/B98).
Logical functions are thus acts of thinking by which the understanding
determines all the possibilities judgments have to express their logical forms in their
respective moments; otherwise stated, they are mental activities by which the
understanding determines all the possible relations a thing can have. It is worth
mentioning that logical forms precede logical functions, as our explanation has
tacitly suggested. This is because, although general logic reveals the clue to the
discovery of the categories, the categories (the logical forms of thought) ground the
possibility of judgment (the logical function of thought).
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We can understand now why Kant says that we can “trace all actions of the
understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be
represented as a faculty for judging.” In the same sense, we understand that “[t]he
functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can
exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments” (A69/B94).18 Thus, the
moments of thinking in general account for all the mental activities that constitute
or are expressed in judgments. The logical functions are the mental acts by which
we determine the logical forms in all their moments. Now we can understand the
Table of Judgments.
The Table of Judgments (Tafel der Urteile)19 (A70/B95)
1.
Quantity (Quantität der Urteile)
Universal (all)
Particular (some)
Singular (this)
2.
Quality (Qualität der Urteile)
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

3.
Relation (Relation der Urteile)
Categorical (subject-predicate)
Hypothetical (cause-effect)
Disjunctive (parts-whole)

18

See Chapter 4 for the relation between judgments and consciousness. “That action of the
understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be
intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of
judgments” (B143).
19 What is in parenthesis in English language has been added by us to convey a better comprehension
of Kant’s point.
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4.
Modality (Modalität der Urteile)
Problematic (possibility)
Assertoric (actuality /truth)
Apodictic (necessity)20
Now, this explanation opens the question about the object Kant is
considering in judgments, for it is clear that not all objects in judgments are objects
of possible experience. That is to say, the grammatical subject is not always an
appearance or an object of the outer sense; concepts such as ‘God’, ‘goodness’,
‘unicorn’, etc., do not account for objects of possible experience since they cannot be
given in empirical intuition. However, they are objects in judgments; i.e., they are
used as grammatical subjects. Kant’s own example of a hypothetical judgment
opens tacitly this question: “[i]f there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be
punished” (A73/B98). Eventually, he will contrast illicit concepts of the
understanding from necessary but non-empirical concepts of reason.
Therefore, insofar as the Table of Judgments conveys all the moments of
thinking in general, it is a consequence of the previous exposition that thinking in

20 Modality differs from the other logical forms insofar as it contributes nothing to the content of the
judgment (constituted only by quantity, quality and relation), for it concerns only the value of the
copula in relation to thinking in general; i.e., it is not focused in the cognition conveyed by the
judgment itself but on the copula, the implication or the disjunction each moment conveys (cf. A7475/B100). In this sense Kant states that “[p]roblematic judgments are those in which one regards
the assertion or denial as merely possible (arbitrary). Assertoric judgments are those in which it is
considered actual (true). Apodictic judgments are those in which it is seen as necessary”
(A74/B100). However, modality is included in the moments of thinking in general as well, since it
conveys how the understanding evaluates its own act of judging concerning its mental activities.
Kant says: “[n]ow since everything here is gradually incorporated into the understanding, so that one
first judges something problematically, then assumes it assertorically as true, and finally asserts it to
be inseparable connected with the understanding, i.e., asserts it as necessary and apodictic, these
three functions of modality can also be called so many moments of thinking in general” (A76/B101).
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general includes some mental acts of unification of representations that do not rely
on sensible intuitions in any way whatsoever. Through such acts no determinate
cognition of objects takes place. Nevertheless, we can think (though not cognize)
God, goodness and unicorns. When we make judgments about such objects our
understanding is exercising some sort of function or act of unification, even though
no manifold of empirical intuition is given to us. This shows something important,
namely, that the domain of thinking in general is broader than that of cognition in
general. Kant recognizes openly the broader character of thought:
Once I have pure concepts of the understanding, I can also think up objects
that are perhaps impossible, or that are perhaps possible in themselves but
cannot be given in any experience since in the connection of their concepts
something may be omitted that yet necessarily belongs to the condition of a
possible experience (the concept of a spirit), or perhaps pure concepts of the
understanding will be extended further than experience can grasp (the
concept of God). (A96)
Now, it also happens the other way around; i.e., that appearances can be
given in intuition without being determined by functions of the understanding (cf.
A90/B122). Kant says: “objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having
to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the
understanding containing their a priori cognitions” (A89/B122). These statements
suggest that there is a sort of “blurred zone” in the sense that empirical intuitions
are not always subsumed under (pure) concepts, and that the understanding can
perform actions of unification that can result in concepts without any intuition
corresponding to them. The two cases are, however, entirely different. In the first
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case, we are dealing with the possibility of undetermined appearances; in the
second, with the mere logical (but not “real”) possibility of pure objects of thought
(Gedankendingen).
It is worth mentioning that the fact that the grammatical subject is not
always a possible object of experience has opened a discussion by certain
commentators, who, like Henry Allison, consider it necessary to distinguish between
Kant’s uses of the German words ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Objekt.’ According to Allison, an
object in the sense of a Gegenstand is a possible object of cognition, while an object
in the sense of Objekt is a grammatical subject (Allison 1983, 134-136). Other
commentators have noted that this terminological distinction does not appear to be
supported by Kant’s texts. At least on some occasions, Kant uses indiscriminately
the terms ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Objekt’ when he refers to objects of possible cognition or
to objects intended only as grammatical subjects of judgments. In particular, the
German word ‘Objekt’ is used frequently in the first Critique to refer to objects of
intuition. Thus, the terminological distinction Allison discerns appears to be
questionable at best.
2.2.3. The Origin of the Categories through the Pure Synthesis of Space and
Time
The question now is how through these logical functions we discover the
‘categories’ (Kategorien) or in what sense these logical functions provide a clue
(Leitfaden) to the discovery of the categories (cf. A67/B92, A70/B95, A76/B102).
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This will allow us to answer our third and last question. Shortly after Kant
introduced the Table of Judgments he introduces the Table of the Categories.
However, in between, he introduces the concept of ‘synthesis’ (Synthesis).21
At first sight one might be tempted to think that in this context ‘synthesis’
(Synthesis) is a synonym of ‘function’ (Funktion), since Kant defines synthesis stating
that “[b]y synthesis in the most general sense . . . I understand the action of putting
different representations together and comprehending their manifoldness in one
cognition” (A78/B103). Just before this citation Kant gives the first definition of
synthesis in the Critique of Pure Reason when talking about the manifold of space
and time:
Only the spontaneity of our thought requires this manifold first be gone
through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to
be made out of it. I call this action synthesis (Allein die Spontaneität unseres
Denkens erfordert es, daß dieses Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise
durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine
Erkenntnis zu machen. Diese Handlung nenne ich Synthesis). (A77/B102)22
These definitions seem prima facie to juxtapose ‘synthesis’ (Synthesis) and
‘function’ (Funktion) to a certain extent. Nevertheless, what prevents us from
making them synonyms is that synthesis fundamentally appears linked to the
concept of a manifold (playing then a fundamental role in the constitution of

21

The explanation in the first Critique begins in the Third Section: On the Clue for the Discovery of all
Pure Concepts of the Understanding titled On the pure concepts of the understanding or categories
(A76-77/B102).
22

We recall here that function is “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a
common one.”
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experience as well).23 This makes the scope of the synthetic activity of the mind
broader than that of the functions the understanding performs in its logical use.
Likewise, the synthesis will relate not only to the understanding, but mainly to the
imagination, as will be further explained. Abstraction will not be required as a
condition to perform the synthesis either. The synthesis is presented by Kant as the
mental act of spontaneity (Spontaneität) par excellence. The question then is why
Kant begins to talk of synthesis just before presenting the Table of the Categories,
and how are we supposed to understand the link between the categories and the
manifold, since it has been stated that the concept of a manifold is intimately related
to that of synthesis. The manifold in question has also to be specified since we
already know a manifold can be given either a priori or empirically.
We begin by stating that the fact that we can discover the categories in
judgments through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments (von der
logischen Funktion des Verstandes in Urteilen) does not account for their origin as
such. The origin of the categories is a product of synthesis. This explains why Kant
interrupted his exposition to introduce the concept of synthesis. A fundamental
distinction will allow us to explain the origin of the categories:
The synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or a
priori) first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw
and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that
which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them in a
certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we
wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition. (A78/B103)
23

See Chapter 3 for the subjective constitution of experience.
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In this passage Kant contrasts synthesis with analysis. Synthesis is the act
through which a manifold is composed by collecting its elements and unifying them
to produce a (certain) content.24 We have to ask ourselves then what kind of
synthesis produces the categories. Otherwise stated, what manifold are we talking
about such that its unity─i.e., its composition as a manifold─generates categories?
What content is at stake here?
We know already that the content refers to the manifoldness given in
intuition. Since the senses provide the material─sensorial impressions─for the
manifold of empirical intuition from which empirical concepts arise, the content
Kant is considering here can only be an a priori content, for the categories are pure
concepts of the understanding (cf. A95-96), and thus their manifold has to be an a
priori manifold. Now, concepts whose content is composed of pure manifolds are
necessarily produced by a synthesis: “[s]uch a synthesis is pure if the manifold is
given not empirically but a priori (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis
of our representations these must first be given, and no concepts can arise
analytically as far as the content is concerned” (A78/B103).
As anticipated, the content Kant is talking about then is that of the manifolds
of space and of time. Since space and time are a priori intuitions it is clear that their
manifolds have to be given a priori as well. Kant reminds us of this when he states
that “[t]ranscendental logic . . . has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a

24

See Chapter 3 for the clarifying work of analysis in contrast to the combination through synthesis.
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priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the
pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be
without any content, thus completely empty” (A77/B102) (Emphasis mine). This
citation makes clear that the manifolds of space and of time are then the matter of
the pure concepts of the understanding or categories.
Thus, the synthesis runs through and collects the elements, i.e., the mind
collects the different possible relational manifolds in space and the different
possible relational manifolds in time that, as such, are dispersed, and unifies them in
a manifold, i.e., in the manifold of space and in the manifold of time, respectively.
Both are a priori manifolds. The elements of space and of time are then
spontaneously organized and united in a manifold by the synthetic activity of the
mind; this means that the manifolds of space and time have been composed.25 The
activity of synthesizing is performed by the faculty of the imagination, even though
the production of concepts is due to the understanding:
Synthesis in general is . . . the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind
through indispensable function of the soul,26 without which we would have
no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring
this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding,
and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.
(A78/B104)
It is important to stress the difference between composing the manifolds of
space and of time and expressing their unity in pure concepts: composing the
25

See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the synthetic activity of the mind.

26 Kant’s copy of the first edition of the first Critique states this clause instead with “of a function of
the understanding.”
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manifold is uniting the dispersed contents that are given a priori in intuition; this is
an action of the imagination. This unity, i.e., the composed manifold, is not the unity
of concepts, even if the latter unity conveys the former unity through concepts by the
action of the understanding. Both actions are immediately connected and arise at
the same time, but are different and, thus, performed by different faculties. That is to
say, when the manifolds of space and of time are composed─i.e., unified─pure
concepts of the understanding or categories arise to give form to these manifolds, for
categories are forms. More precisely, they are forms of thought (cf. B150).
Now, these forms that arise from the pure synthesis are discursive forms.
That is to say, the categories arise from the pure synthesis of space and of time to be
able to convey discursively what is contained in both manifolds that, as such, can
only be intuited. ‘Categories’ (Kategorien) arise to be able to think, and indeed
cognize, the manifolds of space and of time; this is why they are forms of thought or
intelligible forms. Otherwise stated, categories are the universal ways in which all
possible relational manifolds in space and all possible relational manifolds in time
are a priori organized in their completeness, through concepts that will function
then as rules for empirical intuition. The following passage explains well the
process:
Transcendental logic, however, teaches how to bring under concepts not the
representation, but the pure synthesis of representations (Aber nicht die
Vorstellungen, sondern die reine Synthesis der Vorstellungen auf Begriffe zu
bringen, lehrt die transz. Logik). The first thing that must be given to us a
priori for the cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the
synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing,
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but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis
unity, and that consist solely in the representations of this necessary
synthetic unity are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that
comes before us, and they depend on the understanding. (A78-79/B104)
It is worth noting that the passage conveys the process by which an object of
the outer sense is cognized at the same time that it conveys how categories are
formed. Therefore, it anticipates a question about the pure synthesis from which
the categories originate, namely: are we to understand that the synthesis of spaces
and of times is performed each time an object or appearance is empirically given to
us in intuition, or is it a sort of original synthesis that is performed once and for all?
There is no conclusive answer to this question in Kant’s texts; at least not if we
consider the categories to be a product of the synthesis and not pre-given concepts.
It is our position that the pure synthesis of spaces and times must be an original
synthesis.27
Martin Heidegger upholds our same position concerning the origin of the
categories. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger claims that “the Table
of Judgments is not also the ‘origin of the categories,’ but rather is merely the
‘guiding text for the discovery of all the concepts of the understanding’” (Heidegger
1997, 40).28 He also maintains that the categories are generated through the
synthesis of the pure intuitions of space and time (Heidegger 1997, 30 ff.). As
Heidegger points out:
27

We say an original synthesis because the original synthesis is the synthesis of the manifolds of
consciousness. See Chapter 4 for this explanation.

28

The word ‘also’ seems to be unnecessary.
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The authority of the categories must be determined through the elucidation
of their essence. As pure representations of unities within finite representing,
they [categories] are essentially dependent upon pure synthesis and hence
upon pure intuition. (Heidegger 1997, 60-61)29
However, as his exposition follows, Heidegger gives more importance to time
than to space on the grounds that time “dwells” in the subject in a more original way
than space (cf. Heidegger 1997, 35). More precisely, Heidegger’s argument is that
since the pure synthesis unifies a priori, what it unifies has to be given to it a priori
(until here we agree), but since time is a more universal intuition than space, he
considers ultimately the pure imagination has to be related to time essentially (cf.
Heidegger 1997, 57). It is possible that Heidegger is considering here the relation of
the categories to the transcendental schemata that are time-determinations. Now, it
is true, as we will see, that the categories and the imagination have a closer
relationship to time than space does. However, on this precise point, we think it is
required to stay closer to Kant’s text than Heidegger does; also because the usage of
the categories will be restricted to the empirical use of the understanding; i.e., their
application will be only to objects of possible experience that, as we know already,
are in space.

29

Heidegger describes the nature of space and time as pure intuitions by saying:
[A]s pure intuition, space gives in advance merely the totality of those relations according to
which what is encountered in the external senses would be ordered. At the same time,
however, we find givens of the ‘inner sense’ which indicate no spatial shape and no spatial
references. Instead, they show themselves as a succession of states of our mind
(representations, drives, moods). What we look at in advance in the experience of these
appearances, although unobjective and unthematic, is pure succession. (Heidegger 1997, 36)
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Space and time as pure intuitions are presented by Heidegger as original
representations; i.e., as presentations which allow [something] intuitable to spring
forth (cf. Heidegger 1997, 99). He says “[w]hat is discerned in pure intuition is a
whole which is unified in itself, although it is not empty, and whose parts are always
just limitations of itself. But this unified whole must allow itself to be discerned in
advance regarding this togetherness of its manifoldness which is for the most part
indistinct” (Heidegger 1997, 100).
Heidegger also quotes some of the same of Kant’s passages cited by us to
justify his ideas. His main point is that the categories originate from the pure
synthesis of space and time, since what this synthesis unifies or brings together is
the essential unity of pure knowledge that brings together all the structural
syntheses as a whole (cf. Heidegger 1997, 42). He points out rightly that the pure
synthesis unifies what in themselves already demonstrate synthetic structure (cf.
Heidegger 1997, 43). Heidegger says:
With this essential dependency of our pure thinking upon the pure manifold,
the finitude of our thinking ‘demands’ that this manifold fit with thinking
itself, i.e., fit with it as a conceptual determining. In order for pure intuition
to be determinable through pure concepts, however, its manifold must have
been gathered from dispersion, i.e., it must be gone through and assembled.
This reciprocal preparing-themselves-from-each-other takes place in that act
which Kant generally calls synthesis. (Heidegger 1997, 44)
Heidegger also supports the idea that this synthesis is performed by the
imagination (cf. Heidegger 1997, 44; 56 - 58). He states correctly that for the
cognition of objects the unity of pure thinking and pure intuition is required, and
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that this is performed through this synthesis (cf. Heidegger 1997, 46): “[i]n pure
synthesis, pure intuition and pure thinking should be able to meet one another a
priori” (Heidegger 1997, 49).
Heidegger’s position is not the only one dominant in the literature. In his
essay On the Unity of Subjectivity, Henrich argues that the categories are pre-given
concepts, and thus not products of pure synthesis. Henrich’s criticism of
Heidegger’s conception, however, is mainly focused on denying that the
transcendental imagination is the common root on which all other mental faculties
are grounded.30 Heidegger openly holds that the transcendental power of the
imagination is the common root of sensibility and understanding. He supports this
statement by saying that the transcendental imagination is the faculty that is
originally unifying (cf. Heidegger 1997, 96 ff.).31
Henrich considers that equating the common root with the transcendental
imagination is a misguided way to understand Kant’s ideas (cf. Henrich 1994, 40).
He points out rightly that it is the demand of reason to bring unity into the
cognitions of the understanding, and that this is, for Kant, a merely regulative idea
that serves as a focus imaginarius or imaginary focal point of human cognition (cf.

30

In the Introduction to the first Critique Kant mentions an unknown common root at the origin of our
faculties and, more precisely, from which possibly originated sensibility and understanding. “[T]here
are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root,
namely sensibility and understanding” (A15/B29) (Emphasis mine).
31 Heidegger recalls here that the concept ‘faculty’ (Vermögen) comes from the German verb
vermögen that means to have the ability to do something (Heidegger 1997, 94n).
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A644/B672) (cf. Henrich 1994, 26).32 We agree with Henrich besides in that this
demand of reason to unify the cognitions of the understanding in as few principles
as possible is not to be confused with the reduction of the mental faculties to a single
grounding faculty (cf. Henrich 1994, 26). As Henrich points out, there is a pluralism
of faculties in Kant whose “unity” arises through the achievement of harmony rather
than through a common derivation (cf. Henrich 1994, 26-27).
Henrich’s argument against Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation is that the
categories are grounded in apperception, and that apperception is the radical
faculty from which everything follows. We agree with Henrich that pure
apperception has priority in Kant over the imagination, even if the imagination is
the most active of the faculties and mediates among them.33 Henrich claims:
In its content the structure formed by the faculties of the mind is determined
through the structure of finite self-consciousness, that is, through
apperception and its categories. To that extent apperception and not
imagination is, in Kant’s words, the ‘radical faculty’ (radix!) (A114). (Henrich
1994, 31)34
The key point against Heidegger’s conception on the origin of the categories
is stated by saying:
The concepts of faculty, power, spontaneity, and freedom are all predicables
of relational categories. Their possible validity [the validity of the relational
categories] thus depends on the principle of apperception, in which they first
originate as merely logical forms through which it is possible to think
32

See Chapter 5 for the analogy with the focus imaginarius.

33

See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the nature of apperception and its relation to transcendental
imagination.

34

In A114 Kant calls transcendental apperception the radical faculty of all our cognition.
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something. They can only bring about knowledge insofar as they [relational
categories] are applicable to something pregiven (Henrich 1994, 35).35
Since categories are conceived as necessary concepts implied in all thinking,
Henrich recurs to Kant’s paralogisms to show that no object─or, in Heidegger’s
preferred term, being─ can be known through self-consciousness, for in selfconsciousness only the condition for all thinking is thought (cf. Henrich 1994, 36).
He then states that “[t]o know a being means to ‘determine’ something pregiven
through those necessary concepts that are implied in all thinking” (Henrich 1994,
36). In other words, only by determining the given sensible impressions in intuition
can we cognize an object, and this determination is performed by the pure concepts
of the understanding that are contained in all thinking. He adds that these
conditions; i.e., the categories, must also be pre-given to consciousness (cf. Henrich
1994, 36). The categories are not only pre-given concepts, but they guarantee the
unity of self-consciousness through all the different thoughts that belong to it.
All reality that becomes accessible to self-consciousness has to be thought by
means of the forms which guarantee its possible unity in all the different
thoughts. It is inconceivable that self-consciousness could gain real cognition
outside of that relation of itself─and the forms of possible unity─to
pregiven thinkable data (appearances) (Henrich 1994, 29-30).36

35

In this case, the “something pre-given” of the last sentence refers to the given through sensibility.

36 For a better comprehension of these statements see Chapter 4 in which self-consciousness is
explained.
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2.2.4. The Categories: the Determination of Intuition in General and their
Discovery through the Logical Functions in Judgments
Having explained the origin of the categories through the pure synthesis of
space and of time, we can now clarify how the categories can be discovered in
judgments through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments. The
link between categories and judgments is stated in this fundamental passage:
I will merely precede this with the explanation of the categories. They are
concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition [the intuition
of the object in general] is regarded as determined with regard to one of the
logical functions for judgments (Sie sind Begriffe von einem Gegenstande
überhaupt, dadurch dessen Anschauung in Ansehung einer der logischen
Funktionen zu Urteilen als bestimmt angesehen wird). Thus, the function of
the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the
predicate, e.g., ‘All bodies are divisible.’ Yet in regard to the merely logical use
of the understanding it would remain undetermined which of these two
concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that
of the predicate. For one can also say: ‘Something divisible is a body.’
Through the category of substance, however, if I bring the concept of a body
under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must
always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with
all the other categories. (B128-129)
The nature of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding that are
disclosed in Transcendental Logic is conveyed in this passage by saying that
categories determine the intuition of an object in general. This means that categories
determine a priori the content of all possible objects of experience. It is clear that an
object in general is given through an intuition in general. Thus, the correlate of pure
concepts of the understanding is an object in general that is given through an
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intuition in general.37 Since categories belong to the transcendental level of
experience they cannot determine empirical intuition directly, but only intuition in
general; they will need then a mediating representation to be applied to empirical
intuition, as will be further explained in this chapter.
We know already that the logical functions of the understanding in
judgments are the mental acts that account for all the moments of thinking in
general. Thus, what Kant is saying in the passage just cited is that the categories
determine a priori the way in which each empirical intuition─through the
corresponding concept that represents the (empirical) intuition in a judgment─is
related to another one as they are expressed in judgments. This explains also why
the number of categories is the same─twelve─as the moments of thinking in
general in the Table of Judgments. Stating this through an example, we can say that
it corresponds to the logical function of the understanding in judgments the
establishment of a cause-effect relationship, but it corresponds to the categories to
determine which objects of intuition are going to be causes and which are going to
be effects in the relationship. Evidently, the same is the case for all judgments. Kant
claims:
In such a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the
understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general a priori, as there
were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table [the
Table of Judgments]: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its
capacity entirely measured by these functions. Following Aristotle we will

37

See Chapter 4 for a complementary explanation of the object in general.
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call these concepts categories, for our aim is basically identical with his
although very distant from it in execution. (A80/B106)
Therefore, all empirical intuitions that are brought under concepts in
judgments are a priori determined by (one of) the categories. This means that the
categories determine which concept can be used as a subject and which as a
predicate, which concept accounts for a quality and which for a quantity, which for a
cause and which for an effect, and which for a part and which for a whole.
Otherwise stated, determining intuition in general by means of the categories
implies determining the way in which we think all objects of possible experience.
For instance, the categories determine that we can predicate being tall of a person
but not on the contrary; i.e., “Peter is tall” but not “Tall is Peter”; or in the case causeeffect relationship that we can say “if you push the chair, then it falls” but not “if the
chair falls then you push it”, or “Dogs like bones” but not “Bones like dogs”, etc.
Therefore, the way concepts are related in judgments─concerning their
content─is determined a priori by the categories. The categories determine
intuition because they act upon the content that is given to us. Thus, we can now
understand why Kant says that Transcendental Logic deals with pure concepts that
relate to objects a priori. As forms of thought the categories determine all the
moments of thinking in general, and they do so by determining intuition in general.
Otherwise, we could not think what is given to us in empirical intuition, nor
understand what is conveyed in judgments. This could never be achieved by
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General Logic since it only analyzes logical forms without considering how these
forms are related a priori to empirical contents.
By contrast, Transcendental Logic surveys all of the possible ways in which a
manifold in empirical intuition can be unified. This explains what Kant means in the
penultimate citation by “in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it
would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function
of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate.” That is to say, General
Logic can never determine the content of the concepts it relates in judgments, and,
thus, General Logic cannot determine which concept is to be considered a predicate
and which is to be considered as a subject; e.g., it leaves undetermined which of two
concepts─say ‘body’ and ‘divisible’─has the function of the subject and of the
predicate. Since General Logic abstracts from all content it can only analyze what is
given to it, i.e., analyze given representations. Kant points out this limitation of
General Logic by contrast to the action of Transcendental Logic:
The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same
actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts
by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its
representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition
in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the
understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can never be
accomplished by general logic. (A79/B105)
It is clear then why Kant says we can discover the categories through the
logical functions of the understanding in judgments, or why judgments provide a
clue for discovering the categories; in judgments we can find how intuition has been
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determined a priori and what concepts are subsumed under which categories. This
is why Kant speaks of the discovery of the categories through the logical functions of
the understanding in judgments. We can understand now the Table of the
Categories.
Table of Categories (Tafel der Kategorien) (A80/B10)
1.
Of Quantity (Der Quantität)
Unity
Plurality
Totality
2.
Of Quality (Der Qualität)
Reality
Negation
Limitation

3.
Of Relation (Der Relation)
Of inherence and Subsistence
(substantia et accidens)
Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect)
Of Community
(reciprocity between agent and
patient)
4.
Of Modality (Der Modalität)
Possibility – Impossibility
Existence – Non-existence
Necessity – Contingency

Kant says “this is the listing of all original pure concepts of synthesis that the
understanding contains in itself a priori, and on account of which it is only a pure
understanding; for by these concepts alone can it understand something in the
manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object for it. This division is systematically
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generated from a common principle, namely the faculty for judging (which is the
same as the faculty for thinking)” (A81/B106).38
The categories then account for the understanding as a pure understanding.
If categories allow us to understand something in the manifold of empirical
intuition, it is because they a priori determine intuition in general. This is why
categories are considered rules. As Longuenesse rightly points out: “the very acts of
judging by which we subsume intuitions under concepts and subordinate lower
concepts to higher concepts also provide rules for ordering manifolds in intuition
and thus eventually for subsuming objects of sensible intuition under the
categories” (Longuenesse 2007, 139).
Categories allow us to think an object for the empirical manifold, insofar as
they are forms of thought originated in the pure synthesis of the manifolds of space
and time. Categories then express the unity of the synthesis of the manifolds of
space and of time. The fact that categories a priori determine all possible intuition
that appears under concepts in all judgments makes them a priori conditions for the
possibility (of objects) of experience (cf. A111, A93/B126, A88-90/B120-122). Kant
states that categories are the conditions of the possibility of experience in general.

38

The idea that the Table of the Categories has been systematically generated from a common
principle that is the faculty of judging is at the core of transcendental philosophy. Kant says:
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in
accordance with a principle, since they [its concepts] spring pure and unmixed from the
understanding, as absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in
accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of
which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of
them together can be determined a priori, which would otherwise depend upon whim or
chance. (A67/B92)
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Thus, determining intuition in general in regard to one of the logical functions in
judgments allows the categories to function as a priori rules in cognition.
It can be added finally that Kant takes the Table of Categories to contain all
the elementary concepts of the understanding (cf. B109-110); he calls them also
ancestral concepts (Stammbegriffe) of pure understanding (cf. A82/B107).39
Another relevant remark is that the third category in each title always arises from
the combination of the first two in its class.40 However, this does not mean that the
third category is a derivative one; it has the same value than the other two in its
class, and is an ancestral concept of the understanding as well (cf. B111).
2.2.5. The Origin of the Categories Revisited: A Difficult Birth
Our exposition concerning the categories requires some final comments. A
first topic concerns the question about the validity of pure concepts that arise from
pure intuition, and whose function consists in their application to empirical
intuition. At first sight the argument could seem to convey a certain circularity,
mostly due to the necessary link that pure intuition has to maintain with empirical

39

Kant holds that the family tree (Stammbaum) of the pure understanding can be composed if we
establish the pure but derivative concepts of the categories, that he calls the predicables of pure
understanding. However, this is only mentioned but the family tree is not composed since Kant’s aim
in the first Critique is not the completeness of the system─which could not be passed over in a
complete system of transcendental philosophy─but only the principles for a system. Nevertheless,
some predicables are proposed: under the category of causality can be subordinated the predicables
of force, action and passion; under the category of community those of presence and resistance;
under the predicaments of modality those of generation, corruption, alteration. (cf. A82/B107-108).
40

In this sense allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity, limitation is
nothing other than reality combined with negation, community is the causality of a substance in the
reciprocal determination of others, finally necessity is nothing other than the existence that is given
by possibility itself (cf. B111).
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intuition to have objective reality, as explained in Chapter 1. However, the idea of a
possible circularity can be disregarded since the pure synthesis of spaces and times
is a way to unite intuitive and discursive forms that by themselves would be
separated. The unity of both is necessary for knowledge to arise. Another possible
aspect Kant could have had in mind here was the intention to avoid falling into the
mistake of traditional metaphysics; in this sense, that pure concepts arise from
synthesized pure intuitions allows the categories to have a link to what de facto is
given.
Heidegger considers that it is precisely the dependence on pure intuition that
allows the categories to rule empirical intuition: “[o]nly insofar as the pure
understanding, as understanding, is servant of pure intuition can it remain master of
empirical intuition” (Heidegger 1997, 53). He also considers pure intuition to link
categories and empirical intuition. The composed manifolds of space and of time,
with all their possible relations, are presented by Heidegger as ruling unities which
thereby enable the categories to be conceived as rules: “[t]he pure concepts . . . are
those which have such ruling unities as their unique content. They serve not only as
rules, but also, as pure representing, they give first of all and in advance something
rulable” (Heidegger 1997, 52). In the same sense he claims:
The unifying unity of pure understanding which grasps in advance, therefore,
must itself already have been united previously with pure intuition as well.
This a priori unified whole made up of pure intuition and pure understanding
‘forms’ the play-space for the letting-stand-against in which all beings can be
encountered. (Heidegger 1997, 54)
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A second comment concerns the fact that we discover the categories through
the logical functions of the understanding in judgments, but at the same time these
logical functions are possible due to the categories, since they are the ruling a priori
concepts in all judgments (under which empirical intuitions are subsumed). Kant
became aware of this situation; this is why in the second edition of the first Critique
he refers to the discovery of the categories through judgments as the origin of the
categories in the logical functions of the understanding, and calls this origin the
metaphysical deduction (cf. B159). The principle of the metaphysical deduction is, as
explained in our previous exposition, that categories originate in the
understanding’s capacity to judge; this principle account for the completeness of the
Table of the Categories. Kant says: “In the metaphysical deduction the origin of
the a priori categories in general was established through their complete
coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking” (B159). The
metaphysical deduction, widely referred to in the literature, explains why some
commentators identify the logical functions in judgments with the categories.41
A third comment concerns the objective validity of the categories. It could be
maintained that since they definitely rule the combination of representations in
judgments, they are objectively valid as pure concepts. However, the objective
validity of the categories is not to be demonstrated in the metaphysical deduction
but in the transcendental deduction, whose aim is to justify the validity of applying
41 For an explanation of the metaphysical deduction and its impact, see the article of Longuenesse,
Béatrice. 2007. Kant on a priori concepts. The metaphysical deduction of the categories. Kant and
modern philosophy. Cambridge collections online. Cambridge University Press: 129-168.
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pure concepts─originated completely a priori as rules─to what is given in
empirical intuition (appearances). In Kant’s words, “I therefore call the explanation
of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori their transcendental
deduction” (A85/B117).42 Thus, the concern is no longer about whether there are
pure concepts that can relate to possible objects of intuition a priori, but rather
about the entitlement the categories have to do so. Kant explains the problem:
[A] difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of
sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have
objective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of
objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions
of the understanding. (A89-90/B122)
Thus, what Kant is conveying here is that we have to demonstrate that pure
concepts of the understanding are objectively valid; thus the transcendental
deduction is a question about the right or lawfulness these pure concepts have to be
conditions of possible experience; ultimately this turns out to be a question about
how it is possible that categories condition a priori objects of possible experience (cf.
B159). The objective validity of the categories is thus related to their proof as a
priori conditions. The contrast with sensibility is introduced, for in sensibility there
is no need to prove that space and time are a priori conditions of the possibility of

42

Kant distinguishes here this deduction from an empirical deduction which is the one concerning
empirical concepts, since it is described as that “which shows how a concept is acquired through
experience and reflection on it” (A85/B117). See Chapter 1 for the formation of empirical concepts.
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objects, since appearances have necessarily to be given in space and time (cf.
A89/B121-122).43
It is our position that Kant did not succeed completely in this demonstration.
That is to say, even if the categories de facto rule the subsumption of intuitions in
judgments, he did not really succeed in his transcendental deduction, partly because
of his failure to provide an unambiguous account of the origin of the categories, and
partly because there is no way to demonstrate their lawfulness further than the
metaphysical deduction, at least we were absolutely sure categories are pre-given
concepts. Through the first Critique it becomes evident that the origin of the
categories is an open question. That is to say, the categories could have been
originated through the pure synthesis of space and time─which we have explained
here since it appears as the ‘official version’ in the first Critique─but they could also
be pre-given concepts whose origin depends exclusively on pure apperception, as
Henrich points out. The exposition of the deductions, notably the B-Deduction,
makes clear that the categories express the synthetic unity of consciousness, and, in
so doing, Kant seems at times to be taking them as pre-given concepts, even if the
imagination still serves as a medium to link understanding and apperception.44 It is
worth mentioning that Heidegger himself admits the origin of the categories is

43

It is worth noting that objective validity must not be confused with the objective reality; what gives
objective reality to space and time and to the categories is their relation to empirical intuition. That
is to say, the objective reality is guaranteed by the data of the senses.

44 For the relation of the categories to pure apperception, and the transcendental imagination, see
Chapter 4.
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problematic: “[t]his origin of the categories has often been disputed and always will
be” (Heidegger 1997, 39).
One of the sections in the B-Deduction that supports the conception of the
categories as pre-given concepts is section 19 whose title is “The Logical Form of all
Judgments Consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts
Contained Therein” (B140). Even in earlier sections we find ambiguous statements;
e.g.: “[n]ow pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure concept of the
understanding. By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a
ground of synthetic unity a priori” (A78/B104) (Emphasis mine).
It is clear that Kant struggled with the transcendental deduction for a long
time, and that it was a problem for him, even if the need and origin of the categories
appeared since his pre-critical period, as the famous letter to Marcus Herz, dated
February 21st, 1772, clearly shows:
[T]he pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense
perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through
the senses; but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul,
they are neither caused by the object nor do they bring the object itself into
being. In my dissertation . . . I silently passed over the further question of
how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way
affected by it can be possible. (LMH Ak. X: 130)
In the first Critique some passages express the same concern, and show Kant
advancing a peititio principii; i.e., that pure concepts of the understanding are
necessarily valid simply because we need them. The complete passage is as follows:
All appearances therefore necessarily agree with this formal condition of
sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically
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intuited and given. The question now is whether a priori concepts do not also
precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited,
nevertheless thought as object in general, for then all empirical cognition of
objects is necessarily in accord with such concepts, since without their
presupposition nothing is possible as object of experience. Now, however,
all experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through
which something is given, a concept of an object that is given in intuition, or
appears; hence concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all
experiential cognitions as a priori conditions; consequently the objective
validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through
them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thinking is
concerned). For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of
experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be
thought at all.
The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a
principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely
this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of
experiences (whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the
thinking). Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of
experience are necessary just for that reason (Die transz. Deduktion aller
Begriffe a priori hat also ein Principium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung
gerichtet werden muß, nämlich dieses: daß sie als Bedingungen a priori der
Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen (es sei der Anschauung,
die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begriffe, die den objektiven
Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig).
(A93-94/B126) (Emphasis mine)
2.2.6. Applying Categories to Appearances through Schemata
At this point, it is clear that categories determine intuition in general.
However, the question arises about how these pure concepts of the understanding
are applied to empirical intuition. It has been already mentioned that a mediating
representation is required. This mediating representation is called a schema and its
function is precisely to mediate between categories and empirical intuition.
The section on the Schematism should contain one of the topics most
developed in the first Critique due to its relevance. However, Kant only devotes a
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few pages to it, and the discussion is obscure, since it is not clear at all how
schemata will actually mediate between categories and empirical intuition. Kant
himself accounts for the difficulty to account for schemata, recognizing them as “a
hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine
from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (A141/B180181). Let us nevertheless try to elucidate the main points.
The schematism is the procedure (cf. A140/B179) by which categories will
be able to be a priori related to objects of empirical intuition. However, to be able to
apply the categories to appearances or to subsume an empirical intuition under an a
priori concept, there has to be homogeneity between the two; i.e., “the concept must
contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it”
(A137/B176). We already know that “pure concepts of the understanding . . . in
comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely
unhomogeneous, and can never be encountered in any intuition” (A137/B176).
Thus, there has to be a third thing, i.e., a mediating representation that will have
homogeneity with the category and with the appearance at the same time. This
mediating representation is the transcendental schema:
Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in
homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the
other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This
mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet
intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a
representation is the transcendental schema. (A138/B177)
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The ‘transcendental schema’ (transzendental Schema) is then the mediating
representation that allows the categories to be applied to empirical intuition; as
such it has then necessarily an intellectual side and a sensible side. Kant says the
schema is transcendental because it functions as an (a priori) rule to subsume
appearances under pure concepts. Likewise, “[t]he schema is in itself always only a
product of the imagination” (A140/B179); more precisely, it is a product of the
transcendental imagination (cf. A142/B181). Kant says:
The schema of a pure concept of the understanding . . . is something that can
never be brought to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in
accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the
category expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagination,
which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general, in
accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations,
insofar as these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in
accord with the unity of apperception. (A142/B181)
Kant states that the schema only exists in thought (cf. A141/B180). This is
explained by the relation the transcendental schema has to time; it has no spatial
nature. Kant makes this clear by stating that “the schema is to be distinguished from
an image” (A140/B179),45 and also by conceiving it as a time-determination: “an
application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the
transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the
understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter [appearances] under the
former [categories]” (A139/B178). Thus, the transcendental schema is a

45

See Chapter 3 for the explanation of an image.
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transcendental time-determination; otherwise stated, the transcendental timedetermination is the schema of the category.
This conception of the schema as a time-determination is fundamental since
time is precisely what is shared by the categories and appearances insofar as all
representations, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense, and then, as
such, are all connected to time as the formal condition of inner sense. Ultimately, it
is time that orders, connects and brings into relations all our representations (cf.
A98-99). Categories then can be structured in time and this is precisely what Kant
does when he describes each of the titles of the categories in terms of time:
The schemata are therefore nothing but a priori time-determinations in
accordance with rules, and these concern, according to the order of the
categories, the time-series, the content of time, the order of time, and
finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects. (A145/B184185)
Through a time-determination then the categories are connected with time
as the form of sensibility. Concerning appearances, the connection with time is
evident since appearances are in time, for all empirical intuition has a manifold that
is given to us under the conditions of space and time as the forms of sensibility.
Thus all the categories have their corresponding schemata that allow them to
be applied to appearances; e.g. the schema of the category of actuality is existence at
a determinate time, while the schema of the category of necessity is existence at all
times (cf. A145/B184). The schemata then are all a priori time-determinations in
accordance with rules of their synthesis, i.e., with rules that account for the
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synthesis of time-determinations. Each of the four types of categories is associated
with a corresponding way of determining time: the time-series for the quantitative
categories, the content of time for the qualitative categories, the order of time for the
categories of relation, and the sum total of time for the categories of modality (cf.
A145/B184-185). Schemata then “realize” the category in the sense of applying
them to empirical reality; the key point for Kant is that the categories have to be
sensibilized in order to be applied to objects of possible experience. This
sensibilization occurs thorough the schemata which implies the structuring of the
categories in terms of time.
Likewise, it must be noted that the realization of the categories through
schemata is at the same time their restriction, since categories are limited to
empirical intuition. In this sense Kant says: “[w]ithout schemata, therefore, the
categories are only functions of the understanding for concepts, but do not
represent any object. This significance comes to them from sensibility, which
realizes the understanding at the same time as it restricts it” (A147/B187).
2.3. Mathematical Concepts: The Other A Priori Concepts
Pure concepts of the understanding are not technically speaking the only a
priori concepts; mathematical concepts are a priori concepts as well.46
Mathematical cognition is rational cognition from the construction of concepts (cf.

46

Even if the topic of mathematics is outside the scope of this dissertation, we consider it to be
important to account for the third kind of concepts Kant introduces, in order to have a complete
comprehension of the topic of concept formation.
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A713/B741), and mathematical concepts are a priori concepts constructed
arbitrarily: “to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition
corresponding to it (Einen Begriff . . . konstruieren, heißt : die ihm korrespondierende
Anschauung a priori darstellen)” (A713/B741). To construct then is to exhibit a
priori in intuition the object corresponding to the concept; the point here is that in
constructing the concept the object is already generated by the subject.47 This
means that the mind has the faculty to determine an object a priori (e.g., a triangle)
by intuiting its properties in pure intuition. However, the intuition of its properties
is at the same time the determination of the concept itself, and the guarantee of its
objective validity. This explains why mathematics conveys universality and
apodictic certainty.
The arbitrary nature of mathematical concepts is due to the fact that they are
constructed; they are neither abstracted from experience nor produced by the pure
synthesis of the understanding. Thus, mathematical concepts are neither general
concepts (empirical concepts) nor pure concepts of the understanding (categories)
that determine (an object of) intuition in general. A thing in general is not the
concern of mathematics.
Even if mathematical cognition is rational cognition, mathematical
concepts─as all other concepts─are produced by the understanding, since reason

47 We can exhibit an object corresponding to the concept either through mere imagination in pure
intuition or on paper in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori, without having to
borrow the pattern for it from any experience (cf. A713/B 741).
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does not produce any concept at all (cf. A408-409/B435). However, the fact that
they are formed arbitrarily frees them from the need of a critique of pure reason,
since their objects are perfectly defined: “for I must know what I wanted to think,
since I deliberately made it up, and it was not given to me either through the nature
of the understanding or through experience” (A729/B757). This shows too that
only concepts that are arbitrarily thought can properly be defined. Definition
(Erklärung) is to exhibit originally (urpsrünglich) the exhaustive concept of a thing
within its boundaries (cf. A727/B755).48 In this way, all that belongs to the concept
is included in the definition (of the object). Mathematical definition contains the
complete exposition of the object. We go from the concept to the intuition that
corresponds to it, and cognize a priori what pertains to its object.
The mind then has the faculty to determine geometrical and numerical
objects by exhibiting their properties in intuition. As what can be exhibited a priori
in intuition are spatio-temporal relations, what the mind constructs then are the
qualities or shapes of objects or their quantitative relations. Mathematics allows the
construction of concepts that account for different qualities or shapes in space, or
temporal relations expressed in numbers. In geometry we exhibit a priori the

48

Thus categories and empirical concepts cannot be defined properly speaking. In this sense,
mathematical definitions can never err since the concept is first given through the definition; it
contains just that which the definition would think through it. Kant, however, recognizes that even if
nothing incorrect can occur in its content, sometimes, but rarely, there can be a defect in the form
with regard to precision; e.g. the common explanation of the circle that it is a curved line every point
of which is the same distance from a single one (the center-point), contains the error of unnecessarily
introducing the determination curved. For it must be a particular theorem, which can be deduced
from the definition and easily proved, that every line each point of which is equally distant from a
single one is curved (no part of it is straight) (cf. A731–732/B759–760).
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shapes or qualities of objects, and in algebra their quantity or the mere synthesis of
the homogeneous manifold through number (cf. A720/B748).
This explains why mathematics is neither interested in a thing in general nor
in existence as such, but in the spatio-temporal properties of the objects of
experience and solely insofar as these properties are combined with the concept of
such objects (cf. A719/B747). Thus, mathematics is focused on the properties of the
objects combined with the concept of the object. This, however, shows that there is
a synthesis in mathematics as well; the synthesis here consists in expanding our
knowledge of the spatio-temporal properties of geometrical and numerical forms.
Mathematics thus is composed of synthetic a priori propositions, i.e., by synthetic
propositions that are to be cognized a priori (cf. A718/B746 ff). Kant explains this
synthesis by saying that when I think the concept of a triangle (it is not that I see
what I think), I go beyond the concept to properties that do not lie in this concept
but still belong to it (cf. A718/B746). Thus, the synthesis in mathematics puts
together properties (of the object) that are not in the concept but belong to it. The
only way this synthesis is possible is by determining my object in accordance with
the conditions of pure intuition.

CHAPTER III
THE SYNTHESIS OF THE IMAGINATION AND
THE RECOGNITION OF THE OBJECT
3.1. Introducing the Synthesis in General and the Three-Fold Synthesis of the
Imagination in the A-Deduction in Particular
All manifoldness—empirical and a priori—requires unity to be cognized, be
it as an object of cognition, as a unified representation, or as a whole of any other
sort. We have already explained that the manifold accounts for the content of
intuition,1 and that the ‘concept’ expresses the unity of the manifold and is produced
by the understanding.2 Now, the ‘synthesis’ (Synthesis) is the mental activity that
allows the manifold to attain unity─be it as a manifold, in a concept, or in one
consciousness. The need to synthesize the manifold of intuition is clear since our
understanding cannot intuit (cf. B135), and our sensibility cannot pre-synthesize
the manifold. As already explained, our intuition is merely sensible and our
understanding only thinks (cf. B139). Therefore, there has to be an action that
allows the passage from ‘manifoldness’ (Mannigfaltigkeit) to ‘unity’ (Einheit), and
1 See Chapter 1. However, as already anticipated as well, the concept of a manifold is not reduced to
the manifolds of space and of time. Kant uses the ‘manifold’ to account for a variety of types of
contents involved in the cognitive process; e.g., “the manifold of appearances” (A182/B225), “the
manifold of our representations” (cf. A108), “the manifold of cognition” (cf. A109), and “the manifold
of consciousness” (cf. A117n/B131).
2

See Chapter 2 for the formation of concepts through the understanding.
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this activity of the mind is the synthesis. The synthesis then operates between two
poles: manifoldness and unity.3 In this sense, there has to be also a faculty that acts
upon the manifold with the aim of constituting determinable objects (of
experience): this faculty is the imagination, according to Kant. “There is thus an
active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination”
(A120).
From the onset we can understand then why Kant considers everything to be
first synthetic or produced by a synthesis, and only then subject to analysis; analysis
always presupposes synthesis (cf. B130). Through ‘analysis’ (Analyse) we can only
make a concept distinct (cf. BL Ak. XXIV: 263) but we cannot thereby fabricate a new
concept: “no concept can arise per analysin, rather, it is only distinctness that can
thereby be given to it” (BL Ak. XXIV: 269).4 To produce a concept requires a

3

Less elaborated statements that indirectly indicate the need for synthesis are found in different
sections of the Lectures on Logic: “[t]hrough combination, however, we fabricate something when we
put much together that in experience is never connected” (BL Ak. XXIV: 262). Likewise, and as
advanced in Chapter 2, “two things are always to be found, which in their harmonious union make up
perfection in general, namely, manifoldness and unity” (JL Ak. IX: 39). “Mere manifoldness without
unity cannot satisfy us” (JL Ak. IX: 39). In addition: “[m]anifoldness and unity constitute every
perfection. Our power of cognition strives very much for manifoldness. But it has the need that it
[manifoldness] must have unity. Otherwise it would not satisfy us, because cognition without unity,
when one thing is not connected with the other, does not increase our cognitions” (VL Ak. XXIV: 810).
4

“A distinct concept is one, of whose marks I am conscious” (DWL Ak. XXIV: 694). The distinctness of
a concept is intimately related to judgments:
[T]o cognize distinctly is to cognize everything by means of a clear mark. But to cognize
something by means of a clear mark is also just to judge. Thus we can also say that distinct
concepts are ones that are cognized by means of a judgment. Now the 2 concepts that are
compared with one another, and in such a way that one contains the marks and the other the
clarity, constitute the material of the judgment. That concept, now, that is to be made
distinct through comparison with its mark, is called the subject. On the other hand, that
concept that is added to the mark as a ground of distinctness is called the predicate. (BL Ak.
XXIV: 273-274)
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previous synthesis, so that through the imagination’s activity the manifold can be
recognized in a concept by the understanding; the concept then is the product of this
synthetic activity. Thus, through analysis we cannot either attain unity or constitute
experience as such. Kant makes this clear by stating that “[a]ll experience is
synthesis” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 551).
Therefore, the subjective constitution of experience refers to the action by
which the mind constitutes an appearance as a determinable object thorough the
synthesis of its manifold (in intuition).5 This means that the mind participates in the
constitution of the object of experience, insofar as the unity required for its cognition
will come from its own spontaneous activity. Kant points this out clearly:
[A]mong all representations combination is the only one that is not given
through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an
act of its self-activity. One can here easily see that this action must originally
be unitary and equally valid for all combination. (B130)
[T]he combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through
the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of
sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of
representation. (B129-130)6
Thus, ‘synthesis’ (Synthesis) in general is the act of the mind that works on
manifolds with the aim of attaining their unity in a whole, and to express this unity
in a concept. Kant uses almost interchangeably the concept of ‘synthesis’ (Synthesis)
and that of ‘combination’ (Verbindung), even if in the B-Deduction combination

5

This is the topic we advanced in Chapter 1 footnote 3.

6 Likewise: “Combination does not lie in the objects . . . and cannot as it were be borrowed from them
through perception” (B134-135).
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refers mostly to the synthesis performed by the understanding. Kant says: “all
combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of
the manifold of intuition or of several objects . . . is an action of the understanding,
which we would designate with the general title synthesis” (B130). However, as
the synthesis operates at different levels and with manifolds constituted by different
elements, its action is not only restricted to the manifold given in intuition and to
the unity attained in a concept by the understanding. Thus, the concept of synthesis
is not only restricted to the combination of manifolds; at times Kant also uses it to
convey the connection of manifolds with the aim of attaining a synthetic unity as the
product or outcome of the act of synthesizing. Likewise, sometimes Kant talks of
‘successive synthesis’ (sukzessive Synthesis) or ‘successive addition’ to account for
the addition of units to constitute a whole (from part to part); e.g., “the successive
addition of one (homogeneous) unit to another” (A142/B182) or “successively
added to each other by me . . . through this successive addition” (A103). Synthesis
then also conveys the addition of units or of elements that compose a manifold, and
to which Kant refers to as successive addition or by repeated positing.
Roughly speaking, we can say that synthesis is the act through which
manifolds are composed and connected, that is, it is the layered act by which
manifolds are combined with one another and, ultimately, brought to one
consciousness. As the next chapter will make clear─even if the synthesis in general
is performed by the imagination─the synthetic unity is ultimately related to
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apperception (cf. A155/B194). However, we will use basically the concept of
synthesis here since it is the concept that accounts for the synthesizing actions of
the mind. It is also the term that Kant relies upon in the A-Deduction.
Now, by ‘imagination’ (Einbildung) Kant understands the faculty of intuition
without the presence of the object (Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). The first Critique defines it
in a very similar way: “Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even
without its presence in intuition (Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen
Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen)” (B151).7
The imagination is conceived an original faculty insofar as it cannot be derived from
any other faculty or mental source, but itself contains the conditions of possibility of
cognition. Kant says: “[t]here are . . . three original sources (capacities or faculties of
the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and
cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense,
imagination and apperception” (A94).
Thus, the imagination is an original faculty that has the role of synthesizing
the diverse manifolds and that is considered as a special kind of intuition─since it is
neither pure intuition nor empirical intuition. In a certain way the imagination will
be a mediating faculty between sensibility and understanding as the synthesis
shows at times. Likewise, as with other faculties, the imagination also has both a
7

Similar definitions are found in the Lectures on Metaphysics: “power of imagination [is] faculty of
intuition without presence of the object (MD Ak. XXVIII: 672). “The faculty of intuition without
presence of the object . . . is the power of imagination” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 585). “The power of
imagination is the faculty of intuition, but also without presence of the object. It must be
distinguished from the senses as much as from the concepts” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 585).
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transcendental and an empirical use, the former being only concerned with form (cf.
A94) and comprising it as one of the a priori foundations for the possibility of
experience (cf. A97). The latter accounts for its reproductive activity (cf. A115), a
topic to which we will return.
Having made these introductory remarks we can enter now to the
explanation of the synthesis of the imagination following the three─a priori and
empirical─levels of its activity as Kant describes it in the A-Deduction. The threefold synthesis is divided as follows: “the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition”
(cf. A98), “the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination” (cf. A100) and “the
synthesis of recognition in the concept” (cf. A103). Kant introduces the three-fold
synthesis by saying:
If therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its
intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this, and receptivity can
make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity. This is now
the ground of a three-fold synthesis, which is necessarily found in all
cognition: that namely, of the apprehension of the representations, as
modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them
[representations] in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept.
(A97)
3.2. The Synthesis of Apprehension in the Intuition
The synthesis of apprehension is aimed directly at the intuition─at the
empirical and pure intuitions. Kant’s main focus is on empirical intuition. He is now
interested in distinguishing between ‘(bare) apprehension’ and ‘synthesis of
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apprehension.’8 The point of this synthesis is to bring the manifold of intuition into a
representation, whose unity is to be further recognized discursively in a concept.
The distinction rests not only on the intention of the synthesis to attain the unity of
the manifold in one representation, but also on the fact that this synthesis is aimed
directly at unity of the intuition itself. Kant defines the synthesis of apprehension in
the first Critique as follows:
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the
representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take
together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of
apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure
provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as
contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a
synthesis. (A99)
[B]y the synthesis of apprehension I understand the composition of the
manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical
consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible. (B160)
Thus, by synthesis of apprehension Kant means the mental activity of
running through an empirical manifold and collecting its elements, i.e., of
successively adding one element to another, so that the elements of the manifold can
be put together, i.e., so that the manifold can be composed or received in one
representation. Both definitions show the intention to unify what is dispersed and,
thus, to present it in one representation. The “composition of the manifold” is not
different from “its presentation as contained in one representation.” The “running
thorough the manifold” is the synthesis, i.e., the activity of adding one element to

8

Bare apprehension is a mere juxtaposition of elements or manifolds. The contrast with synthesis of
apprehension will become clear below. See section 3.4. The Recognition of a Manifold as an Object.
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another, so that a determinable object can be constituted, where it is clear─from
what has been explained thus far─that this determinable object is the appearance
(as the second definition makes clear as well). Thus, the synthesis of apprehension
conveys that the mind─the imagination─participates in the constitution of a
determinable object insofar as it unifies the manifold that is given to us and received
under the forms of sensibility.
However, the second intention Kant has in each definition is different, for
while the A edition states that, while intuition provides the manifold, intuition itself
cannot provide it in a unified way or as contained in one representation; this is why
the empirical manifold in intuition has to be synthesized by the imagination. The
imagination thus acts on the content of sensibility. By contrast, the B edition
stresses that perception requires this synthesis as a condition; i.e., that no empirical
consciousness is possible if the manifold has not previously been composed, since
what we perceive are appearances and not dispersed elements of matter in space
and time. It is in this sense then that we can understand that the synthesis of
apprehension grounds perception. Kant claims: “every appearance contains a
manifold . . . There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us,
which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon
perceptions I call apprehension” (A120). In the footnote it is added that
“imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself” (A120n). It is clear then
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that the synthesis of apprehension is a condition for perception: “all possible
perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension” (B164).
Now, it is also added that the synthesis of apprehension brings the manifold
of sensible impressions into an image: “[f]or the imagination is to bring the manifold
of intuition into an image (Bild); it must therefore antecedently take up the
impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them” (A120). Thus, the ‘image’ (Bild) is
also an outcome of this synthesis. However, this statement prima facie creates a
problem, since the question arises about what the relation is between an ‘image’
(Bild) and an ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung), and if one precedes the other in some way.
A close look into the statements in which Kant refers to the image will allow us to
clear up this problem.
My mind is always busy with forming the image of the manifold while it goes
through [it]. E.g., when I see a city, the mind then forms an image of the
object which it has before it while it runs through the manifold. Therefore if
a human being comes into a room which is piled high with pictures and
decorations, then he can make no image of it, because his mind cannot run
through the manifold. (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 235)
[T]he schema is to be distinguished from an image (so ist das Schema doch
vom Bilde zu unterscheiden). Thus, if I place five points in a row, . . . . . , this is
an image of the number five. On the contrary if I only think a number in
general, which could be five or a hundred, this thinking is more the
representation of a method for representing a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in
an image in accordance with a certain concept than the image itself, which in
this case [in a thousand] I could survey and compare with the concept only
with difficulty. Now this representation of a general procedure of the
imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema
for this concept. (A140/B179-180)
We can only say this much, the image is a product of the empirical faculty of
productive imagination, the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in
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space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination,
through which and in accordance with which the images first become
possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are in
themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that
they designate. (A141-142/B181)
The three citations allow us to understand the nature of an image. The first
passage states that images are always formed while the synthesis of the manifold is
performed; the synthesis of apprehension produces the image in some way. The
second text makes clear that the image is a visual representation (of an object) and
that the imagination provides concepts with images through schemata. Thus,
schemata re-appear here as the mediating third representation; however, this time
Kant is considering the empirical schema that provides empirical concepts with
their corresponding images.9 Finally, the third passage says that image and schema
are produced by the imagination─even if by different uses of the imagination─and
that images are never fully congruent with their concepts, in spite of the action of
the schemata that connects them.10
Thus, while the image is a visual representation of an empirical object, the
appearance is the (determinable) empirical object. Now, since both are produced by
the synthesis of apprehension when the manifold in intuition is unified, we are to
understand then that the image is the subjective way in which the appearance is

9

See Chapter 2 for the transcendental schema, and its mediation between categories and intuitions.

10

The idea of the schema as monogram is only to be considered for sensible schemata that connect
mathematical concepts with their corresponding images. The analogy of the monogram is
understandable due to the simultaneous way in which mathematical objects and their corresponding
concepts are formed. See Chapter 2 for the formation of mathematical concepts.
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synthetically apprehended. That is to say, the composition of the manifold in
empirical intuition brings in the appearance as a determinable object and, at the
same time, an image of this determinable object. Both are brought in by the same
synthesis and closely resemble each other. Nevertheless, they are different, for the
appearance contains objective reality insofar as substances are their material
elements, while the image, by its nature, is merely subjective. Thus, while the
appearance is to become a determined object through the application of the
categories, bare images can never be objects of cognition themselves.
Through the empirical schema the image is connected to the empirical
concept that accounts for the empirical object; however, as images are necessarily
particular they can never be fully congruent with their concepts, which are general.
There are many possible ways in which an object can be imaged; multiple visual
representations or mental pictures of an empirical object are capable of being
formed. For instance, the concept of a dog─a concept that determines a certain
type of empirical object─becomes applicable to dogs through its corresponding
schema, namely, a general rule that applies to four-footed animals with such-andsuch empirical features. In contrast to this general rule, the particular images that
the mind produces are not restricted to one particular shape, for it is self-evident
that many different shapes satisfy the requirement of the concept of a four-footed

122
animal with such-and-such features.11 A similar procedure takes place in the case of
sensible schemata which provide mathematical concepts with their images. Kant
says:
No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it
would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all
triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this
sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in
thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to
pure shapes in space. Even less does an object of experience or an image of it
ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related
immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination
of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept. The concept of
a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify
the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any
single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I
can exhibit in concreto. (A141/B180) (Emphasis mine)
Thus, from this we can conclude that the image is only the subjective way in
which the appearance is represented through the synthesis of apprehension, for it is
only the visual representation or picture we have of the appearance. Both─image
and appearance─are produced when the imagination unifies the manifold in
intuition, but whereas the appearance is the determinable object that the mind
receives in one representation, the image is just the visual representation of that
object. In this sense we can say that an image is a particular representation of a
particular object: multiple visual representations for an appearance can be
made─and are made─by the imagination. The image then conveys that an

11 See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how an empirical concept is produced and what role
abstraction plays in this act, as well as the nature of the generality or universality of an empirical
concept.
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appearance (as object) can be visually represented or pictured from different
perspectives.
Commentators usually do not focus on Kant’s account of the subjective image
that arises through synthesis. Instead, they focus on the objective appearance.
Indeed, they tend to blur the distinction between image and appearance.12 Rudolf
Makkreel is an exception. He highlights the specificity and relevance of Kant’s
account of the image in the A-Deduction by calling attention to the different
temporal roles played by three imagistic products of synthesis. First, through the
process of image formation (Abbildung) we acquire representations of the present, a
process that corresponds to the synthesis of apprehension. Second, reproductive
image formation yields representations of the past (Nachbildung). This is what Kant
refers to as the synthesis of reproduction. Finally, an anticipatory image formation
represents the future (Vorbildung). This corresponds to the synthesis of recognition
in the concept (Makkreel 1994, 16). While we agree with the two first statements,
we cannot agree with the third, since we do not find textual support in Kant for
upholding it. As we mention here below in a footnote, anticipation is part of our
capacity to form images, but this does not mean that it is related inherently to the
synthesis of recognition in the concept.

12

For instance, in the case of Longuenesse we think this is due to her reading of the A-Deduction
under the mathematical model (Longuenesse 2000, 35 ff.). It is worth mentioning that both, B.
Longuenesse and R. Makkreel (who is mentioned immediately now), conceive both deductions are
connected, and that they do not exclude each other.
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Makkreel neither explains nor fully develops these three points concerning
the A-Deduction. Nevertheless, he provides us with an interesting path for
understanding the initial stages of image formation by explaining the different
species of what Kant calls our Bildungsvermögen or ‘formative faculty’. Two points
deserve our attention. First, in the pre-critical period Kant conceived imagination─
Einbildung─not as he does during the critical period, namely, as a pure productive
and reproductive faculty, but only referred to an ‘imaginative formation’ which was
a more independent species than the others and consisted in the power to invent
images. Second, focusing on the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Makkreel states that
the conscious operation of the imaginative formation makes it a mode of invention
that connects all representations by a free act of volition. Makkreel says it is here
that we find the origin of the synthetic function of the imagination as Kant presents
it in the first Critique (Makkreel 1994, 13 ff.)
As already indicated, the imagination grounds its empirical activity through
its transcendental use by establishing an a priori foundation for it. Thus, the
empirical synthesis of apprehension is grounded in the pure synthesis of
apprehension in the intuition that is the synthesis of spaces and of times. This
accounts for the imagination’s being considered a productive faculty (A123).13 That
is, the imagination has also to run a priori through the manifolds of space and time
13

In the Anthropology: “[t]he power of imagination (facultas imaginandi) . . . is . . . productive, that is,
a faculty of the original presentation of the object (exhibitio originaria), which thus precedes
experience . . . Pure intuitions of space and time belong to the productive faculty” (Anthr. Ak. VII:
167).
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to attain the unity of each manifold in one representation, i.e., to attain the
representation of space and the representation of time. This means then that all
possible representations of space are united in one representation, i.e., in the
representation of space; likewise with time. Kant says:
Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., in
regard to representations that are not empirical. For without it we could
have a priori neither the representations of space nor of time, since these can
be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its
original receptivity provides. We therefore have a pure synthesis of
apprehension. (A99-100)
The synthesis of spaces and times, as the essential form of all intuition, is that
which at the same time makes possible the apprehension of the appearance,
thus every outer experience, consequently also all cognition of its objects.
(A165-166/B206)
[T]he synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must
always be in agreement with the latter [forms of outer and inner sensible
intuition a priori in the representations of space and time], since it [the
synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance] can only occur
in accordance with this form. (B160)14
3.3. The Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination
Now, the empirical synthesis of apprehension is inseparably connected with
“the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination” since formed images must be
necessarily capable of being reproduced; otherwise, every representation would
appear to us each time as a new one, and experience of enduring objects would be
impossible (cf. A102). Kant joins both levels of the synthesis because he sees that
this is the only way in which representations can be necessarily connected with one
14

These statements concerning the pure synthesis of apprehension─i.e., the composition of the
manifolds of space and time─complement the explanation of the pure synthesis of space and time in
Chapter 2.
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another; it is clear that this connection is required in order to constitute possible
experience. If we were always to lose the preceding parts of a line, the previous
representations of the house we are building, or of the perceptions we already had,
no cognition would be possible at all. This is why Kant states that:
It is, however, clear that even this apprehension15 of the manifold alone
would bring forth no image and no connection of the impressions were there
not a subjective ground for calling back a perception, from which the mind
has passed on to another, to the succeeding ones, and thus for exhibiting
entire series of perceptions, i.e., a reproductive faculty of imagination, which
is then also merely empirical. (A121)16
Thus, the synthesis of apprehension is inseparably connected to the
reproductive imagination: image formation is inseparable from the reproducibility of
images in thought. This relationship is fundamental since it conveys that what we
reproduce are images and not appearances. However, through the reproduction of
these images it is possible to exhibit the entire series of perceptions─i.e., the
exhibition of appearances─and this is where the synthesis of reproduction plays a
role. Kant is conveying two empirical activities here: one is the reproduction of
images and the other is the synthesis of reproduction. The former brings back to the
present─i.e., reproduces─images that have already been synthesized in
apprehension; the latter combines these past images with the new ones being
produced.
15

Kant is talking here of the synthesis of apprehension and not of bare apprehension.

16 In the Anthropology, the reproductive imagination is presented as the faculty of the derivative
presentation of the object (exhibitio derivativa) whose capacity consists in bringing back to the mind
an empirical intuition it previously had (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167).
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If Kant speaks of reproduction as a subjective ground it is because both
activities of the reproductive imagination are not only empirical but also only in
time: there is a mental transition from past perceptions to actual ones. The synthesis
of reproduction does not need the actual re-presentation of the object (appearance)
once it has been intuited. This stresses the idea that what the mind calls back or
reproduces are images and not appearances─even if both play a role in perception.
Kant wants to convey that being able to reproduce the image avoids the need to
constitute the manifold in intuition of a determinable object or appearance again.
Thus, even if images are subjective, they participate in the construction and
continuity of cognition in some way, for the imagination is able to bring back to the
present what it represented in the past. However, as already mentioned, the
“exhibition of the entire series of perceptions” refers clearly to the entire series of
objects (appearances) and not to the multiple, subjective, and diverse images of
those objects.17 Kant had already envisaged these ideas in his pre-critical period, as
the following passage points out:

17 Kant claims that the capacity the imagination has to go from the past to the present allows it to
anticipate images, and in this way to pass from the present to the future, as we have seen in
connection with Makkreel. As Kant says we anticipate the future by producing images – as an
architect produces an image of the house she intends to build. Thus, ‘anticipation’ (Vorbildung) is
also possible even if we have no impression and thus no actual image. The twofold capacity of the
imagination to go from the present to the past and from the present to the future constitutes the laws
of the reproductive imagination (cf. ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 236).
In another section of the Lectures on Metaphysics Kant calls attention to the anticipative
power of the imagination: “[t]he faculty of imagination <facultas imaginationis> is reproductive
<reproductiva> with respect to past time, anticipating <praevidendi> with respect to future, and
productive <productiva> with respect to no time” (MM Ak. XXIX: 883). He says here that anticipation
is grounded on the law of expectation of similar outcomes <lex expectationis casuum similium>.
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[M]y mind draws forth the representation of the senses from previous times,
and connects them with the representations of the present. I reproduce the
representations of the past time through association, according to which one
representation draws forth another, because it had been accompanying it.
This is the faculty of reproductive imagination. (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 236)
This passage shows that the reproduction of images needs to be guided by a
subjective rule that Kant calls ‘association’ (Assoziation), for this rule has necessarily
to determine the way in which past representations are to be combined with present
ones. If there were no criterion for bringing back what has already been imaged,
then the synthesis of reproduction in imagination would only be an arbitrary play of
the imagination and it would not serve at all in cognition. The first Critique makes a
clear statement in this sense:
[T]heir reproduction [the reproduction of representations] must thus have a
rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in
the imagination with one representation rather than with any others. This
subjective and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules is
called the association of representations. (A121)
Thus, reproduction is governed by the rule of association, so that certain
representations can be brought back to the present─instead of others─and
synthesized with the new ones. Association establishes then which images are going
to be reproduced in order to be combined with the new ones. However, this implies
that association has in some way to be connected with the new images formed
through the synthesis of apprehension. Otherwise, the synthesis of reproduction
could not attain its aim. The mind has to be able to reproduce representations in a
certain way to avoid generating unruly heaps and to present them in a lawfully
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connected way, since otherwise no cognition would arise (cf. A121). As the
penultimate quotation mentions, the criterion that association follows is that of
accompaniment. This idea reappears in the first Critique when Kant states that:
It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with which
representations that have often followed or accompanied one another are
finally associated with each other and thereby placed in a connection in
accordance with which, even without the presence of the object, one of these
representations brings about a transition of the mind to the other in
accordance with a constant rule. This law of reproduction, however,
presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a
rule. (A100) (Emphasis mine)
Thus, the law of reproduction is the empirical law that reproduces past
images in accordance with the law of association, which is in turn also an empirical
law that follows the criterion of associating in accordance with the times a
representation has been accompanied by another. This might seem vague and even
unnecessary, but Kant introduces a fundamental point in the last sentence: in
reproduction it is already presupposed that the objects of the external world─i.e.,
appearances─are actually subjected to the same rules of association. The last
sentence establishes a break through the word ‘however,’ indicating a shift from
(the rule of) association to the common properties objects in the external world de
facto share, so that reproduction is ultimately grounded─through association─in
something that conveys objective reality.
This way, what we associate in the mind is what we find already associated in
the external world. This implies that there is some sort of regularity in the external
world, and that it is this regularity or order that the mind follows when it brings
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back past images and combines them with new ones. That “appearances themselves
are actually subject to such a rule” means that this is how things stand in the
external world; i.e., that appearances de facto share common properties. These
‘common properties’ are precisely what accounts for the objective ground Kant
requires for association, so that it can rule the reproduction of images without
remaining at the merely subjective level of images; i.e., keeping at the same time its
connection with appearances. Otherwise, association would remain totally
subjective and the reproduction of images would not collaborate to yield genuine
cognition. The following passage allows a better comprehension of this idea:
If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being
where now changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the
longest day the land were covered now with fruits, now with ice and snow,
then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think
of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red; or if
a certain word were attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one and
the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the
governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected
in themselves, then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place.
(A100-101) (Emphasis mine)
Thus, if we can “think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation
of the color red” it is because we have perceived something red, and the image of
that thing red─say a piece of meat─brings to my mind the redness of cinnabar.
That is to say, the common property both objects share de facto is what allows the
imagination to associate images in the same way, and thus allows us to reproduce
the images that have common properties with the new (imaged) objects they are
combined with. The criterion of accompaniment in association is a way of saying
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that the imagination associates according to the shared properties different objects
in the external world de facto have. But the crucial point of Kant’s argument is that
de facto regularities are guaranteed by de jure laws of possible experience. Thus,
when thinking of red cinnabar I can also bring back the image of its heaviness and,
thus, I can reproduce the heaviness of a stone in the mind, without the need to have
any of these appearances actually present in perception again.
Now, Kant calls ‘affinity’ (Verwandtschaft) this objective ground that
association has through the common properties in appearances (as objects): “I call
this objective ground of all association of appearances their affinity” (A122). This is
better specified when Kant makes explicit that this affinity belongs to objects
themselves: “[t]he ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold,
insofar as it lies in the object, is called the affinity of the manifold” (A113). Thus, by
affinity Kant wants to convey the intrinsic similarity of appearances through the
properties they share; by affinity of the manifold he means the common properties
objects in the external world de facto share. The perception of this affinity of
properties in appearances grounds the rule of association that in turn grounds
reproduction, and allows thereby the synthesis of reproduction of the imagination
to be performed. But that there is an objective affinity─one that holds de jure and
not merely de facto─ is due to the fact that experience consists in appearances
determined by a priori laws of human understanding.
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At this stage of his argument, however, Kant does not explain further what
the empirical affinity consists in. Instead, he stresses indirectly its importance by
making clear that the empirical rule of association cannot be put in doubt, even
stating that it has to be assumed: “that empirical rule of association, which one
must assume throughout if one says that everything in the series of occurrences
stands under rules according to which nothing happens that is not preceded by
something upon which it always follows” (A112-113).18 This citation also shows the
relevance the reproduction of images has for cognition, insofar as it relates the rule
of association to the causal rule. Thus, the causal rule19 requires the rule of
association insofar as association establishes the relationship between images and
appearances again. We say ‘again’ since, if left alone, the diverse images formed
from each appearance would not collaborate in cognition in a law-governed way
and would only be subjectively associated in our minds, giving rise to apparent
patterns that have no objective validity. This would imply that all our past or
previous representations were lost or had remained unconnected in the mind, or
that they were arbitrarily connected with the new images we form in the present. As
already explained, this second level of the synthesis requires past
representations─images of appearances─to be kept and united to new ones.

18

It is possible to think here that the common properties of things can be produced in some way by
the mutual causality of substances. See Chapter 1 for the mutual causality of substances.
19

The topic of causality is explained below in this same chapter.
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The distinction between the causal rule and the rule of association must not
be blurred, since the merely subjective association of the manifold does not follow
an objective sequence or succession as the causal relation does. In association, the
connection among appearances as well as between images can take place arbitrarily.
For example, according to the causal law that, ceteris paribus, if it rains the road will
get wet, the representations “it rains” and “the road is wet” have to follow one
another necessarily; i.e., first it rains then the road gets wet, and not the other way
around. By contrast, association allows the connection to run in either temporal
direction: either of the two─the rain or the wet road─can bring back or reproduce
the other. The same holds true for our association of shared properties, though here
there is no relevant contrast to be drawn between subjective and objective temporal
sequences. When such sequences are involved, our perceptions are actually
connected by the causal rule─insofar as what we perceive are appearances─but
they are not reproduced by the causal rule.
Our discussion of the empirical synthesis of apprehension in intuition and of
the reproduction in the imagination has clarified the fundamental role that
perception plays in cognition. This is relevant since Kant conceives experience as
empirical cognition (cf. B147), where empirical cognition is a cognition through
perception, even if it is not grounded in perception, for we already know that every
object has to be given under the forms of space and time in sensibility and governed
by the categories of the understanding in order to be cognized.
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Finally, Kant states that empirical affinity is grounded on a transcendental
affinity. However, the only statement concerning this point says: “[a]ll appearances
. . . stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence in a
transcendental affinity, of which the empirical affinity is the mere consequence”
(A113-114). This transcendental affinity is not explained until Kant investigates the
regulative use of the ideas of reason.20 Nevertheless, it plays a crucial role in Kant’s
account of association, for without it we could not explain how de facto regularities
acquire their de jure character. The necessary laws to which Kant refers in the
passage just cited originate in the understanding, one of which (perhaps the most
important) is the causal law. Kant says: “the understanding is itself the source of the
laws of nature, and thus of the formal unity of nature” (A127). This means that the
laws of nature are not to be understood as merely particular or empirical, but as
grounded in pure laws of the understanding that first make empirical laws possible
(cf. A128). The formal unity of nature is established a priori through the principles
of the understanding that come from the categories,21 which allow us to consider
nature as a synthetic unity of all possible appearances in original apperception.
From this we can infer then that by transcendental affinity Kant intends to convey
the idea that since the unity of nature is formally determined a priori by the
subjection of the sensible manifold to transcendental apperception (cf. A114), it can
20

This topic, however, is outside the domain of this dissertation.

21 The principles of the pure understanding as rules of the objective use of the categories are not
treated in this dissertation since they are outside its domain. See: Critique of Pure Reason. Book II:
Analytic of Principles, Chapter II: System of all Principles of Pure Understanding.
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be considered that the laws of the understanding will be connected a priori in some
way with possible appearances. As Kant puts it: “[f]or this unity of nature should be
a necessary, i.e., a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances” (A125).22
3.4. The Recognition of a Manifold as an Object
The question now arises as to how it is possible to recognize an object as an
object. We have stated above that perception requires the synthesis of
apprehension, insofar as what we perceive are appearances and not dispersed or
isolated elements in space and time. The empirical synthesis of apprehension, we
said, has the aim of composing the manifold as a unity; i.e., to bring it as one
representation to the mind. In this sense, perception presupposes the synthesis of
apprehension. Thus, the question is now: how is this manifold recognized as an
object? Kant states this question by asking “how the manifold is combined in the
object” (A190/B235). This question is also stated by asking how the manifold is
combined in the appearance itself (cf. A191/B236).23
The question arises for the synthesis of apprehension alone cannot
guarantee the representation of the manifold as necessary─i.e., that the manifold
we combine is combined in the same way as it is combined in the object itself─since,

22

See the article of Henry Allison on the answer of Kant to David Hume concerning affinity,
association, and experience, with some basic relations to consciousness. Allison, Henry. 1974.
Transcendental affinity-Kant’s answer to Hume. In Kant’s theory of knowledge. Ed. Lewis White Beck,
119-127. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

23 Kant’s usage of ‘appearance itself’ in this explanation must not be confusing. He introduces the
‘itself’ following the concept ‘appearance’ here to stress he is talking about appearances as objects
and not focusing in their representational nature. See Chapter 1 for the two sides of appearances.
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when apprehending, the imagination only juxtaposes the elements it collects but, in
doing so, it cannot guarantee that the synthesized manifold is necessary. Thus, in
bare apprehension (Apprehension), the imagination cannot recognize the manifold
as an object. Kant says: “apprehension (Apprehension) is only a juxtaposition
(Zusammenstellung) of the manifold of empirical intuition, but no representation of
the necessity of the combined existence of the appearances that it juxtaposes in
space and time is to be encountered in it” (A176/B219). This is why the example of
the house is introduced,24 since the apprehension of an object alone can occur in an
arbitrary way; i.e., the empirical manifold could be synthesized without following a
necessary order. That is to say, I can apprehend the house beginning from the roof
to the ground level or vice versa (cf. A192/B237). Therefore, a necessary order
cannot be determined through the successive apprehension of the elements in a
manifold alone. Kant points out:
The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive (Die
Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinung ist jederzeit sukzessiv). The
representation of the parts succeed one another. Whether they also succeed
in the object is a second point of reflection. (A189/B234)
Kant’s insistence on the successive nature of apprehension is relevant, for the
fact that the imagination always apprehends successively the manifolds of
appearances (cf. A182/B225, A201/B246) opens prima facie the alternative that the
connection of manifolds can account for the recognition of an object as an object.
However, since the synthesis of the imagination determines inner sense concerning
24 The discussion concerning the distinction between the house and the ship driven downstream
begins in A190/B235.
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time (cf. B233), but time itself cannot be perceived, there is no guarantee that the
connection of appearances in the imagination will be the same as the connection of
objects outside the mind, for the imagination by itself has no criterion for
determining which appearance─ i.e., aspect of a thing or state of a substance─
comes first and which comes second. Therefore, through this alternative I am only
conscious that I am placing one appearance, or state of a substance, first and
another second, but not that this is the order objects themselves follow in the
external world. Kant says:
[C]onnection is . . . the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which
determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This, however, can
combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either one
or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived in itself, nor can
what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically
determined in relation to it. I am therefore only conscious that my
imagination places one state before and the other after, not that the one state
precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere
perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding
one another remains undetermined (es bleibt durch die bloße Wahrnehmung
das objektive Verhältnis der einanderfolgenden Erscheinungen unbestimmt).
(B233-234) (Emphasis mine)
Thus, from the mere synthetic activity of the imagination in apprehension,
there is no way to get out of the subjectivity of our own representations;25 there is
no way to guarantee through bare apprehension that the connection in our mind
corresponds to the connection of objects in the external world. It could be that both
25

“We have representations in us, of which we can also become conscious. But let this
consciousness reach as far and be as exact and precise as one wants, still there always remain only
representations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind in this or that temporal relation.” (Wir haben
Vorstellungen in uns, deren wir uns auch bewußt werden können. Dieses Bewußtsein aber mag so weit
erstreckt, und so genau oder pünktlich sein, als man wolle, so bleiben es doch nur immer Vorstellungen,
d.i. inner Bestimmungen unseres Gemüts in diesem oder jenem Zeitverhältnisse). (A197/B242)
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successions follow different patterns. This difference is clearly established by
appealing to the nature of an objective time series: “I still have to show what sort of
combination (Verbindung) in time pertains to the manifold in the appearances itself
even though the representation of it in apprehension is always successive”
(A190/B235). This is why the mind seeks a rule (Regel) through perception that
guides its synthetic activity in apprehension. As expected, the condition this rule has
to fulfill is to make one way of combining the manifold necessary, for this is what is
required to recognize a manifold as an object; i.e., to guarantee the recognition of an
object as an object. Kant states this condition clearly:
[A]ppearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension,
can thereby only be represented as the object that is distinct from them if it
stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and
makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That in the appearance
which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the
object. (A191/B236) (Emphasis mine)
Thus, there has to be a rule that guides the synthesis in apprehension so that
the synthesized manifold can be recognized as an object. The rule has to fulfill two
conditions: it has to distinguish the combination of a manifold from all other
combined manifolds, and has to make one way of combining the manifold necessary.
The two conditions are really one for the necessary manifold already implies its
distinction from other manifolds. The passage cited above indicates that the
condition for the rule (that guides apprehension) is already contained in the
appearance, and that this is the object. This explains why the initial question that
gave rise to this section was stated in terms of recognition of the object as an object,
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since there is something in the appearance itself that allows this recognition, as we
will now explain.
To seek the rule in perception means to seek the rule in what happens, but
the only way in which something that happens can be perceived is if a previous
appearance precedes it that did not contain the appearance—or state of a
substance—that we are perceiving now. “That something happens, i.e., that
something or a state comes to be that previously was not, cannot be empirically
perceived except where an appearance precedes that does not contain this state in
itself” (A191/B236-237). This is because, as explained in Chapter 1, we cannot
perceive empty time, so what we perceive is always a succession of occurrences.
Kant points out: “a reality that would follow on an empty time, thus an arising not
preceded by any state of things, can be apprehended just as little as empty time
itself. Every apprehension of an occurrence is therefore a perception that follows
another one” (A191-192/B237). This is precisely why Kant contrasts the example of
the house with that of the ship driven downstream. In the former the successive
apprehension of the manifold could be in any order, whereas in the latter the
successive apprehension has to be guided by the sequence in the object, for we
cannot perceive first the ship driven downstream and afterwards the ship driven
upstream, but only in the contrary way. Kant says, “[m]y perception of its position
downstream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible
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that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived
downstream and afterwards upstream” (A192/B237).
Thus, the successive synthesis of apprehension follows the succession of
happenings in time (that we perceive). So apprehension and perception are both
subjected to how things succeed one another in the external world, or to how the
states of a substance change in time. The relation among appearances themselves─
i.e., the occurrences or happenings we perceive─indicates to the imagination how
to synthesize, for they show a necessary order in the temporal sequence which allows
the connection to the object. A fundamental passage accounts for this:
In the synthesis of the appearances the manifold representations always
follow one another. Now by this means no object at all is represented; since
through this sequence, which is common to all apprehensions, nothing is
distinguished from anything else. But as soon as I perceive or anticipate that
there is in this sequence a relation to the preceding state,26 from which the
representation follows in accordance with a rule,27 I represent something as
an occurrence, or as something that happens; i.e., I cognize an object that I
must place in time in a determinate position, which, after the preceding state,
cannot be otherwise assigned to it. (A198/B243) (Emphasis mine)
Therefore, what allows the recognition of the object as an object is not simply
that the imagination follows the rule that determines the succession of objects in the
external world─i.e., the causal rule─while it successively synthesizes in
apprehension, but that, in doing so, the imagination perceives that one state follows
another necessarily so that the mind places─has to place─the objects of the

26

Note that the recognition of the object is intimately linked to the causal rule.

27

By “in accordance with rule” Kant means “necessarily” (cf. A194/B239).
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sequence in determinate temporal positions. This allows the mind to recognize an
object in the manifold, and to recognize it as different from other objects in the
sequence as well. Hence, the perceived sequence of appearances indicates to the
mind what specific causal relations hold in experience – i.e., what follows from what
necessarily. This allows the mind to recognize an object in the manifold by
determining its place in the temporal sequence.
Now, we mentioned above that “the condition for the rule is contained in the
appearance.” But what exactly does “contained in the appearance” mean? The
answer is that every appearance is the cause of the following appearance in time,
because every appearance posits the following one: “if the state that precedes is
posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows”
(A198/B243-244). Kant answers this way: “there must . . . lie in that which in
general precedes an occurrence the condition for a rule, in accordance with which
this occurrence always and necessarily follows” (A193/B238-239). That “the
condition for a rule must lie in what precedes an occurrence” and “that this
occurrence must always follow necessarily,” means that the previous occurrence
contains the condition of the later, and this can only be because it posits it. For
example, the ship upstream is the cause of the ship downstream, because its first
appearance or state has posited the second one. It is because one state or
appearance posits the next one that the condition for the rule is contained in the
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appearance itself, since each appearance is caused by a previous one from which it
follows in time. Kant says:
This rule for determining something with respect to its temporal sequence,
however, is that in what precedes, the condition is to be encountered under
which the occurrence always (i.e., necessarily) follows (Diese Regel aber,
etwas der Zeitfolge nach zu bestimmen, ist: daß in dem, was vorhergeht, die
Bedingung anzutreffen sei, unter welcher die Begebenheit jederzeit (d.i.
notwendiger Weise) folgt). (A200/B246)28
[T]his rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens, and
it makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the
apprehension of this appearance) necessary (Diese Regel aber ist bei der
Wahrnehmung von dem, was geschieht, jederzeit anzutreffen, und sie macht die
Ordnung der einander folgenden Wahrnehmungen (in der Apprehension dieser
Erscheinung) notwendig). (A193/B238)
Thus the rule the mind seeks─and finds─in the external world through
perception is the causal rule, insofar as each appearance is necessarily an effect of a
preceding one as well as being the cause of a following one, because earlier states
posit later states necessarily. Kant says this is precisely the meaning that the concept
of causality has: “that something could be so constituted that, if it is posited,
something else must necessarily thereby be posited as well; for that is what the
concept of cause says” (Prol. Ak. IV: 257). Through this explanation Kant conveys
that the recognition of an object as an object is possible in the perception of the
succession of appearances because there is a causal relation among appearances.
Thus, the causal rule allows the mind to recognize a manifold as an object, insofar as
the sequence of states that follow one another necessarily─and that the mind

28

This statement is Kant’s conception of the so called ‘law of causality.’
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perceives─forces the mind to determine each state in time, i.e., makes the mind give
each appearance a determinate position in the sequence.
The discovery of the causal rule then guarantees the perceiving subject that it
is not enclosed in inner sense, and that its representations of objects are not just a
play of its own imagination (cf. A194/B239). Ultimately, what the mind recognizes
then are the different states of external substances through their alteration in time,
and it does so by determining the position each appearance has in space and time.
Thus it is the (causal) rule we find in appearances that determines the succession in
apprehension, since the imagination synthesizes following the (successive) order of
appearances in the external world. Kant’s point, however, is stronger, since what he
intends to convey is that the successive synthesis of apprehension must follow the
order of things in the external world; otherwise, no object would be recognized in
the manifold that is being synthesized. A fundamental passage explains this:
In our case I must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension
from the objective sequence of appearances, for otherwise the former
would be entirely undetermined and no appearance would be distinguished
from any other. The former alone [the subjective sequence of apprehension]
proves nothing about the connection of the manifold in the object, because it
is entirely arbitrary. This connection must therefore consist in the order of
the manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension of
one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in
accordance with a rule. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the
appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to
be encountered in it, which is to say as much as that I cannot arrange the
apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence. (A193/B238)
(Emphasis mine)
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As the passage makes plain, it is an imperative that the synthesis in
apprehension follows the succession of objects in the external world; this is
conveyed by the statement that “I must derive the subjective sequence of
apprehension from the objective sequence of appearances.” This is the only way we
can recognize an object as an object in the manifold that is being synthesized, for, by
following the causal rule in appearances─where the preceding appearance posits
the following one necessarily─the mind is able to distinguish one object from
another in the manifolds it synthesizes by determining its place in the sequence, and
thus recognizing a way of combination as necessary. Thus the causal rule frees the
activity of the imagination from the mere temporal relations that representations
have in inner sense. This is one of the most interesting explanations Kant gives of
how the mind and the external world condition one another mutually.29
This is how the two required conditions are then fulfilled, for the rule
encountered in the succession of appearances themselves guides the synthesis of
apprehension to combine manifolds in the same way. This means that the
combination in the manifold is necessary, and it allows us to distinguish one
manifold from another precisely by making a combination necessary. The
successive synthesis in apprehension follows then the succession of appearances
themselves in time and this makes it possible for the mind to distinguish among
manifolds and to recognize an object in the manifold it combines. It is the causal
29 In Chapter 1 we explained how inner and outer sense condition each other as well, even if in the
inner-outer relationship a tension exists which is not the case here.
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rule then that grants of objective significance the synthesis of apprehension. In the
same sense, Kant says:
If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always
presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance
with a rule. For without this I would not say of the object that it follows, since
the mere sequence in my apprehension, if it is not, by means of a rule,
determined in relation to something preceding, does not justify any sequence
in the object. Therefore I always make my subjective synthesis (of
apprehension) objective with respect to a rule in accordance with which the
appearances in their sequence, i.e., as they occur, are determined through the
preceding state, and only under this presupposition alone is the experience
of something that happens even possible. (A195/B240) (Emphasis mine)
A clarification needs to be made here, for this explanation seems to
contradict our initial statement that perception (Warhnehmung) presupposes the
synthesis of apprehension, for now it seems that this synthesis follows perception.
Kant, however, is very precise in this presentation, for the apprehension of the
manifold is one thing, and the perception of appearances is another. The distinction
between the two is very subtle, since the three activities─i.e., the successive
apprehension of the manifold in intuition, the perception of appearances, and their
submission to the causal rule in apprehension (and perception)─are basically
simultaneous. It is just that to perceive something there has to be some sort of
manifold being synthesized in apprehension, for otherwise there would be nothing
to perceive at all. In short, while I perceive the boat going downstream, my
imagination is simultaneously synthesizing the manifold in apprehension in the
same way. And due to the causal rule that guides perception and the synthesis of

146
apprehension, I am able to recognize the synthesized manifold as an object by
determining the place of the objects in the sequence in time.
Finally, the recognition of the object as an object has to be distinguished from
the determination of an object as an object of experience, for it is one thing to
recognize the manifold as an object and another to make the object an object of
cognition.30 We recall here that possible experience depends on the understanding,
since the understanding makes the representation of an object possible (cf.
A199/B244-445) through the categories. Kant says “this happens through its
conferring temporal order on the appearances and their existence by assigning to
each of these, as a consequence, a place in time determined a priori in regard to the
preceding appearances” (A199/B245). Thus it is not just necessary to determine
the position of an appearance in the temporal sequence, but to determine it a priori.
This implies we are no longer operating only at the perceptual level but, more
fundamentally, at the transcendental level.
Otherwise stated, we are no longer talking of the causal rule we seek and
find, but of the causal law that determines a priori the causal relation of
appearances. “The assignation of a place in time a priori to appearances” implies the
ruling action of the categories; more precisely, of the relational category of causeeffect, where appearances are already conceived as phenomena or existing objects

30 This distinction correlates to the distinction between ‘judgments of perception’ and ‘judgments of
experience’ that is explained in the next section of this chapter.
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under natural laws. Thus the causal law31 determines an object insofar as it assigns
it a priori a determinate place in the temporal sequence.
It is clear that assigning a place in time determined a priori─i.e., applying the
categories to objects in general─is not the same thing as establishing the
determinate position in time of a perceptual object. Since we are talking in both
cases of objects of the outer sense, before as appearances and now as phenomena,
let us explain how an ‘object of perception’ (Gegenstand der Warhnehmung) can
become an ‘object of experience’ (Gegenstand der Erfahrung), since, strictly
speaking, for Kant an object of perception is an appearance, while a phenomenon is
an object of experience; i.e., an object of cognition properly speaking.
3.5. The Controversial Distinction between Judgments of Perception and
Judgments of Experience: A Possible Interpretation
In Chapter 2 we explained how the logical functions of the understanding in
judgments determined all the possible relations a thing can have with its predicates
as well as with other things. It was stated that the different ways in which
representations─more precisely, concepts─are related in judgments convey all the
possible relations a thing can have, and that it was the role of the categories to
determine which intuition is subsumed under each concept in judgments.
Transcendental Logic then clarified the absolutely necessary role of the categories
in all judgments. However, in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will
31 Even if Kant uses most of the time indistinctly the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘law’; in strict sense ‘law’ is a
rule that is objective.

148
Be Able to Come Forward as Science, written in between the two editions of the first
Critique, Kant surprisingly divides empirical judgments into what he calls a
‘judgment of perception’ (Wahrnehmungsurteil) and a ‘judgment of experience’
(Erfahrungsurteil), where the criterion for the distinction is precisely the absence of
the categories in the former and their presence in the latter. Most commentators
have been puzzled by this perplexing distinction.
Indeed, the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of
experience inevitably raises the question about the need for the categories, since
prima facie it seems that, if categories truly rule intuition, the distinction between
the two types of judgments has no sense at all. On the contrary, if we accept this
distinction, the question arises about the nature of the judgments of perception, and
how are we to understand them in relation to the unity of apperception.32 Several
commentators have criticized this distinction on the grounds that it does not cohere
with Kant’s more considered account of the close tie between the categories and
judgment in general. This is not, however, our position. We think the distinction
between both types of judgments must not be disregarded as futile, even if it is
problematic. The Prolegomena introduces the problem as follows:
Empirical judgments, insofar as they have objective validity, are judgments of
experience; those, however, that are only subjectively valid I call mere
judgments of perception (Empirische Urteile, sofern sie objektive Gültigkeit
haben, sind Erfahrungsurteile; die aber, so nur subjektiv gültig sind, nenne ich
bloße Wahrnehmungsurteile). The latter do not require pure concepts of
the understanding, but only the logical connection of perceptions in a
32

See Chapter 4 for the (objective and subjective) unity of apperception.
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thinking subject. But the former always demand, beyond the representations
of sensory intuition, in addition special concepts originally generated in the
understanding, which are precisely what make the judgment of experience
objectively valid. (Prol. Ak. IV: 298)33
As surprising as the distinction itself, is also the demand that judgments of
perception only contain a logical connection, for this implies that what we perceive
are only representations connected to one another under the requirements of
General Logic. This implies that the connection concerning content─i.e., what is
given in empirical intuition─is not taken into consideration, and thus that the
judgment has no universal or objective validity.34 What are we to understand then
by judgments of perception? Since these judgments are empirical, and the empirical
synthesis in apprehension follows the causal rule that allows us to recognize a
manifold as an object, a first approximation is to conceive judgments of perception
as judgments that recognize the object as an object, and then to consider judgments
of experience as those that determine an object as an object of experience. This
explanation fits with the intention of the Prolegomena since Kant considers all
empirical judgments to be first judgments of perception that are valid only for the
subject, that are then transformed, through the application of the categories, into
judgments of experience. As Kant says:
All of our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception; they hold only
for us, i.e., for our subject, and only afterwards do we give them a new
33

The Jäsche Logic presents the distinction between both judgments this way: “A judgment of
perception is merely subjective, an objective judgment from perceptions is a judgment of experience”
(JL Ak. IX: 113). However, besides a Note, Kant gives no further explanation.
34

Kant equates universal validity and objective validity (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 298).
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relation, namely to an object, and intend that the judgment should also be
valid at all times for us and for everyone else; for if a judgment agrees with
an object, then all judgments of the same object must also agree with one
another, and hence the objective validity of a judgment of experience means
nothing other than its necessary universal validity. (Prol. Ak. IV: 298)
Let us note first that the object Kant is talking about here is a genuine object.
As Kant explains, we cognize an object only when we succeed in relating our
representations to something distinct from our own representations. It is clear that
this new relation refers then to the object as an object of experience or a
phenomenon. Now, this new relation is established by adding the categories to the
perceived appearances, and more precisely, to empirical intuition: “special concepts
must yet be added, which have their origin completely a priori in the pure
understanding, under which every perception can first be subsumed and then, by
means of the same concepts, transformed into experience” (Prol. Ak. IV: 297). The
addition of the categories then guarantees the cognition of a property that belongs
necessarily to the object (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 298), and this allows the judgment of that
object to be considered as universally valid – i.e., to count as a judgment of
experience. The cognition of properties that belong to the object necessarily is
precisely the determination of the object which is only possible through the
categories. Therefore, a determined object is an object of experience.
As the passage just quoted states, the determination of an object concerning
its properties brings unity to the object: this is what Kant means when he says that
“if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also
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agree with one another.” This unity of the object accounts for the object as a
phenomenon or as the object considered under natural laws, which, it is clear,
cannot be accounted for when mere appearances are at stake. Therefore, the
parallel between judgments of perception as judgments about appearances, and
judgments of experience as judgments about phenomena makes sense. Kant intends
to convey to us that just as appearances can become phenomena, so judgments of
perception can become judgments of experience. Two questions arise then here:
first, how are we to understand the process by which a judgment of perception
becomes a judgment of experience, and, second, how are we to understand the fact
that a perceptual judgment is not governed by the categories? An analysis of Kant’s
own examples is the most useful way to understand what he intends to convey:
[I]f I say: the air is elastic, then this judgment is to begin with only a
judgment of perception; I relate two sensations in my senses only to one
another. If I want it to be called a judgment of experience, I then require that
this connection be subject to a condition that makes it universally valid (Will
ich, es soll Erfahrungsurteil heißen, so verlange ich, daß diese Verknüpfung
unter einer Bedingung stehe, welche sie allgemeingültig macht). I want
therefore that I, at every time, and also everyone else, would necessarily have
to connect the same perceptions under the same circumstances. (Prol. Ak. IV:
299)
What is interesting about this example is that the same formulation is used
for both judgments. The judgment “the air is elastic” is first a judgment of
perception and then a judgment of experience. This implies that in principle the way
the judgment is formulated is not a fundamental point in the discussion. What the
passage states as fundamental is that for a judgment of perception to “be called a
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judgment of experience” the connection has to be universally valid, and this depends
on a condition that, as stated, is the application of the categories to the perceived
elements. The question is then what connection Kant is talking about.
In the chapter concerning the Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics in the
Metaphysical Foundations, Kant defines elasticity as the expansive force of matter
and explains that it is through this force that matter fills space.35 However, matter
also has a compressing force that acts against the expansive force; the compressing
force can drive matter from the space it fills into a decreased space. This way the
enlargement of space by the expanding force can be resisted by the compressing
force. This information is sufficient for our purposes here.
Going back to the passage cited above, when I inflate the tire of my bike I
perceive that air is elastic at this present time and under a specific circumstance that
is only mine; thus I say “air is elastic.” The usage of an air pump in general makes
me─you, Peter, etc.─perceive this elasticity, for the compressed air always tries to
expand as soon as the compressing force diminishes. However, this judgment─“the
air is elastic”─is only subjective insofar as it is only mine, and it does not matter how
many times I inflate the tire of my bike and perceive the elasticity of the air, the
judgment will still continue to be subjective since it is a judgment only valid for me.
As Heidegger points out: “‘every time when . . . then,’ is simply a uniting of various
perceptions, i.e., a perceptual judgment. Here my perceptions (as also those of every
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other perceiving “I”) are always added to one another. This only determines how
what is presently given to me appears to me” (Heidegger 1967, 138). As already
anticipated, we have to focus then on the connection mentioned in the passage.
Since “the air is elastic” is a categorical judgment, for the predicate ‘elastic’ is
attributed to the subject ‘air,’ we will expect the intuitions involved in the judgment
to be subsumed under the relational categories of substance and accident – i.e., ‘air’
being subsumed under the category of substance and ‘elastic’ under the category of
accident. However, Kant surprises us by stating that the subsumption of ‘air’ must
be under the category of cause. This makes clear that the connection he is talking
about is not that of the categorical judgment – i.e., that it is not the copula ‘is’ that is
at stake in the passage from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience.
In a fundamental passage Kant clarifies just this point:
A completely different judgment therefore occurs before experience can arise
from perception. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept,
which determines the form of judging in general with respect to the intuition,
connects the empirical consciousness of the latter in a consciousness in
general, and thereby furnishes empirical judgments with universal validity; a
concept of this kind is a pure a priori concept of the understanding, which
does nothing but simply determine for an intuition the mode in general in
which it can serve for judging. The concept of cause being such a concept, it
therefore determines the intuition which is subsumed under it, e.g., that of
air, with respect to judging in general – namely, so that the concept of air
serves, with respect to expansion, in the relation of the antecedent to the
consequent in a hypothetical judgment. (Prol. Ak. IV: 300)
Universality, then, or more precisely the universal or objective validity of an
empirical judgment (about an appearance), is obtained when the judgment in
question is connected with consciousness in general. Otherwise stated, universality is
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obtained when our empirical consciousness is connected with one consciousness of
pure apperception. The connection of an empirical judgment with one consciousness
or pure apperception is what allows a perceptual judgment to become objectively
valid, and thus to acquire the status of a judgment of experience. The category then
not only determines the activity of judging in general but additionally connects the
empirical consciousness with one consciousness of pure apperception.36 It is this
connection that allows empirical judgments to acquire universal validity. Objective
validity or universal validity implies then empirical intuition is connected to
consciousness in general through the action of the category.
However, the key point in this explanation is that not all categories must be
applied to perceptual judgments, but only that of causality. This is very important,
since otherwise we would have to conclude that there is no category ruling
perceptual judgments, what would make the relation of concepts in such judgments
mere nonsense.37 On this interpretation of the Prolegomena Kant is not thinking of
all categories but only of the causal relation of two judgments subsumed under the
category of causality, since the point is to make an empirical perceptual judgment
into a judgment of experience. More precisely, what Kant is conveying is that
judgments of perception must be governed by the category of causality to become
judgments of experience. As the passage says, the category at stake here is that of
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See Chapter 4 for the explanation of how categories connect empirical consciousness with one
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causality, and the intuition of ‘air’ has to be subsumed under that category. It adds
that this is required “so that the concept of air serves, with respect to expansion, in
the relation of the antecedent to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment.” In our
reading, this statement gives us the path to understand Kant’s intention. Let us then
go to the Logic to understand what Kant means by a hypothetical judgment. Kant
claims:
The matter of hypothetical judgments consists of two judgments that are
connected with each other as ground and consequent. The first of these
judgments, containing the ground, is the antecedent proposition (antecedens,
prius); the second, which is related as the consequent to it, the consequent
proposition (consequens, posterius); and the presentation of this kind of
connection of two judgments with each other in behalf of the unity of
consciousness is called consequence, which makes up the form of hypothetical
judgments. (L Ak. IX: 105)
The Logic adds an important idea that will allow us to understand fully Kant’s
point:
The form of connection in hypothetical judgments is twofold: the positing
(modus ponens) or the deposing (modus tollens) form.
1) If the ground (antecedens) is true, the consequent (consequens)
determined by it is also true—modus ponens.
2) If the consequent (consequens) is false, the ground (antecedens) is also
false—modus tollens. (L Ak. IX: 106)
The hypothetical judgment is then a judgment composed of two judgments
under the form “if . . . then.” The first judgment (the one in the ‘if’ clause) is the
ground and the second (the one in the ‘then’ clause) is the consequent; when the
first judgment posits the second one, the “if . . . then” connection is called a modus
ponens connection. These two judgments (united) constitute the matter of the
hypothetical judgment, but its form is the connection between them – i.e., the
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relation ‘if . . . then.’ Now, Kant calls ‘consequence’ (Konsequenz) the relation the
form of the hypothetical judgment has to consciousness in general. In other words,
‘consequence’ (Konsequenz) is the formal relation of the judgment united to one
consciousness.38
The Logic then sheds light on the statements in the Prolegomena for we can
understand now how a judgment of perception can become a judgment of
experience. Subsuming the intuition of air under the category of causality─“so that
the concept of air serves, with respect to expansion, in the relation of the antecedent
to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment”─we have then the following
hypothetical judgment: “if matter expands, then air is elastic.” This is a hypothetical
judgment in modus ponens because the first or grounding judgment has posited the
second one; i.e., that “air is elastic” necessary follows from the expansive force of
matter.
Thus the perceptual judgment “air is elastic” has become a judgment of
experience because the perception or perceptual judgment─including their concepts
and the empirical intuitions subsumed under them─ has entered into the necessary
causal connections of perceptions determined a priori by its subsumption under the
relational category of causality, i.e., the perceptual judgment has been subsumed
under the causal law, and thus united to consciousness in general, since the

38 Kant says that “[w]hat the copula is to categorical judgments, the consequence is to the
hypothetical─their form” (L Ak. IX: 105). See Chapter 4 for the relevance the copula ‘is’ has
concerning the unity of consciousness.
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categories express the unity of consciousness.39 The “air is elastic” is no longer a
judgment valid only for me; i.e., subjectively valid, but a judgment universally valid,
since it has been united with one consciousness of original pure apperception.
The point is then that when the perceptual judgment is subsumed under the
form “if . . . then” as the consequent of a previous judgment, it becomes a judgment
of experience itself, for the connection “if . . . then” is related to one consciousness of
pure apperception, from which the objective validity of the hypothetical judgments
proceeds. That some judgments determined by the category of causality─more
explicitly, the grounding judgments─are already judgments of experience that are
presupposed in this process, is necessary for the growth of cognition. Kant points to
the presupposition of judgments when he states that:
[T]he air is elastic, becomes universally valid and thereby for the first time a
judgment of experience, because certain judgments occur beforehand, which
subsume the intuition of the air under the concept of cause and effect, and
thereby determine the perceptions not merely with respect to each other in
my subject, but with respect to the form of judging in general (here the
hypothetical). (Prol. Ak. IV: 301) (emphasis mine)40
39

See Chapter 4 for the explanation of how the categories express the unity of consciousness.

40 Longuenesse seems to move in the same direction when she says: “[O]nly a metaphysics of nature
can fully justify the move from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience. And it can do
this because its own universal principles rely on a priori demonstration of the objectivity of the
categories” (Longuenesse 2000 , 175). Moreover, in her essay Kant on causality: What was he trying
to prove? Longuenesse says: “[w]hat allows the transition from the mere statement of a repeatedly
observed occurrence (judgment of perception) to a hypothetical judgment for which we claim the
“strict universality of a rule” (judgment of experience)? Kant’s response is that we presuppose the
necessary truth through of another judgment, prior to both the judgment of perception and the
judgment of experience. We presuppose the truth of a judgment that states that appearances, the
objects of our perception and experience, are ‘in themselves determined’ with respect to the logical
form of our hypothetical judgment. We presuppose, in other words, that appearances are in
themselves, as empirical objects, connected by a chain of causal connections, or we presuppose the
universal validity of the causal principle” (Longuenesse 2005, 240). Here Longuenesse is also arguing
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Let us focus on another of Kant’s examples, where now the judgment of
perception appears to have the form of a hypothetical judgment, but without
necessity in the relation. The passage says as follows:
To have a more easily understood example, consider the following: If the sun
shines on the stone, it [the stone] becomes warm (Wenn die Sonne den Stein
bescheint, so wird er warm). This judgment is a mere judgment of perception
and contains no necessity, however often I and others also have perceived
this; the perceptions are only usually found so conjoined. But if I say: the sun
warms the stone (die Sonne erwärmt den Stein), then beyond the perception
is added the understanding’s concept of cause, which connects necessarily the
concept of sunshine with that of heat, and the synthetic judgment becomes
necessarily universally valid, hence objective, and changes from a perception
into experience. (Prol. Ak. IV: 301n)
Even if the first judgment─i.e., “if the sun shines on the stone, it [the stone]
becomes warm”─seems to be a hypothetical judgment, it is not, for the supposed
grounding judgment does not necessarily posit the second one. It is just a judgment
of perception. However, if we say “if sunshine heats, then the sun warms the stone,”
here the first judgment posits the second one which follows from the first
necessarily, and thus the relation purports to be objectively valid and the judgment
is related to apperception in general. The judgment “sunshine heats” is then the
grounding judgment, or the condition already present, in the judgment of
experience “the sun warms the stone.” Through the subsumption of the intuition of
the sun under the category of cause, the consequent or second judgment becomes
part of a necessary sequence of causal relations that makes the heat of the sun to be

that this is how things are de facto arranged in the external world as well; i.e., she is appealing to the
causal rule we mentioned in our previous section.
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the cause of the stone becoming warm. This is how the connection between “the
sun shines on the stone” and “the stone is warm” becomes an objective connection
and thus this perceptual judgment becomes the judgment of experience “the sun
warms the stone.”
This second example teaches us that the mere causal form, i.e., the ‘if . . . then’
connection, is not by itself sufficient for a judgment of perception to become a
judgment of experience, for the consequent has to follow from the antecedent
necessarily. Non sequiturs, such as, the judgment “If children are small, then leaves
are green,” are clear examples, but as the non-experiential version of “When the sun
shines, the stone grows warm” makes clear, there are perfectly reasonable
hypothetical judgments of perception that also fall short of being judgments of
experience.
This is what we consider Kant to be trying to convey through the
Prolegomena’s distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of
experience. We agree with Heidegger that Kant’s intention with this distinction
between two types of empirical judgments is to point out that an object in the strict
sense is neither what is only sensed (Empfundene) nor what is only perceived
(Wahrgenommene), but that which a judgment of experience posits as an object of
knowledge, i.e. something that has validity for any human subject whatsoever (cf.
Heidegger 1967, 137). Heidegger rightly considers that a judgment of experience
conveys a completely different representation of the given which is its apprehension
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as nature (cf. Heidegger 1967, 139). It is in this sense also that we understand
Kant’s statement that a judgment of perception has no reference to the object (cf.
Prol. Ak: IV: 300).
Our interpretation coincides in many points with Longuenesse’s as well. She
states that the passage from a perceptual judgment to a judgment of experience
implies the subsumption of concepts under more general concepts, and these in turn
under the category of causality (cf. Longuenesse 2000, 175). She states that: “[i]n
the case of ‘Air is elastic’, the judgment of perception becomes a judgment of
experience when the logically connected perceptions are subsumed under the
concept ‘force of repulsion’, which is itself thought under the concept of cause”
(Longuenesse 2000, 181).41 She also says that the passage from perceptual
judgments to judgments of experience requires us to focus on the connection “if . . .
then” and accordingly asks: “[t]he question then becomes, How does the merely
logical combination of perceptions expressed by this connective lead to the
subsumption of intuition under the corresponding category?” (Longuenesse 2000,
176n). She advances the need of hypothetical judgments for this transformation.42
However, it is in her essay Kant on causality: What was he trying to prove? that she
really develops this topic. There she argues that is possible through the
41

Force of repulsion—which is a fundamental property of matter—is also called expansive force,
according to Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations. Longuenesse also refers to this work in her
explanation.
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“Categorical judgments such as ‘Air is elastic’ can thereby also acquire the status of judgments of
experience. But they require the mediation of hypothetical judgments, the true guides of an
experimental method whose main goal is the discovery of causal connections” (Longuenesse 2000,
177).
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hypothetical judgments in modus ponens and she rightly expresses that “what a
hypothetical judgment asserts is that the predication expressed by the consequent
can be asserted only under the condition that the predication expressed in the
antecedent be asserted” (Longuenesse 2005, 238). This is consistent with our own
explanation.
Therefore, in our interpretation, the division of empirical judgments in the
Prolegomena is not really about the lack of categories as ruling a priori concepts in
perceptual judgments─even if Kant initially states so─but about the need to
subsume empirical intuitions, and their corresponding concepts, under the category
of causality to transform perceptual judgments into judgments of experience.
Simply stated, for an ‘object of perception’ (Gegenstand der Warhnehmung) to
become an ‘object of experience’ (Gegenstand der Erfahrung) the category of ‘cause
and effect’ (der Kausalität und Dependenz) has to be applied to the concatenation of
appearances. In our reading, it is not that judgments of perception are not governed
by the categories, for what is at stake in this explanation is merely the category of
cause and effect that is a category that relates two judgments; these two judgments
themselves have necessarily to be governed by the categories. Two passages from the
first Critique convey relevant ideas in this explanation:
The concept, however, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can
only be a pure concept of understanding, which does not lie in the perception,
and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect (Der Begriff
aber, der eine Notwendigkeit der synthetischen Einheit bei sich führt, kann nu
rein reiner Verstandesbegriff sein, der nicht in der Wahrnehmung liegt, und das
ist hier der Begriff des Verhältnisses der Ursache und Wirkung), the former
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of which determines the latter in time, as its consequence, and not as
something that could merely precede in the imagination (or not even be
perceived at all). Therefore it is only because we subject the sequence of the
appearances and thus all alteration to the law of causality43 that experience
itself, i.e., empirical cognition of them [appearances], is possible;
consequently they themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only in
accordance with this law. (B234) (Emphasis mine)
Thus the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) in accordance
with which the existence of that which succeeds (what happens) is
determined in time necessarily and in accordance with a rule by something
that precedes it, consequently the relation of cause to effect, is the condition
of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series
of perceptions (mithin das Verhältnis der Ursache zur Wirkung die
Bedingung der objektiven Gültigkeit unserer empirischen Urteile, in Ansehung
der Reihe der Wahrnehmungen), thus of their empirical truth, and therefore
of experience. Hence the principle of the causal relation in the sequence of
appearances is valid for all objects of experience (under the conditions of
succession), since it is itself the ground of the possibility of such an
experience. (A202/B247)
Thus, in our interpretation there is no contradiction between this section of
the Prolegomena and the main ideas of Kant’s critical philosophy. The distinction
between two types of empirical judgments can only be understood in the context of
a physical explanation; indeed the section in question in the Prolegomena belongs
under the heading “How is Pure Natural Science Possible?” where Kant states, just
before introducing the distinction between both types of judgments, the following
idea:
A judgment of perception can never be considered as valid for experience
without the law, that if an event is perceived then it is always referred to
something preceding from which it follows according to a universal rule; or if
I express myself in this way: Everything of which experience shows that it
happens must have a cause. (Prol. Ak. IV: 296)
43
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It is worth mentioning that Kant himself seems to have had difficulty on this
issue in the Prolegomena discussion, since he himself disregards the first examples
that he gives to explain the topic, namely, “The room is warm,” “The sugar is sweet”
and “The wormwood is repugnant” (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 299). Immediately after having
proposed these three examples he states in a footnote:
I gladly admit that these examples do not present judgments of perception
such as could ever become judgments of experience if a concept of the
understanding were also added, because they refer merely to feeling – which
everyone acknowledges to be merely subjective and which must therefore
never be attributed to the object – and therefore can never become objective.
(Prol. Ak. IV: 299n) (Emphasis mine)
This shows not only that Kant considered his own initial examples to be
inadequate to treat the problem, but also that he recognized that not all judgments of
perception can become judgments of experience. We consider this division of
perceptual judgments to be part of the confusion the text produces, for Kant
mentions at times that subjective judgments concern the state of the subject at a
specific time (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 299), or that they are connected in a consciousness of
my state (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 300), as in the judgment “I feel the room is warm” or “The
wormwood is repugnant to me.” Here Kant is clearly confusing the empirical
consciousness that accounts for inner sense─and thus the inner perceptions about
my own mental state or feelings─with perception as empirical consciousness
related to the objects of the outer sense. The problem is that since perception is
sometimes defined as empirical consciousness, while empirical consciousness is
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also defined as inner sense,44 perception (concerning objects of the outer sense)
appears here to be confused with inner sense. That is to say, the confusion arises
because in these initial examples Kant mixes what belongs to inner sense with what
belongs to the objects of outer sense. As the explanation progresses it is made clear
that Kant did not intend to deal with inner sense, whose perceptual judgments
concern only the state of the subject. Evidently, this type of perceptual judgments,
i.e., judgments about our inner perceptions or about the subject’s feelings, can never
become judgments of experience strictly speaking. Longuenesse rightly points out
that “[i]n the Prolegomena, judgments of perception are judgments about
spatiotemporal objects, albeit valid ‘only for me’” (Longuenesse 2000, 169).45 This
supports our interpretation that Kant’s intention was not to say that perceptual
judgments are altogether deprived from categories, but only that they require
supplementation by the category of causality to be considered as judgments of
experience; it is clear that these are totally different ideas.
Summarizing then, our position is, first, that the text of the Prolegomena
contains a confusion concerning perceptual judgments, but that through Kant’s
exposition it is possible to understand that the judgments of perception Kant is
talking about are judgments concerning the objects of the outer sense. Second, as
we have shown, it is possible that judgments of perception concerning objects of the
outer sense become judgments of experience through the application of the category
44
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of causality, and that this is what Kant intends to convey through the distinction
between the two types of empirical judgments. Finally, there is no real conflict or
contradiction with Kant’s critical thinking concerning the categories as a priori rules
in all judgments. We agree in this sense with Guyer that if categories only
conditioned judgments of experience, Kant would be contradicting his view
defended in the first Critique, according to which categories are the conditions for all
judgments (Guyer 1987, 91 ff.). In this sense Guyer raises a sharp and fundamental
question: “How can judgments of perception express any form of self-consciousness,
yet not use the categories?” (Guyer 1987, 100).46
Finally, since the topic of causality has been at stake here, we finish this
section with a comment on David Hume. The influence Hume had on Kant as well as
the divergence in their views is well known; the literature about Kant is generous on
this issue. Concerning causality, it is relevant to mention that Kant agrees with
Hume that the influence of the senses is the starting point of all experience; i.e.,
sensible impressions or what is empirical must play a fundamental role in any
explanation of our grasp of the empirical world. However, in contradistinction to
Hume, Kant maintains that causal relations are necessary. Thus, Kant does not
agree with Hume’s position that the causal relation is merely subjective and can
only be grounded on habit. Even if both considered that the causal rule can be found
in experience (Erfahrung), Hume grounded causality in habit or custom, implying
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that no certainty, but only mere probability, was possible for empirical cognition.
This is why Kant took Hume’s empiricism to culminate in skepticism.47 A tacit
reference to Hume summarizes Kant’s position, and his criticism of Hume’s
conception of causality:
To be sure, it seems as if this contradicts everything that has always been
said about the course of the use of our understanding, according to which it is
only through the perception and comparison of sequences of many
occurrences on preceding appearances that we are led to discover a rule, in
accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain
appearances, and are thereby first prompted to form the concept of cause.
On such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, and the rule that it
supplies, that everything that happens has a cause, would be just as
contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then
be merely feigned, and would have no true universal validity, since they
would not be grounded a priori but only on induction. (A195-196/B240241)48
Having attained this point in our discussion, an inevitable question arises:
how am I conscious of my perceptions? How do I know that my perceptions are
mine? Otherwise stated, how can I know that this empirical consciousness belongs
to me? Kant answers that “only because I ascribe all perceptions to one
consciousness (of original apperception) can I say of all perceptions that I am
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See: Hume, David. 2000. An inquiry concerning human understanding. Ed. Tom L. Beauchamp. New
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We can add here that, by contrast, René Descartes in his Third Meditation grounded the necessity
of the causal relation on the degrees of perfection or of objective reality of an idea. That is to say, for
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conscious of them” (A122). Through this statement we introduce ourselves into the
transcendental level of the synthesis and to original consciousness as the ground.

CHAPTER IV
PURE APPERCEPTION AS TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS
4.1. The Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept
To understand “the synthesis of recognition in the concept” (cf. A103 ff.) we
have first to remember that concepts express the unity of the manifold – more
precisely, that the manifold is recognized as an object through a concept.1 Kant
recalls this frequently, even towards the end of the first Critique he says: “the
understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts” (A644/B672).
In the synthesis of recognition in the concept Kant advances this fundamental idea
that the manifold is recognized in the concept. However, he is concerned here neither
with empirical nor spatio-temporal manifolds, nor with their corresponding
concepts. The constitution of concepts by the understanding as the expression of
the unity of the manifold in an object is not at stake here.
Kant defines “the unity that constitutes the concept of an object” by stating
that “insofar as they [our cognitions] are to relate to an object, our cognitions must
also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it [to an object]” (A104-105).
This conveys the unity of all cognitions of an object. However, this is not Kant’s main
intention here, for he observes that the manifold of cognition has to correlate to an

1

See Chapter 2 for the formation of concepts.
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object. All cognitions have to be related to one another and at the same time related
to an object that accounts for them in a unified way. Thus, the object Kant is
considering now is the object that accounts for the (unified) manifold of cognition,
and the concept that the synthesis of recognition is to produce is precisely the
concept of this object, i.e., the concept of the object that accounts for the manifold of
cognition (in a unified way).
The question then arises as to what kind of object this could be. Kant begins
his explanation by inquiring about the meaning of the expression “an object of
representations” (eines Gegenstandes der Vorstellungen) (cf. A104). The object in
question is presented as the object that accounts for the manifold of (all) our
representations concerning outer sense. However, it is plain there is no specific
object that correlates to the manifold of (all) our representations─to the manifold
of cognition─for it is clear that no intuition could correspond to such a manifold.
Thus, Kant will talk about this object as “a something in general” and will give it the
name “X” (cf. A104).2 Kant says:
What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to and
therefore also distinct from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object
must be thought of only as something in general = X, since outside of our
cognition we have nothing that could set over against this cognition as
corresponding to it (Was versteht man denn, wenn man von einem der
Erkenntnis korrespondierenden, mithin auch davon unter schiedenen
Gegenstande redet? Est ist leicht einzusehen , daß dieser Gegenstand nur als
2

We see here again how General Logic serves Kant’s Transcendental Logic: the most abstract
concept, i.e., ‘something’ (explained in Chapter 2) serves Kant to account for the transcendental
object as a ‘something in general.’ In the Lectures on Metaphysics, Kant says: “Something means any
object of thinking; this is the logical something. The concept of an object in general is the highest
concept of all cognitions” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 544).

170
etwas überhaupt = X müsse gedacht werden, weil wir außer unserer Erkenntnis
doch nichts haben, welches wir dieser Erkenntnis als korrespondierend gegen
über setzen könnten). (A104)
Nevertheless, since it is also clear that objects exist in the external world, and
that upon them rests the objective validity of our cognitions, the reference to the
“object =X” has to convey a certain necessity in itself. Otherwise our cognitions
would be arbitrary or determined at pleasure (cf. A104).
Thus, on the one hand, there has to be an object that accounts for the
manifold of all our representations concerning objects of the outer sense, and, on
the other hand, this object cannot be an empirical object (cf. A109), since it is
precisely the “object” that contains all (possible) empirical objects─ultimately all
substances─and evidently there is no intuition of “this object.” Therefore, it can
only be a transcendental object (‘X’) (cf. A105). X then is the ‘transcendental object’
(transzendentale Gegenstand) that accounts for all our representations of objects of
the outer sense, and that has to be presupposed in cognition for upon it ultimately
rests all objective validity. Kant says: “The transcendental object . . . is . . . an
unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts”
(A379-380). It is clear that the transcendental object is required since we cannot
cognize things in themselves, but only things as they appear through the
representations we have of them.
It is worth mentioning that the transcendental object is also called an object in
general for it refers to all possible empirical objects. Thus, the object in general is
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the object that accounts for the manifold of all our representations (concerning
objects of the outer sense) or the manifold of cognition. X represents then an ‘object
in general’ (Gegenstand überhaupt) (cf. A251), which is why it can also be called the
object of sensible intuition (der Gegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung) (cf. A250) or
of intuition in general, since all objects are ultimately objects of intuition for Kant.
Therefore, X is the transcendental object or the object in general or the object of
intuition in general. 3

3

These associations are made in the following passage of the first Critique:
All our representations are in fact related to some object through the understanding, and
since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding thus relates to them
to a something, as the object of sensible intuition: but this something* is to that extent only
the transcendental object (aber dieses Etwas ist in so fern nur das transzendentale Objeck).
This signifies, however, a something = X, of which we know nothing at all nor can know
anything in general (in accordance with the current constitution of our understanding), but
is rather something that can serve only as a correlate of the unity of apperception for the
unity of the manifold in sensible intuition, by means of which the understanding unifies that
in the concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot even be separated from the
sensible data, for then nothing would remain through which it would be thought (Dieses
transzendentale Objekt läßt sich gar nicht von den sinnlichen Datis absondern, weil alsdenn
nichts übrig bleibt, wodurch es gedacht würde). It is therefore no object of cognition itself, but
only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general, which is
determinable through the manifold of those appearances. (A250–251) *(In Kant’s copy of
the A edition of the first Critique is says to “this something as object of an intuition in
general”).
It is relevant to stress that the transcendental object is not the noumenon, in spite of certain sections
where Kant tends to present them as synonyms. In Chapter 1, we mentioned that the concept of the
noumenon is introduced by Kant to account for things in themselves conceived as objects of pure
understanding, to indicate hypothetical objects of an intellectual intuition. Even if the transcendental
object pertains equally to the transcendental level, it is clear that it cannot be equated with the
noumenon for then the transcendental object would not stand for things in themselves but for objects
of intellectual intuition. In short, while the transcendental object belongs to Transcendental Logic, the
noumenon—more precisely, the concept of a noumenon—does not belong to it. The distinction is
subtle but it must be kept in mind. Kant makes the distinction as follows:
The object to which I relate appearances in general is the transcendental object, i.e., the
entirely undetermined thought of something in general. This cannot be called the
noumenon (Das Objekt, worauf ich die Erscheinung überhaupt beziehe, ist der
transzendentale Gegenstand, d.i. der gänzlich unbestimmte Gedanke von etwas überhaupt.
Dieser kann nicht das Noumenon heißen); for I do not know anything about what it [the
transcendental object] is in itself, and have no concept of it except merely that of the object
of a sensible intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all appearances. (A253)
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Having made these clarifications, the question arises about the concept of this
transcendental object: what is then the concept that accounts for this transcendental
object? As X is only the object in general or the transcendental object, its concept can
only convey the unity this object makes necessary, and this unity is the unity of the
manifold of cognition─that is, the manifold of all our representations concerning
objects of the outer sense, or of intuition in general. However, this unity can only be
a formal unity since the object in question is a transcendental object. Therefore, it
can only account for the unity of consciousness; more precisely, it is the unity of the
object in general and of cognition in general in one consciousness. This unity is
produced by the synthesis through which the manifold of all our representations is
a priori united in one consciousness, and it is expressed through an a priori concept.
As Kant says:
It is clear, however, that since we have to do only with the manifold of our
representations, and that X which corresponds to them, because it should be
something distinct from all our representations, is nothing for us, the unity
that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of
the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations.
(A105)
Thus, “the synthesis of recognition in the concept” consists in the a priori
combination of all possible representations of determinable objects that constitute
the manifold of cognition, and this at the same time is united in one consciousness,
producing thereby the concept of the transcendental object as an expression of the
unity of all possible cognition in one consciousness. This synthesis then is the
activity by which the pure imagination unites all our representations of possible
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determinable objects and at the same time combines them in one consciousness.
The formal nature of this unity is due to the fact that this unity expresses the
relations established between the object in general, the manifold of cognition and
one consciousness. This can be expressed in a simpler way by stating that the unity
of consciousness is formal since through it no object of intuition is given. As Kant
says: “this unity [the unity of consciousness] is only the unity of thinking, through
which no object is given” (B421-422). Thus, through this synthesis the formal unity
of consciousness is recognized in a concept that is the pure concept of the
transcendental object. Kant claims:
The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our cognitions
is really always one and the same = X) is that which in all of our empirical
concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality.
Now this concept [the pure concept of the transcendental object] cannot
contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but
that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it
[the manifold of cognition] stands in relation to an object. This relation,
however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness. (A109)
Thus, the necessary unity of consciousness is the formal unity of
consciousness, and it is the unity that must be encountered in the manifold of
cognition, insofar as this manifold correlates with an object in general or
transcendental object, and this relation is at the same time a relation with
consciousness. In the Reflexionen Kant stresses that the unity of consciousness must
be understood in terms of relation: “[f]or unity properly concerns only the relation”
(Refl. Ak. XVIII: 369). However, the question arises about how the diverse and
specific manifolds of intuition are to be related to one another in cognition, and to
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one consciousness as well. The answer to this question requires a preliminary
explanation of the nature of consciousness itself.
4.2. Apperception is not Inner Sense
Consciousness (Bewußtsein) is also called ‘apperception’ (Apperzeption) by
Kant, and it is represented by the concept ‘I’. “Consciousness of oneself
(apperception) is the simple representation of the I” (Das Bewußtsein seiner selbst
(Apperzeption) ist die einfache Vorstellung des Ich) (B68). The A-Deduction refers to
apperception as “consciousness of oneself” (A107). Apperception then is not
consciousness of something (different from us) but consciousness of ourselves; i.e.,
the representation ‘I’ merely means consciousness that I am. Kant says: “I am
conscious of my self not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I
am. This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting” (B157).
As such, consciousness has necessarily to be one (cf. A103) and the same, for
otherwise not even the logical unity required in every thought would be possible at
all (cf. A398). This is why Kant refers to consciousness as “numerically identical” (cf.
A107), i.e., as one and the same.4 These two attributes are inherent to consciousness
insofar as they constitute the nature of apperception for Kant. This is why he refers
to both saying they are analytical propositions, i.e., that they are contained in the
concept of consciousness and, thus, can be discovered through analysis. Concerning
‘oneness’ or unity (Einheit) Kant states: “[t]hat the I of apperception, consequently

4

“Things that are entirely one and the same are called numerically the same <numero eadem>, for it
is one and the same thing <unum idemque; G: ein und eben dasselbe Ding>” (MM Ak. XXIX: 839).
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in every thought, is a single thing that cannot be resolved into a plurality of
subjects, and hence a logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking,
and is consequently an analytic proposition” (B407-408). Likewise, concerning
‘sameness’ (Gleichheit ): “[t]he proposition of the identity of myself in everything
manifold of which I am conscious is equally one lying in the concepts themselves,
and hence an analytic proposition” (B408).
Now, Kant postulates the thoroughgoing identity of the thinking subject, i.e.,
the total identity of consciousness, as a necessary condition for the possibility of all
representations (cf. A116). He supports this statement by arguing that the only way
in which all representations can represent something in me is by belonging to one
consciousness (cf. A116). Otherwise stated, only this single consciousness can make
representations into thoughts (cf. A350). All representations must then be capable
of being connected with (one) consciousness (cf. A116). This is a petitio principii:
Kant recognizes this fact, saying this is a principle that holds a priori (cf. A116).5 A
synthesis will function as the proof of this principle.
From this we infer that the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves cannot then
refer to empirical consciousness, since as such ‘empirical consciousness’ (das
empirische Bewußtsein) is dispersed (cf. B133), always subjective and nothing
abiding can come from it (cf. A107). It is worth mentioning, however, that empirical
consciousness is not reduced to the perceptions of the objects of the outer sense, as

5

Note that here Kant is talking of all representations in general and not of all representations
concerning objects of the outer sense, as was the case when he explained the transcendental object.
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anticipated already in the previous chapter. Empirical consciousness is also used by
Kant as a synonym of inner sense insofar as inner sense accounts for what the
subject itself undergoes (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161) – that is, for our inner state and
inner perceptions.
This distinction is fundamental since Kant clearly wants to distinguish ‘inner
sense’ (äußerlich Sinn) from ‘apperception’ (Apperzeption), and the confusion
between the two has been due to the fact that both concern the ‘I’.6 Kant states that
while the ‘I’ in apperception accounts for the (grounding) subject, the ‘I’ in inner
sense accounts for the ‘I’ as a (grounded) object: the ‘I’ is the object of the inner
sense (cf. A362).7 “[T]he representation of my Self, as the thinking subject, is related
merely to inner sense” (A371). This means that when I represent to myself the
subject that I am, I am taking myself as an object and, thus, considering myself from
the standpoint of my inner state, of what happens in me, of how I am affected in my
inner self. This domain─i.e., the subject as the object of the inner sense─is outside
the domain of cognition proper. The ‘I’ is not a possible object of experience for,
even if these inner intuitions and self-perceptions are empirical, they cannot be
given through sensibility in empirical outer intuition. In other words, what occurs in
inner sense occurs only to me. Therefore, cognition of the object that accounts for
our inner state is not possible, since the representation ‘I think’ is neither an
6

“[I]t is customary in the systems of psychology to treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of
apperception (which we carefully distinguish)” (B153).

7 The ‘I’ of inner sense is sometimes referred as ‘soul’ (Seele). As explained in Chapter 1, the soul is
the organ of inner sense, but nothing can be predicated of it.
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intuition nor an object that can be given in any empirical intuition, and cognition
necessarily requires the application of the categories to empirical intuition:
[T]he categories do not afford us cognition of things by means of intuition
except through their possible application to empirical intuition, i.e., they
serve only for the possibility of empirical cognition . . . The categories
consequently have no other use for the cognition of things except insofar as
these [things] are taken as objects of possible experience. (B147-148)
Hence of the thinking I (the soul) . . . one can say not so much that it cognizes
itself through the categories, but that it cognizes the categories, and
through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and hence
cognizes them [categories] through itself. Now it is indeed very illuminating
that I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order
to cognize an object at all (Nun ist zwar sehr einleuchtend: daß ich dasjenige,
was ich voraussetzen muß, um überhaupt ein Objekt zu erkennen, nicht selbst
als Objekt erkennen könne); and that the determining Self (the thinking) is
different from the determinable Self (the thinking subject) as cognition is
different from its object. (A402)
The second passage is also relevant for it openly states a tension present
throughout Kant’s work. We can make this clear by considering Kant’s statement
“that I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to
cognize an object at all.” Kant means that I cannot cognize the ‘I’ that I am, in spite of
the fact that this ‘I’ is presupposed in all of my cognition as its ultimate ground. The
determining Self refers to the ‘I’ of apperception, while the determinable Self refers to
the ‘I’ of inner sense. It is clear that both subjects are the same, but while the first
functions as a grounding consciousness, the second is the subject insofar as it takes
itself to be an object.
This tension is also present throughout Kant’s treatment of the question
about the priority of the outer and the inner in the relation between outer sense and
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inner sense. As mentioned in Chapter 1, while during his pre-critical period Kant
seemed to disregard the need of the outer sense to account for the certitude of the I,
in his critical period, and notably in the second edition of the first Critique, he makes
clear that inner sense presupposes outer sense to account for itself. As Kant says:
[E]ven our inner experience . . . is possible only under the presupposition of
outer experience . . .
I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.8 All timedetermination presupposes something persistent in perception.9 This
persisting thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence
in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the
perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me
and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.
Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by
means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. (B275)
(Emphasis mine)10
Therefore, the ‘I’ that I am─apperception─must not be confused with “I” as
the object of inner sense. As already mentioned, the ‘I’ as the object of inner sense
cannot be an object of cognition, since our inner intuitions cannot be subsumed
under the categories, but only the intuitions of the outer sense. Kant says: “[t]hus
through the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general not the
least is won in regard to the cognition of myself as object” (B409). Finally, the
mentioned identification between empirical consciousness and inner sense is clearly
stated in the following passage:

8

Simply stated, this means that I am conscious of myself as the object of inner sense.

9

This is a tacit reference to substances as the persisting material elements. See Chapter 1.

10 Kant states this second passage precisely against the Cartesian cogito. Concerning Descartes, see
also the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Bxxxix).
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The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our
state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can
provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances,11 and
is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception. (A107)
4.3. The Synthesis of the Manifold of Consciousness: Transcendental
Apperception as Self-Consciousness
From what has been just stated, it is evident that empirical consciousness
cannot condition the possibility of all representations. It has to be pure
apperception that is at stake here. We can make this clear by uniting the above
postulated principle with Kant’s definition of pure apperception: “pure
apperception, i.e., the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible
representations” (A116). In other words, pure apperception is the condition of the
possibility of all representations (and is also present in all representations). The
question then arises as to how it is that pure apperception conditions the possibility
of all representations. Otherwise stated, how do I know that all representations
belong to me, i.e., to this one consciousness that I am? Likewise, how are we to
understand the multiple and diverse representations of (empirical) consciousness
in relation to this one consciousness of pure apperception? The answer to both
questions rests on the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness in one
consciousness (of ourselves). As Kant points out:
All empirical consciousness . . . has a necessary relation to a transcendental
consciousness (preceding all particular experience), namely the
consciousness of myself, as original apperception. It is therefore absolutely
11

Here Kant refers tacitly to the constant flux in inner sense mentioned in Chapter 1.
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necessary that in my cognition all consciousness belong to one consciousness
(of myself). Now here is a synthetic unity of the manifold (of consciousness)
that is cognized a priori. (A117n)
Through the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness, performed
by the pure imagination, all consciousness─i.e., all (possible) empirical and pure
manifolds of consciousness─are a priori combined in one consciousness of pure
apperception. On account of this synthesis pure apperception is conceived as a
transcendental consciousness, since it is the original necessary condition that
grounds all unity of manifolds of consciousness and in one consciousness of itself.
Kant states that “[e]very necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground”
(A106), and he adds that “this original and transcendental condition is nothing other
than the transcendental apperception” (Diese ursprüngliche und transzendentale
Bedingung ist . . . keine andere, als die transzendentale Apperzeption) (A106-107).
We see here then how the unity of consciousness is in one sense a by-product
of this synthesis, but in another sense it is the ground of the very possibility of
synthesis. The former is the case because through this synthesis all possible
relations among the manifolds of consciousness are combined: this is also what Kant
conveys when he refers to “a synthetic unity of the manifold of consciousness.” The
expression ‘synthetic unity’ refers here to the outcome of the synthesis, as well as to
the a priori connection of the manifolds in one consciousness. However, in another
sense, the unity of consciousness is the very ground of this synthesis, for insofar as
transcendental apperception, or the transcendental subject, is the ground of all
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synthesis, it is not itself a by-product of the synthesis. As Kant says: “[a]
transcendental ground must . . . be found for the unity of the consciousness” (A106).
We see again a double argument in Kant’s way of reasoning. This procedure seems
to be a way to keep the relation between the mind and the external world
conditioned from both sides, but also a way to avoid falling into a vicious circle.
Thus, through the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness, pure
apperception becomes the transcendental condition─i.e., a transcendental
apperception─that grounds the unity─or relation─of all possible manifolds of
consciousness and in one consciousness, or in pure apperception. This happens
when all the (possible) manifolds of consciousness are united to one another and
combined in one consciousness.12
This explanation answers the second question; that is, it accounts for how the
multiple diverse manifolds of consciousness are united in one consciousness. This is
further supported by the first synthetic a priori principle that this synthesis brings
about: “[t]he synthetic proposition that every different empirical consciousness
must be combined into a single-consciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic
principle of our thinking in general” (A117n). This principle accounts for the unity
of consciousness as a necessary outcome of the synthesis, which expresses all the

12

In the B-Deduction the synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness in one consciousness begins
just before B131. In the corresponding footnote Kant says that the consciousness of one
representation, as far as the manifold is concerned, has to be distinguished from the consciousness of
another. At issue is the nature of the synthesis of consciousness. This a priori synthesis of the manifold
of consciousness in one (self)-consciousness is called by Kant in the B-Deduction the original
combination (cf. B132-133).
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(possible) relations that the diverse manifolds of consciousness can have to one
another. Likewise, it is relevant to note that following Kant’s explanation, we see
how at the transcendental level of experience, the unity of consciousness precedes
all data of sensible intuition (cf. A107).13 Again there is a double movement: initially
we began with empirical intuition and attained transcendental consciousness; at
first it seemed as if empirical intuition took us to the original consciousness, but at
the transcendental level it seems that everything comes from the grounding
consciousness.
It is worth mentioning that in the B-Deduction Kant points out that the
synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness precedes the synthesis from which the
categories arise: “[t]his unity, which precedes all concepts of combination a priori is
not the former category of unity . . . The category therefore already presupposes
combination” (B131). This statement shows that, in the order of priorities, the
synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness has to be conceived as more
foundational than the pure synthesis of spaces and of times from which the
categories originate as forms of thought. It is, however, not clear at all how these
two acts of synthesis may occur simultaneously. It is assumed that all acts of
synthesis are simultaneous, since the synthesis is only one, even if some
commentators speak in the plural. Kant speaks of the synthesis in the singular and
his explanations account for one mental activity performed constantly and at several
13 In the Reflexionen Kant says: “All representations must be represented in relation to one
consciousness and thus as universally subjected to the unity of consciousness” (Refl. Ak. XVIII: 331)
(Emphasis mine).
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levels. We think, however, as already mentioned, that the a priori synthesis of the
manifold of consciousness, and the pure synthesis of space and time, are not
performed over and over, but rather represent a singly accomplished original
synthesis. Were this not the case, Kant’s fundamental argument that the categories
are ruling concepts would be weakened. When, as in this chapter, the categories are
considered from the intellectual point of view, and not from the point of view of our
pure intuitions of space and time (which belong to sensibility), it becomes evident
that the synthesis of the manifold of consciousness has necessarily to precede the
synthesis that gives birth to the categories. Kant says: “[a]pperception is itself the
ground of the possibility of the categories, which for their part represent nothing
other than the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as that manifold has
unity in apperception” (A401).
Now, the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness not only
establishes transcendental apperception as the original ground, but it also makes
evident that pure apperception is a self-consciousness, for it is through this synthesis
that the subject becomes aware of its own self as the one that performs the synthesis,
i.e., as the one that combines the diverse manifolds. Thus, through the synthesis
consciousness becomes aware that it is (also) a ‘self-consciousness’
(Selbstbewußtsein). As Kant says:
[T]he mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the
manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this a priori, if it [the
mind] did not have before its eyes the identity of its action. (A108) (Emphasis
mine)
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[T]his unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the
manifold the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the function
by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined into one
cognition. (A108) (Emphasis mine)
Thus, the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness discloses the
nature of consciousness as self-consciousness,14 and it is this awareness or selfconsciousness that guarantees the subject that all its representations are its own, for
it makes clear that these representations─the ones I am combining─belong to me,
that they are my representations. As Kant points out: “the manifold representations
that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if
they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness” (B132). Thus selfconsciousness allows us to answer the first question that was still pending─i.e.,
how pure apperception conditions the possibility of all representations─for the
awareness that the mind has of its own activity of synthesizing enables it to
recognize all its representations as its own. Thus, what was initially presented as a
peititio principii, namely, the fact that “pure apperception conditions the possibility
of all representations,” is proved at the level of self-consciousness.
The B-Deduction recalls this point when the analytical unity of
consciousness─i.e., that one consciousness must always accompany all

14

It is worth mentioning that the awareness of the subject as the one that performs the synthesis is
not restricted to the synthesis of consciousness. Indirectly, Kant represents consciousness as selfconsciousness in other passages such as this one: “[i]f, in counting, I forget that the units that now
hover before my senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the
generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and consequently I
would not cognize the number” (A103) (Emphasis mine).
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representations─is grounded in the synthetic unity of consciousness─i.e., on the
synthesis of the manifold of consciousness in one consciousness that establishes
self-consciousness as the unconditioned ground. The passage says as follows:
Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations
in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of
the consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity
of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic
one (Also nur dadurch, daß ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vorstellungen in
einem Bewußtsein verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich mir die Identität
des Bewußtseins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle, d.i. die
analytische Einheit der Apperzeption ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend
einer synthetischen möglich). The thought that these representations given in
intuition all together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I
unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein . . . only
because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all
together my representations. (B133-134) (Emphasis mine)
The B-Deduction makes clear that the relation to the identity of the
subject─i.e., to the thoroughgoing identity of apperception that recognizes itself as
one self-consciousness by being conscious of the synthesis it performs─“does not
come about by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but
rather by my adding one representation to the other and being conscious of their
synthesis” (B133).
4.4. The ‘I’ is not the ‘I Think’, and the ‘I Think’ is not the Cartesian Cogito
As an expression of this awareness of itself, consciousness─more precisely,
self-consciousness─will produce spontaneously the representation ‘I think’ (cf.
B132). The ‘I think’ is then the expression of self-consciousness (cf. A398-399), and
as such it must be capable of accompanying all representations insofar as all
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representations are necessarily connected to self-consciousness (cf. A117, B132) as
their ultimate and unconditioned ground. Kant claims: “it is that self-consciousness
which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to
accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be
accompanied by any further representation” (B132). “Self-consciousness in general
is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and yet is
itself unconditioned” (A401).
Insofar as the ‘I think’ is the proposition of self-consciousness it can only be
an a priori judgment (cf. A343/B401), for it has to precede all possible experience.
It is also contained in every judgment because it is the form of judgments insofar as
it is the original judgment whose form all judgments necessarily reproduce; in it the
“object” represented is that ‘I think’. Kant says: “the proposition I think . . . contains
the form of every judgment of understanding whatever and accompanies all
categories as their vehicle” (A348/B406).
The ‘I think’ is then the form of apperception (cf. A354); as form it is not only
contained in every judgment but is also the vehicle of all concepts (cf. A341/B399),
insofar as it is the condition under which anything can be thought. It is described as
a “vehicle” because “it serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to
consciousness” (A341-342/B399-400). It is the form of consciousness that must be
capable of accompanying all (my) representations, for otherwise I would not be able
to think them. Through the ‘I think’ then representations are made into thoughts.
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Therefore, all representation has to presuppose the ‘I think’ as a transcendental a
priori proposition. Kant says:
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought
at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be
impossible or else at least would be nothing for me (Das: Ich denke, muß alle
meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir
vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches eben so viel
heißt , als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich
nichts sein). (B131-132)
Longuenesse has a similar reading to ours insofar as she takes the ‘I think’ to
represent the analytical unity of consciousness, and that can, but need not,
accompany my representations (Longuenesse 2000, 65-67).
The ‘I think’ then is merely the subjective formal condition of all possible
cognition and thinking in general; it precedes all experience because all experience
depends on it. However, it is clear that the representation ‘I think’ of transcendental
apperception is not an experience itself (cf. A354). In this sense the ‘I think’ is the
analogue of time at the level of the understanding, for just as time is the universal
formal condition of sensibility, so the ‘I think’ is the universal formal condition of the
understanding from which all concepts and judgments originate. Thus, the ‘I think’
conditions and is presupposed in all thought. Thus, both─time and the ‘I
think’─are to be presupposed in all possible experience.
However, the ‘I’ in the judgment ‘I think’ must be distinguished from the bare
concept of a thinking subject. The concept of the ‘I’ is a wholly empty representation
(cf. A346/B404), since it has no manifold or content in itself (cf. A381). As already
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mentioned, the ‘I’ is merely consciousness of oneself. As such, it is neither an
intuition, nor does it have any intuition bound to it (cf. A350). Through the concept
of the ‘I’ Kant represents a transcendental subject of thoughts, where these thoughts
are intended to be that subject’s predicates. Our thoughts then are represented as
the predicates of a transcendental subject that is designated through the bare ‘I’.
“Now in all our thinking the I is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only as
determinations, and this I cannot be used as the determination of another thing”
(A349).15 Thus, the ‘I’ as such cannot be cognized; we only cognize it through its
determinations that are our thoughts. The ‘I’ is the subject in all thinking and its
thoughts are its determinations or predicates. Thoughts are the determinations or
predicates of the ‘I’; thoughts belong to the ‘I’ and it is through them that we can
account for the subject transcendentally that is designated through the ‘I’. The
following passages account for these main ideas:
[T]he simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which
one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that
accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which
thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of
thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its
predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least
concept. (A346/B404)16
15

The usage of the concept ‘inherence’ here can cause confusion, since inherence implies reference to
the category of substance (as mentioned in Chapter 1), and Kant denies that substantiality can be
predicated of the ‘I,’ a topic he treats under the heading of the paralogisms of pure reason.

16

The reason Kant presents the ‘I’ here also in terms of a ‘He’ or an “It” is that since “what thinks”
cannot be known, all possible thinking beings can only be represented by transferring a priori to
them the same claim that self-consciousness asserts of itself. As Kant says: “we must necessarily
ascribe to things a priori all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think
them. Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through an external experience,
but only through self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing further that the transference of
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But it is obvious that the subject of inherence is designated only
transcendentally through the I that is appended to thoughts, without noting
the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing anything at all about it. It
signifies only a Something in general (a transcendental subject), the
representation of which must of course be simple, just because one
determines nothing at all about it; for certainly nothing can be represented
as more simple than that which is represented through the concept of a mere
Something. (A355)
These statements warrant a comparison with previously developed ideas.
An analogy between the I and material substances is possible, insofar as both can
only be cognized through their determinations: substances through appearances,
the ‘I’ through its thoughts. This analogy is relevant insofar as it allows us to
perceive that the transcendental subject and the transcendental object are the two
poles of cognition insofar as one guarantees the other to a certain extent. The ‘I’
guarantees that there is a world to cognize─or that I relate to a world─while the
(cognition of) the world presupposes the ‘I’ insofar as whatever happens in the
world happens, in some sense, to me.
Nevertheless, the temptation to consider the ‘I’ as a substance or substratum
must be seen as an illusion. Kant denies the possibility of attributing persistence to
the ‘I’ as he does to material substances. The ‘I’ is not a substance (cf. A400), since
the concept of substance always presupposes an outer intuition that can be
subsumed under it (cf. B407-408). However, a stronger argument against the

this consciousness of mine to other things, which can be represented as thinking beings only in this
way” (A346-347/B405).
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substantiality of the ‘I’ is the fact that inner sense does not present us with anything
that persists in time, as already mentioned in Chapter 1. In this sense Kant says:
But now we have in inner intuition nothing at all that persists, for the I is only
the consciousness of my thinking; thus if we stay merely with thinking, we
also lack the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance, i.e., of
a subject subsisting for itself, to itself as a thinking being. (B413)17
In this sense, Kant criticizes the pretension of a Rational Psychology to be a
science that attempts to ground on the ‘I’ all its supposed cognitions.18
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ‘I think’ of transcendental
apperception is to be distinguished from the ‘I think’ of empirical apperception. It
was Descartes who brought the empirical ‘I think’ to the fore. From what has been
stated thus far, it should be evident that Kant’s conception of the ‘I think’ must not
be understood in terms of the Cartesian cogito. Descartes established the ‘I think, I
am’ (cogito ergo sum) as the first absolute epistemological truth, since our existence
as thinking beings was the only thing that could not be put in jeopardy by the malin
génie, and the hyperbolic and universal doubt.19 Kant considers the Cartesian ‘I

17 “Now in every judgment I am always the determining subject of that relation that constitutes the
judgment. However, that the I that I think can always be considered as subject, and as something
that does not depend on thinking merely as a predicate, must be valid – this is an apodictic and even
an identical proposition; but it does not signify that I as object am for myself a self-subsisting
being or substance.” (B407)
18

See the section on the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first Critique for the explanation of these
ideas. However, it is worth mentioning that in his pre-critical period Kant still conceived the ‘I’ as a
substance (see Lectures on Metaphysics).

19

See Descartes’s First and Second Meditations. Descartes, René. 1976. Méditations métaphysiques.
Paris: J. Vrin.
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think’ to be merely an empirical proposition that must be distinguished from the
transcendental one.
As already mentioned, for Kant our existence as thinking beings cannot be
discovered and grounded apart from the manner in which we relate to the objects of
the outer sense. It is precisely on this point that Kant bases his criticism of the
Cartesian cogito, as is clearly stated in the following passage:
[That] I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other
things outside me (to which my body also belongs) – this is . . . an analytic
proposition; for other things are those that I think of as distinguished from
me. But I do not thereby know at all whether this consciousness of myself
would even be possible without things outside me through which
representations are given to me, and thus whether I could exist merely as a
thinking being (without being a human being). (B409)
This shows that Kant does not accept the Cartesian division between
‘thinking beings’ and ‘extended beings.’ Even less would he accept the claim that
perceptions of the latter must be grounded in an isolated mental activity. Descartes
attributed to the mental activity of intellectual intuiting our knowledge of the
persistence of the matter of material substances whose properties change over
time.20 While Kant agrees with Descartes that there are persistent material
substances in which changing attributes inhere, he cannot agree with Descartes that
it is through an intellectual intuition that we can cognize them.
According to Kant the only way I can know that I am is by determining my
existence in time with reference to persisting objects of outer sense, and not by any

20

See Descartes’s Second Metaphysical Meditation.
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intellectual intuition since our mode of intuition is strictly sensible. As Kant says:
“without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the
act I think would not take place” (B422n). Therefore, the Cartesian cogito ergo sum
is an empirical proposition, even if the ‘I’ in it must not be considered as empirical
insofar as it belongs to thinking in general and represents the transcendental
subject of experience. The empirical ‘I think’ is a proposition of the inner sense
insofar as what it expresses is that I perceive myself as a thinking being. In contrast
to Descartes, Kant argues:
‘I exist thinking,’ that proposition is empirical, and contains the
determinability of my existence merely in regard to my representations in
time. But since for this once again I first need something persisting, and, just
insofar as I think myself, nothing of the sort is given to me in inner intuition,
it is not possible at all through this simple self-consciousness to determine
the way I exist, whether as substance or as accident. (B420)
4.5. The Unity of Consciousness: Relating the Empirical Manifolds to One
Consciousness through the Categories
In discussing the transcendental object, we indicated that the unity of
consciousness was the formal ground of the unity all possible determinable objects
of cognition have to one another. Our subsequent discussion of the synthesis of the
manifolds of consciousness allowed us to represent the unity of consciousness as
the expression of all the possible relations that the diverse manifolds of
consciousness can have to one another and in one consciousness. In both cases the
unity of consciousness was presented as the ground of relations among manifolds
and in one consciousness, even if the former explanation was presented at the level
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of cognition in general, while the latter focused on the level of mere thinking in
general.
Throughout our dissertation it has been made clear that cognition in general
accounts for all possible cognition and consists in the relations between intuition in
general, the object in general, and the categories. By contrast, thinking in general is
mere thinking. Through thinking in general we do not even establish that anything
is really possible for cognition. Thinking is just representing the object of a noncontradictory concept. For example, the concept of a round-square is a
contradictory concept and, thus, we cannot represent any conceivable object that
would fall under it. However, the concept of God and the concept of a unicorn, are
non-contradictory, and, thus, logically conceivable objects are possible for them.
However, mere logical possibility does not entail what Kant calls “real” possibility.
This means that I can think the object of my concept, but by thinking it I do not show
that the object is possible in the sense of conforming to the conditions of sensible
intuition. For an object to be possible in this sense, the conceivable object has to be
able to be givable (though not necessarily given) in an intuition. In short, thinking
that which is only logically possible remains cognitively idle or empty.
Having made this clarification, we now have to explain the connection
between (self-)consciousness and empirical intuition, which express the highest
transcendental ground and the basic sensorial data of experience, respectively. This
will allow us to answer the pending question introduced in our discussion of the
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synthesis of recognition in the concept, namely, how the diverse and specific
manifolds of intuition relate to one another in cognition and to one consciousness. In
cognition, both “extremes,” i.e., (self-)consciousness and empirical intuition, are
connected in the different ways in which manifolds can be combined one another and
in one consciousness. As Kant says: “All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in
the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness . . . and through
this alone is cognition possible” (A116). Likewise: “no cognitions can occur in us, no
connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness . . . and in
relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible” (A107).21
Since the unity of consciousness originated in the a priori synthesis of the
manifold of consciousness─thus from the faculty of thinking in general─there has
to be a faculty that combines the manifold of empirical intuition in one
consciousness. Pure apperception is the original ground, but is not, properly
speaking, a faculty. This faculty is the understanding (Verstand) since we know it is
the faculty for thinking; more precisely, it is the faculty or capacity for thinking
objects of possible experience. As such, it is the faculty through which all concepts
are produced. 22 This is why Kant also states that the two extremes to be related are
understanding and sensibility, instead of saying they are consciousness and
sensibility. “Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily

21

Additionally: “[T]he unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object . . . and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions” (B137).

22

See Chapter 2 for the formation of concepts and the role played therein by the understanding.
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be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination” (cf.
A124). Thus, it is the pure imagination that connects a priori the faculties of
sensibility and of understanding, for through this activity of the imagination the
manifold of intuition is combined with the necessary condition of the unity of
apperception; and the a priori combination of the two faculties accounts for the
transcendental function of the imagination (cf. A124).
Now we call the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental if,
without distinction of the intuitions, it concerns nothing but the connection
of the manifold a priori, and the unity of this synthesis is called
transcendental if it is represented as necessary a priori in relation to the
original unity of apperception. (A118)
Now, Kant says: “[t]hrough the relation of the manifold to the unity of
apperception . . . concepts that belong to the understanding can come about, but
only by means of the imagination in relation to sensible intuition” (A124).23 It is
clear that these “concepts that belong to the understanding” are the pure concepts
of the understanding or categories. Thus, what Kant is conveying here is that each
23 It is worth mentioning that this passage can be taken in another sense, namely, as saying that the
categories arise from the combination of sensibility and understanding—for Kant presents this
relation or connection in terms of a combination (synthesis) as well (cf. A124). This would explain
why the function of the pure imagination is called here transcendental, and thus said to ground all
cognition a priori. This second possibility is supported by another passage of the B-Deduction when
Kant talks again about the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. The passage says as follows:
[T]he imagination . . . can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance with the
unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the
sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must
be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding
on sensibility and its first application. (B151-152)
This is, for instance, one of the passages where the categories are represented as pre-given rules. The
origin of the categories in the imagination’s pure synthesis of space and time, explained in Chapter 2,
allows Kant to posit an a priori connection between pure intuition and consciousness, i.e., between
the forms of sensibility and pure apperception by means of the understanding. However, as
mentioned already this origin is problematic since Kant also says the categories express the unity of
consciousness, which as such is a priori.
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time the imagination enters into contact with empirical intuition, the categories
need to be applied─are de facto and de jure applied (through schemata)─to the
empirical objects we synthesize. As the imagination is always synthesizing─even
unconsciously (cf. B130)─every contact with a sensible datum implies the
immediate application of categories when data are related to one another, since they
are pure concepts of the understanding that determine intuition in general, and,
thus, the categories rule the relation among empirical manifolds a priori. It is in this
sense that the categories function as a priori rules for intuition. As Kant says:
[A]ll appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must
stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity, in accordance with which
their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible, i.e., that in experience
they must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception.
(A110)
It is evident that the “a priori rules of their synthetic unity” are the categories
under which all determinable objects of empirical intuition─i.e., all
appearances─must stand, because the categories govern a priori how these
manifolds given in empirical intuition are to relate to one another.24 This means
that appearances─insofar as they are to become phenomena─have to be governed
according to the necessary unity of consciousness. “All sensible intuitions stand
under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold [the manifold
of sensible intuitions] can come together in one consciousness” (B143). Thus, the
manifolds in empirical intuition cannot relate to one another unless they stand
24

See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how the categories rule the manifolds of empirical intuition.
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under the categories, for the understanding adds unity to intuitions through the
categories: “the unity that is added to the intuition through the understanding by
means of the category” (B144).
Thus, categories are the “tools” of the understanding, i.e., the rules the
understanding has to unite or relate to the manifolds given in empirical intuition.
This unity is the unity of consciousness. This explains why Kant considers the
categories to be conditions of the possibility of experience (cf. B161). It is worth
noting that the last block citation establishes a subtle distinction between the
requirement that appearances stand under the categories, and the post facto
condition in which phenomena stand under the categories insofar as they are
conditioned by the unity of consciousness. However, what is more important in the
passage is the association─established by the “i.e.”─between the categories and
the necessary unity of consciousness, since in both cases objects of the outer sense
must stand under them.
In the first Critique the association between ‘categories’ (Kategorien) and the
‘unity of consciousness’ (Einheit der Apperzeption) is frequent; this is because the
categories express the unity of consciousness. Kant is clear about this point:
[F]or the peculiarity of our understanding, [is] that it is able to bring about
the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only
through precisely this kind and number of them (Von der Eigentümlichkeit
unsers Verstandes aber, nur vermittelst der Kategorien und nur gerade durch
diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperzeption a priori zu Stande zu
bringen). (B145)
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The categories then are the ways in which the manifolds of empirical
intuition can be connected to one another in order to be in accordance with the unity
of consciousness. This means that through the categories the manifold of empirical
intuition is connected with (self-)consciousness or original apperception. The
categories, insofar as they are forms of thought (cf. B148) express the necessary, i.e.,
formal, unity of consciousness, but since they are conceived also as pure concepts of
the understanding, they connect empirical intuition and (self-)consciousness, for
they function as the rules under which the understanding subsumes empirical
intuitions under concepts in judgments.25 It is worth mentioning here that the
double characterization of the categories must not create confusion, for it is one
thing to refer to the nature of the categories as forms of thought, and another to refer
to their function as rules of unity.26 This is conveyed in the following passages:
But for their part they [categories] are in turn nothing other than forms of
thought, which contain merely the logical capacity for unifying the manifold
given in intuition in a consciousness a priori. (A248/B305-306)
[P]ure categories, through which I never think a determinate object, but
rather only the unity of representations in order to determine their object.
Without an intuition to ground it, the category alone cannot yield any
concept of an object; for only through intuition is an object given, which is
then thought in accordance with the category. (A399)27

25

See Chapter 2 for the relation among categories, intuition, and judgments.
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In Chapter 2 we could not yet make this distinction which presupposes the exposition of the unity
of consciousness.
27 At this point we can now understand why Kant says: “Just for this reason, then, the categories do
not represent any special object given to the understanding alone, but rather serve only to determine
the transcendental object” (A251).
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These statements imply that if we can think what is given in empirical
intuition, it is because intuition in general is governed by the categories: “[w]e
cannot think any object except through categories” (B165). This also supports our
previous statements that the objects of perceptual judgments have to be determined
by the categories. The understanding necessarily connects with the appearances by
means of the categories (cf. A119). And, “the categories . . . are only rules for an
understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking” (B145). We stress here,
however, the necessary connection of (empirical) intuition with pure consciousness
through the categories of the understanding, since without this connection no
cognition is possible at all. “[W]e cannot cognize any object that is thought except
through intuitions that correspond to those objects” (B165). Cognition requires
(empirical) intuition besides thinking. Kant states these two connections when he
says: “I do not cognize any object merely by the fact that I think, but rather I can
cognize any object only by determining a given intuition with regard to the unity of
consciousness, in which all thinking consists” (B406). This complements the
distinction recently made between cognition in general and thinking in general.28
Let us stress the distinction between (merely) thinking and cognizing. As
already mentioned, we can think of “something” that is logically conceivable, but

28

The following passage states well the relationship between understanding, consciousness and
intuition as well:
Understanding is the faculty for bringing various representations under a rule. It rests on
apperception. It is the faculty for determining the particular by the general. With the higher
cognitive power the cognitive faculty is considered not in relation to intuition, but rather to
the unity of consciousness. (MM Ak. XXIX: 889)
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this by itself does not guarantee that this “something” is or can be an object of
cognition; e.g., noumena, a spirit, God, etc. The fact we have forms of thought; i.e.,
categories, implies that some sort of unity can be formally determined; i.e., that the
understanding has the possibility of exercising some acts of unification by itself and
without relying on empirical intuitions. Nevertheless, cognition can only be attained
if categories are applied to empirical intuition and united in one consciousness. A
fundamental passage makes clear that thinking and cognizing must be clearly
distinguished from one another:
To think of an object and to cognize an object are thus not the same (Sich
einen Gegenstand denken, und einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist also nicht
einerlei). For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through
which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition,
through which it is given; for if an intuition corresponding to the concept
could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is
concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything
at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be
given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied. Now all
intuition that is possible for us is sensible (Aesthetic), thus for us thinking of
an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become
cognition only insofar as this concept is related to objects of the senses.
(B146)
We conclude, then, that the connection between empirical intuition and (self)consciousness is performed by the faculty of understanding, insofar as the
understanding is the faculty that allows us to think possible objects of experience
through pure concepts. Otherwise stated, the understanding allows us to think an
object in general through the categories (cf. B146). The understanding connects
empirical intuition and original apperception through categories that are forms of
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thinking that express the unity of apperception, and function as determining
concepts for intuition in general. However, as mere forms of thought the categories
allows us to think whatever we can imagine, but can neither bring about cognition
nor have any real significance; only through their application to empirical intuition
through schemata do they acquire significance and give rise to genuine cognition.
This is the process by which a determinable object─an appearance─becomes a
determined object─a phenomenon. As Kant points out:
The pure concepts of the understanding are . . . mere forms of thought, without
objective reality – since we have available no intuition to which the synthetic
unity of apperception, with they alone contain, could be applied and that could
thus determine an object. Our sensible and empirical intuition alone can
provide them with sense and significance. (B148-149) (Emphasis mine)
We close this section with a key passage where Kant summarizes several of
the main ideas explained here:
[T]he understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given
representations, in accord with the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus
think a priori synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of sensible
intuition, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition
must necessarily stand, through which then the categories, as mere forms of
thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application to objects that can be given
to us in intuition, but only as appearances; for of these alone are we capable
of intuition a priori. (B150-151)
4.6. The Unity of Consciousness in Judgments
Through this explanation we can see that the categories, as pure concepts of
the understanding, make possible the combination among manifolds of empirical
intuition and in one consciousness insofar as they express the necessary unity
produced by the synthesis of consciousness, i.e., the unity of consciousness, which is
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ultimately grounded in one (self-)consciousness or original apperception.
Everything in Kant’s philosophy is, ultimately, grounded in this original
apperception. We can now cite completely the passage cited above partially:
Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which
for their part represent nothing other than the synthesis of the manifold of
intuition, insofar as that manifold has unity in apperception. Selfconsciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the
condition of all unity, and yet is itself unconditioned. (A401)
The pending question recalled at the beginning of the previous section, i.e.,
the question of how the diverse and specific manifolds of intuition relate to one
another in cognition and to one consciousness, has already been addressed at the
transcendental level. Nevertheless, we still have to specify how this unity of
apperception appears in judgments, i.e., how it appears through the relations of
concepts in judgments when the categories are (already) applied to empirical
intuition.29 A text of the Reflexionen, written in between the two editions of the first
Critique, conveys relevant information:
[T]here are three logical functions under a certain title, hence also three
categories: because two of them [categories] demonstrate the unity of
consciousness in two oppositis, while the third in turn combines the
consciousness of the two. Further kinds of unity of consciousness cannot be
conceived. For if a is a consciousness that connects a manifold, and b is
another [consciousness] which connects in the opposite way, then c is the
connection of a and b. (Refl. Ak. XVIII: 370)
This passage indicates then that there are three possible ways in which
consciousness can be united in judgments and that these ways correlate with the

29

See Chapter 2 for the relationship between categories and judgments.

203
three moments contained under each logical form in judgments. This explains why
the moments in each of the four logical forms of judgments are always three: it is
because we can relate things in one way or in the opposite way, but besides these
two possibilities we can also relate them by somehow combining the two. Therefore,
there are only three possible ways in which empirical manifolds can be related to
one another and in one consciousness for each of the logical forms. Let us recall one
of our previous examples: I can unite ‘tall’ to ‘John’ by affirming it, as in the
judgment “John is tall” (affirmative judgment). This is one combination of the
manifold. However, I can also unite them by denying that the predicate belongs to
the subject, as in the judgment “John is not tall” (negative judgment): this is the
opposite way of combining the manifold. Finally, I can say that what belongs to John
is the property of being non-tall, which means that John is excluded from the class of
objects that have the property in question (infinite judgment). This is the way of
combination that arises from the connection of the two previous forms. Thus we
have here an example of the three possible ways in which the unity of consciousness
can be expressed in judgments concerning the logical form of quality.
The unity of consciousness can be objective or subjective; in either case, the
content is considered when the concepts in judgments are related to each other and
to one consciousness in general. Kant recalls the role of the categories and the
logical functions in judgments to explain the objective unity of consciousness. He
writes:
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Through the category I represent to myself an object in general as
determined with regard to the logical functions of judgments: of the subject
(not predicate), of the consequence as ground, of the multiplicity in its
representation. But why must I always represent every object as
determined with regard not only to one, but rather to all the logical
functions of judgment? Because only thereby is objective unity of
consciousness possible, i.e., a universally valid connection of perceptions,
hence experience as the only reality in cognition. (Refl. Ak. XVIII: 391)
This passage gives us new information. It says that every (possible) object
must be determined in regard to each of the moments of thinking, i.e., in regard to
each of the three moments under each of the four logical forms, because this is the
only way in which the objective unity of consciousness is possible. This means that by
objective unity of consciousness we are to understand all the possible determinations
that objects can have in a concatenated way─and that are expressed in judgments.
The objective unity of consciousness conveys then the unity of all possible objects of
experience. This is why Kant refers to it as “a universally valid connection of
perceptions,” since “[e]xperience is possible only through the representation of a
necessary connection of perceptions” (B218). This implies that an a priori
connection of all possible perception in one consciousness can only arise through
the use of the categories. This is a way of guaranteeing the possibility of experience
through the a priori unity of perceptions in one consciousness.
Now, the objective unity of consciousness implies that the relation of
concepts in judgments is objectively valid. This means that the connection between
(empirical) intuition and original apperception is established through the
categories, and thus that the two representations combined in the judgment are not
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only combined in the object (cf. B142) but also in one consciousness. The objective
unity of consciousness is produced by subjecting the connection or relation of
concepts in judgments to one consciousness through the categories. In the previous
chapter this was explained in terms of the category of causality, but in the first
Critique Kant will explain this objective unity of consciousness through the copula
‘is’ for the categorical judgment is the basic pattern of all judgments. As Kant says:
[A] judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the
objective unity of apperception. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to
distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.
For this word [is] designates the relation of the representations to the
original apperception and its necessary unity, even if the judgment itself is
empirical, hence contingent, e.g., “Bodies are heavy.” By that, to be sure, I do
not mean to say that these representations necessarily belong to one
another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another
in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of
intuitions. (B141-142)
The point Kant is conveying here is that what makes the connection of
representations in judgments universally valid is the relation their empirical
manifolds (subsumed under concepts) has to original apperception: the copula ‘is’
has the function of conveying this relationship in the judgment united to one
consciousness. For example, the representations ‘body’ and ‘heavy’ in the judgment
“Bodies are heavy” belong to one another insofar as the concepts imply that an
empirical intuition has been subsumed under them. At the same time, the relation in
the judgment, expressed through the copula ‘is,’ has been united to one
consciousness. What judgments are these? Strictly speaking, Kant is thinking of all
(possible) judgments of experience.
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Now, Kant also conveys that the same relation─in this case ‘bodies’ and
‘heavy’─can in certain cases─namely, judgments of perception─have only
subjective validity as well. Kant suggests that in that case the relation must not be
expressed using the copula ‘is’; i.e., not as “Bodies are heavy”, but as “If I carry a
body, I feel a pressure of weight” (cf. B142). We could also say something like “[t]his
body weights a lot; I feel pressure when carrying it.” The point Kant wants to
convey with this distinction is that there is also a subjective unity of consciousness,
and that this kind of unity is determined by association: “the relation of these same
representations [body and heavy] in which there would be only subjective validity,
e.g., in accordance with laws of association” (B142).
Since association grounds reproduction, he also refers to the subjective unity
of consciousness in terms of reproduction: “[i]f . . . I investigate more closely the
relation of given cognitions in every judgment and distinguish that relation, as
something belonging to the understanding, from the relation in accordance with
laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity) (B141).
Likewise, “the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to
empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing
to the explanation of the possibility of cognition a priori, and on that account
belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology” (B152).
Thus the main point is the use of the categories insofar as they link the
relation in judgments to one consciousness. However, as already stated, categories
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govern all judgments; thus it could be argued that the boundaries between a
subjective and an objective unity of consciousness are porous. It is evident that
Kant is recalling here the distinction between judgments of perception and
judgments of experience, where perceptual judgments are united to consciousness
only subjectively, for the connection in the relation is only valid for me. Thus, the
idea is to use the copula ‘is’ to state only judgments of experience.
Finally, the subjective unity of consciousness is easier to specify; all
judgments of inner sense are evidently subjective united to consciousness since they
are necessarily mine. Likewise, judgments of images are also subjectively valid;
judgments based on association or on reproduction; i.e., on empirical laws, are all
subjectively united to consciousness. This, however, does not mean that they are
false; it means only that the connection among concepts in judgments is not united
to one original consciousness. No doubt the controversy about the origin and
deduction of the categories is somehow connected to this issue.

CHAPTER V
BOUNDARIES AND CONCEPTIONS FOR A THEORY OF MENTAL DERANGEMENT:
DEFICIENCY OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES AND MENTAL ILLNESS
5.1. Introduction to the Problem. The Unavoidable and Natural Illusions of
Reason
In our previous chapters we have explained the fundamental ways in which
our cognitive faculties function and relate to one another. In this explanation the
boundaries of possible experience have been established, making clear that this
domain must be governed by the categories of the understanding which can only
apply to empirical intuition. We have also stated in the Preface that we are not
dealing with the level of reason in this dissertation for ‘reason’ (Vernunft) is not,
properly speaking, a constitutive cognitive faculty, since it does not relate directly to
sensibility. However, reason, as the highest faculty, demands unity of the
understanding, and this has consequences that are relevant to our interest, and that
thus must be mentioned briefly. As Kant says:
In fact the manifold of rules and the unity of principles is a demand of reason,
in order to bring the understanding into thoroughgoing connection with
itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under
concepts and through them into connection (In der Tat ist Mannigfaltigkeit
der Regeln und Einheit der Prinzipien eine Forderung der Vernunft, um den
Verstand mit sich selbst in durchgängigen Zusammenhang zu bringen, so wie
der Verstand das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung unter Begriffe und dadurch
jene in Verknüpfung bringt). (A305-306/B362)
208
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[R]eason relates itself only to the use of the understanding . . . in order to
prescribe the direction toward a certain unity of which the understanding
has no concept, proceeding to comprehend all the actions of the
understanding in respect to every object into an absolute whole. (A326327/B383)
Reason strives to attain the unity of the understanding by positing regulative
a priori principles (cf. A11). These principles are conceived as transcendent
principles insofar as they posit objects beyond the boundaries of possible
experience (cf. A296/B352-353). The proper use of such posited objects is strictly
immanent to experience. Nevertheless they function as if they were transcendent
principles whose posited objects could be attained through pure inferences of
reason (cf. A303/B360; A339/B397) in its search for unconditioned conditions of
the conditions of possible experience. “[T]he proper principle of reason in general . .
. is to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with
which its unity will be completed” (A307/B364).
Thus, it is through a priori inferences that reason strives to unify the
cognitions of the understanding and so to bring the understanding into a
thoroughgoing connection with itself. As such reason seeks to attain the absolute
unity of a system. As Kant says: “reason, in inferring, seeks to bring the greatest
manifold of cognition of the understanding to the smallest number of principles
(universal conditions), and thereby to effect the highest unity of that manifold”
(A305/B361). Since the major premises of syllogistic inferences of reason are
relational judgments that relate a cognition to its condition, all syllogisms will be of
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one of three types; categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive, depending on whether
their major premise contains a categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive judgment (cf.
A304/B361). Since reason has a natural tendency to ground its major premises in
higher-order syllogisms whose major premises are unconditioned conditions, it is
naturally led to posit three unconditioned conditions. These unconditioned
premises are correlated with three corresponding ideas: first, the idea of an
absolute subject that is not itself a predicate belonging to an underlying subject;
second, a cause that is not itself an effect of some other cause; and, third, an absolute
whole that is not a part of any other thing. Kant represents these three ideas as
transcendental ideas of reason, or the so-called pure concepts of reason (cf.
A311/B368). They include the idea of the soul (Seele), the idea of freedom
(connected to the cosmological idea of the world as a totality), and the idea of God
(Gott). Kant specifies their function as follows:
[T]hese transcendental concepts lack a suitable use in concreto and have no
other utility than to point the understanding in the right direction so that it
may be thoroughly consistent with itself when it extends itself to its
uttermost extremes. (A323/B380)
Kant calls them ‘ideas’ because Plato conceived his ideas as ‘archetypes’ of
things in themselves that do not have their origin in the senses (cf. A313/B370). In
the following passage, Kant further explains his own conception of ideas:
Ideas . . . are still more remote from objective reality than categories; for not
appearance can be found in which they may be represented in concreto. They
contain a certain completeness that no possible empirical cognition ever
achieves, and with them reason has a systematic unity only in the sense that
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the empirically possible unity seeks to approach it without ever completely
reaching it. (A567-568/B595-596)
Thus, it is clear the transcendental ideas of reason do not apply directly to
experience in any way, and thus that they are merely regulative principles that guide
the understanding toward a goal of unity as if each were an imaginary focal point or
focus imaginarius towards which all cognition and principles of the understanding
converge.1 Kant writes:
I assert: the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive use . . . On the
contrary . . . they have an excellent and indispensable necessary regulative
use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting
which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which,
although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius) – i.e., a point from which the
concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely
outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain
for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension. Now
of course it is from this that there arises the deception (Nun entspringt uns
zwar hieraus die Täuschung), as if these lines of direction were shot out from
an object lying outside the field of possible empirical cognition. (A644/B672)
Thus we see that the aim of reason to unify the understanding has as its
necessary consequence unavoidable illusions and deceptions, since at the same time
that reason projects its pure concepts─i.e., soul, God and world─to an imaginary
focal point toward which all the principles and cognitions of the understanding must
converge, it makes the understanding transgress its own boundaries. The resulting
illusion that we can cognize the objects of the ideas is inevitable. It is this illusion
that has given rise to the disciplines of rational psychology, theology and cosmology,
which Kant regards as “pseudo-sciences.”
1

The focus imaginarius as a focal point will be better understood further in this chapter.
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It is worth mentioning that the very necessity with which reason directs the
understanding to strive for unity guarantees its unlawful transgression of the
bounds of possible experience; i.e., by establishing its rule over the understanding,
reason does a sort of “violence” to it, guaranteeing that the understanding will use
its concepts and principles to pretend to account for what lies outside the field of
empirical cognition.
Thus, it is from the ideas of pure reason that unavoidable and natural illusions
arise (cf. A298/B354, A339/B397). Such illusions can give rise to further
misinterpretations and delusions (cf. A309/B366) and are thus relevant to the topic
of this dissertation. The tendency to overstep the proper boundaries of its own
faculties is natural to the human mind; this is why Kant thinks we cannot avoid
certain illusions.
5.2. The Need of a Sensus Communis and the Tenuousness of the Boundaries
between the Faculties of Cognition
5.2.1. Common Sense and Derangement in General
The exposition of the derangement of the cognitive faculties in Kant is
fragmentary, disordered and basically descriptive. It is fragmentary, for he gives us
here and there some unsystematic observations to reflect upon; it is disordered
since these ideas are dispersed in different texts, though a relatively systematic
treatment of the topic appears in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View;
finally, they are merely descriptive because the Anthropology and the related “Essay
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on the Maladies of the Head” primarily contain illustrative examples rather than real
explanations.2 In what follow we are going to survey Kant’s treatment of the topics
and/or statements that could serve to construct a full-blown critical theory of the
derangement of the cognitive faculties. We will focus, first, on the deficiencies of the
cognitive faculties; second, on what accounts for mental illness; and third─or in
between─on topics that fall between the other two.
It is in Kant’s “Essay on the Maladies of the Head” that we find Kant’s first
discussion of mental illness, where a criterion concerning the frailties of the head is
established by distinguishing between those frailties which do not suspend civil
community and those in which official care provision is needed. Kant says:
I come now from the frailties of the head which are despised and scoffed at to
those which one generally looks upon with pity, or from those which do not
suspend civil community to those in which official care provision takes an
interest and for whom it makes arrangements. (Kopfes Ak. II: 263)
To this criterion Kant adds a statement that is fundamental: the maladies of
the head are not the same as the maladies of the heart; the former relate to the
cognitive faculties whereas the latter pertain to the will. “I have designated the
frailties of the power of cognition (Erkenntniskraft) maladies of the head, just us one

2

It is worth noting that Kant does not always use the same German word to describe the same
deficiency and/or mental illness. According to the translator and editor of the Anthropology, Robert
B. Louden, Kant’s usage of psychiatric terms also does not map well on to the modern psychiatric
terminology, which itself has changed over time. According to Louden the translator’s option of
rendering the Latin terms that Kant uses to gloss the German is the best way of keeping close to
Kant’s meaning and of avoiding awkward translations into English. In this, Louden agrees with Mary
J. Gregor (Anthr. Ak. VII: xxxviii), one of the two previous translators of Kant’s Anthropology (Anthr.
Ak. VII: 202n126).
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calls the corruption of the will a malady of the heart” (Kopfes Ak. II: 270).3 The
Anthropology keeps the main distinction, but under the concepts of mental
deficiencies and mental illness as defects of the cognitive faculty. “The defects of the
cognitive faculty are either mental deficiencies or mental illnesses” (Anthr. Ak. VII:
202). In this work mental deficiencies are those that do not suspend civil
community. Thus, the topic not only concerns the cognitive faculties but the
criterion by which we distinguish what is merely a cognitive deficiency from a
mental illness, namely, the capacity we have─or do not have─to live in community
with others.
The association of mental derangement with our life in society explains why
Kant discusses this topic in a work on pragmatic anthropology. Kant tells us at the
outset that a pragmatic anthropology is concerned with the investigation of what
the human being as a free-acting being makes of himself (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 119).
More precisely, anthropology is pragmatic when “it contains knowledge of the
human being as a citizen of the world” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 120). By this Kant implies that
theoretical knowledge of the world is not sufficient for a pragmatic anthropology;
for the latter refers to the dealings of the human being in the world, i.e., its
participation in the world systematically formulated.4

3

The distinction between maladies of the head and the heart is mentioned also twice at the
beginning of the essay but it is not justified, and the maladies of the heart are not exposed (Kopfes Ak.
II: 259-260).
4

By contrast to a pragmatic anthropology, a physiological anthropology is what nature makes of the
human being (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 119).
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Since our participation in the world is what is at stake in a pragmatic
anthropology, the need of a common world is necessary─and even has to be
presupposed─to be able to distinguish the cognitive faculties in their normal
functioning from their deranged modes of functioning. In this sense, Kant points out
two different but fundamental ideas: “[w]hen we are awake we have a world in
common, but when we are asleep each has his own world” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 190),5 and
“[t]he only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of common sense (sensus
communis) and its replacement with logical private sense (sensus privatus)” (Anthr.
Ak. VII: 219). The association of dreaming with the sensus privatus is important
since Kant wants to convey that to share a common world we must share a common
sense, and this is something that we only share when we are awake. Being awake
and not sharing a world, or not having a common sense, will be synonymous with
mental derangement. These ideas are complemented by the importance Kant
accords to the activity of comparing what we think with the thoughts of others:
For it is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our
judgments generally, and consequently also of the soundness of our
understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the understanding
of others, instead of isolating ourselves with our own understanding and
judging publicly with our private representations. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 219)
Thus, a sound understanding─which, roughly speaking, refers to common
sense in Kant─and the correctness of our judgments, together imply the possibility

5 This statement is already mentioned in Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics,
where Kant credits erroneously Aristotle for its formulation. The editor of the book says it is a
fragment of Heraclitus (Fragment LXXXIX). (Träume Ak. II: 342n30)
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of communication with others – that is, the capacity to express our judgments
publicly as well as listening to the judgments of others.6 We see then that, as in
other cases, Kant supports a double argument: on the one hand, we need to share a
world and to communicate with others to avoid derangement in general (and
eventually some minor forms of mental illness). However, on the other hand, it is
this common world that we share and to which we belong as human beings, that
guarantees a normal functioning of our cognitive faculties. As the passage cited
above indicates, the capacity to communicate with others is the standard or
criterion by which we can measure the soundness of our understanding; as Kant
says it is “a subjective but necessary touchstone.”
This idea makes clear from the outset that, at least to a certain point, the
distinction between the deranged and the normal functioning of our cognitive
faculties is not always rigidly delimited – i.e., that it is possible to become deranged
to a greater or lesser degree. The relevance of contrasting our judgments with the
judgments of others makes understandable why Kant sometimes presents as
synonyms not only common sense and sound understanding but the faculty of
judging as well. Thus in the third Critique he writes:
By ‘sensus communis’ . . . must be understood the idea of a communal sense,
i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of
everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its
judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion
6

The idea of making public our ideas is central to the spirit of modernity; Kant himself states this in
his famous essay, “What is Enlightenment?” In the same tenor, John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty, upheld
the need to confront our ideas to the ideas of others in order to better our judgments and improve
society.
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which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be
objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. Now this
happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the
merely possible judgments of others, and putting oneself in the position of
everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that contingently
attach to our own judging. (KU Ak. V: 293-294)
This passage is interesting insofar as it presents the need to take into account
everyone’s position as a sort of “practice” that we must follow. In suggesting that
this has to be done “a priori” Kant emphasizes that what is to be taken into account
are “not so much the actual but the possible judgments of others.” Thus, here Kant is
giving us a sort of regulative principle that has to guide a priori our faculty of
judging. Kant then mentions that by this he intends to contrast a broad-minded
person with a narrow-minded one (cf. UK Ak. V: 295).7
However, Kant also stresses the idea that we can easily fall into some sort of
derangement by stating that we must “avoid the illusion of taking as objective what
are merely private conditions.” The illusion Kant is considering here are the

7

It is worth mentioning that in the context of the third Critique, these statements are not mentioned
with the intention of accounting for a malfunction or derangement of the cognitive faculties, but
rather with the intention of establishing a way of thinking that gives a purposive use to the cognitive
faculties. This is why Kant mentions the relation of judgment with reason as a whole in this passage.
The point is then not only to contrast our judgments with those of others but to put oneself a priori in
the position of others, because the idea is to reflect on our own judgments from a universal
standpoint. This intention of the third Critique, however, does not invalidate the passage cited above,
since the faculty of judging is being considered here in relation to a different aim.
Likewise, the idea of comparing our judgments with the judgments of others was already
mentioned in Dreams. As Kant says: “[a]ll of this perhaps reveals that, when it comes to our own
judgments, we sense our dependency on the universal human understanding, this phenomenon being
a means of conferring a kind of unity of reason on the totality of thinking beings” (Träume Ak. II:
334).
For a different conception of the relation between sensus communis and sensus privatus see:
Saji, Motohide. 2009. On the division between reason and unreason in Kant. Human Studies 32, no. 2
(June): 201-223.
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illusions of inner sense, for one of the main problems in derangement is precisely
that inner sense is subject to illusions. Kant says:
It is said that inner sense is subject to illusions, which consist either in taking
the appearances of inner sense for external appearances, that is, taking
imaginings for sensations, or in regarding them as inspirations caused by
another being that is not an object of external sense. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 161)
Kant is referring here to enthusiasm or spiritualism which he regards as
forms of mental illness (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161); below this is explained.
5.2.2. The Intersection of Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology
This explanation touches on another topic, namely, that accounting for the
nature of the inner states of the subject is a topic that belongs to empirical
psychology. This is so because the judgments that account for my inner states are
necessarily empirical. The question then arises about the relation that empirical
psychology has to pragmatic anthropology, and how the two presumably distinct
disciplines represent derangement of the mind. Until now the ‘I’ has always been
presented in mental terms; Kant speaks of a mental subject and is basically
interested in a pure mental subject; he does not focus as much on the nature of
empirical consciousness as such. Jean-Paul Sartre is right then when he says Kant
cared neither about the constitution nor the deduction of the empirical
consciousness (cf. Sartre 2003, 94).
We have then passed from a (pure) mental subject that places a priori
conditions on cognition, and that as empirical consciousness has inner states, to talk
in this chapter of the human being of pragmatic anthropology. The question then is
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how this human being comes to be, or how we are to understand the “passage” from
the mental subject to a human being that participates in a common world. Kant
deals constantly with these topics in the Lectures on Metaphysics; in his pre-critical
writings a dualism mind/body is prevalent. In his critical period, Kant replaces the
mind/body dualism with his more nuanced distinction between inner and outer
sense. For example, Kant says: “I, as a human being, am an object of inner and outer
sense” (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 224). In a later text he specifies this connection more
precisely:
Pyschology is the cognition of the object of our inner sense. The object of all
inner intuition is the soul. As object of outer and inner sense I am a human
being. As object merely of inner sense I am a soul, and as an object merely of
outer sense I am a body. (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 583-584)8
Thus, by human being Kant means the ‘I’ that feels, has inner perceptions,
exists physically and lives in the world we share with one another. The
transcendental subject is not mentioned in his anthropological definition of human
subjectivity. Kant implies that the ‘I’ of apperception is not at stake in an inquiry
concerning the ‘I’ as human being. Since this ‘I’ has a body, exists in the world, and is
related to other Is in the same condition, it is the concern of a pragmatic
anthropology. However, as this ‘I’ has feelings and subjective inner states that come
directly linked to what affects his/her body, this ‘I’ is also the concern of empirical
psychology. In short, we can say that empirical psychology is concerned with the

8 The topic of how the soul and the body are united; the community between soul and body, and the
location of the soul in the body, with its collateral topics is not a topic of this dissertation and thus
will neither be explained nor mentioned here.
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inner states of the ‘I’ as an object of the inner sense,9 while pragmatic anthropology
is concerned with the living bodily ‘I’ in its dealings with others. This explains why
both disciplines are concerned with mental derangement, though from somewhat
different points of view. However, since both disciplines deal with empirical
observations the boundary between them is sometimes difficult to discern. Three
passages─written after Kant’s first edition of the first Critique─show this problem
clearly:
A psychology of observations could be called anthropology . . . One can still
distinguish anthropology from it, if one understands by this a cognition of
human beings insofar as it is pragmatic. (MM Ak. XXIX: 757)
In empirical psychology we consider our I as soul and as human being. But
we consider the body, on the one hand, as an organ of the soul which
depends on the soul, but on the other hand as a lodging, since the soul also
often depends on it. A short anthropology is thus presented in empirical
psychology (MM Ak. XXIX: 877)
[E]mpirical psychology is not yet so complete that it could furnish a separate
science, since work on it has begun only recently. Because one knew of no
other science with which it could be paired, that is why it is joined to rational
psychology <psychologia rationalis> as a stranger and guest, since it is still
most closely related to this. (MM Ak. XXVIII: 876)
5.2.3. The Fragile Boundary between Sanity and Mental Derangement
Kant suggests not only that the boundary between empirical psychology and
pragmatic anthropology is porous, but also that the boundary between a normal and
a deranged mind is not rigid. A first point that deserves our attention is his
reference to the fact that children initially talk in the third person─e.g., “Karl wants
9 “Empirical psychology <psychologia empirica>is the cognition of the objects of inner sense insofar as
it is obtained from experience” (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 222).
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to eat,” “Kant want to walk,” etc.─prior to developing a first-person consciousness of
themselves. As Kant says, “[b]efore he [the child] merely felt himself; now he thinks
himself” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 127). It is well known that people who suffer from mental
illness sometimes speak in the third person as well. This suggests that in mental
derangement a sort of involution is present, insofar as the person goes back to a
stage when s/he did not have a robust sense of self-consciousness. This sense of
self-consciousness is related to the capacity to “feel oneself” in inner sense.
However, Kant suggests that apperception is a more developed capacity than that of
inner sense, insofar as apperception implies an ability to think and not merely feel
oneself. In certain cases of mental derangement the person will regress to his/her
own private world where s/he lived in the earliest stages of life.
Another interesting fact about childhood that is also perceivable in mental
illness is that initially the perceptions of a child cannot be united in a concept of an
object (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 128). From our discussion concerning the synthetic
activity of the mind, we can explain this by saying that the child is not yet able to
perform the synthesis of apprehension that would allow him to recognize a
manifold as an object and so form a concept of that object. Something like this could
occur in cases of amentia, as we will see below.
Likewise, Kant warns us of two activities that have to be performed with
caution, to avoid the danger of succumbing to mental derangement. The first is
abstraction, which plays a fundamental role in forming empirical concepts and in
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cognition in general. According to Kant, we must not make our inner sense into an
abstract object of empirical investigation, since such an activity takes us away from
our proper attention to objects of outer sense (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 131). There is a
further danger that by analyzing our mental states we will interfere with the mind’s
natural tendency to synthesize its representations in one consciousness. The
second activity is self-observation in general. Spying on oneself can produce mental
derangement (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 132-133). As Kant says:
To observe the various acts of representative power in myself, when I
summon them, is indeed worth reflection; it is necessary and useful for logic
and metaphysics. – But to wish to eavesdrop on oneself when they come into
the mind unbidden and on their own (this happens through the play of the
power of imagination when it is unintentionally meditating) constitutes a
reversal of the natural order in the faculty of knowledge, because then the
principles of thought do not lead the way (as they should), but rather follow
behind. This eavesdropping on oneself is either already a disease of the mind
(melancholy), or leads to one and to the madhouse. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 133-134)
In both warnings we see clearly the cognitive primacy that outer sense has
for our mental health. In previous chapters we explained that the outer sense is
what allows us to represent ourselves at all. Now Kant makes clear that outer sense
is also necessary to maintain our sanity. Kant refers to this point indirectly when he
says: “[i]nner sense sees the relations of its determinations only in time, hence in
flux, where the stability of observation necessary for experience does not occur”
(Anthr. Ak. VII: 134). Again, contact with the external world is considered
fundamental to avoid a malfunctioning of the cognitive faculties. Retiring into
oneself can promote insanity for it exposes us to the illusions of inner sense: “The
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tendency to retire into oneself, together with the resulting illusions of inner sense,
can only be set right when the human being is led back into the external world and
by means of this to the order of things present to the outer senses” (Anthr. Ak. VII:
162).
5.3. The Deficiencies of the Cognitive Faculties
5.3.1. Misuse of the Power of Judgment as a Source of Mental Deficiencies
Mental deficiency is always the effect of the relationship between two
faculties: one is the power of judgment and the other is the power of imagination.
We have already explained that the power of judgments is the faculty of subsuming
intuitions under a rule – i.e., it concerns our ability to determine whether or not
something stands under a rule of the understanding. Here we are not dealing with
the inferences of reason nor with the objective aspects of empirical cognition, but
rather with empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology. Many of the rules of
our common world and/or daily life are taken for granted because they have been
acquired in childhood and naturally arise just by living with others in a commonly
recognized world. Some of these rules are cultural. For example, putting our shoes
inside the refrigerator instead of in the closet or walking naked in the street would
be signs of mental deficiency. If a person who has never cooked or even watched a
cooking show on TV, were told to wash the rice before cooking it and then, taking
this advice, washed it with Tide or Ajax, we would probably not attribute to him or
her a mental deficiency, for ignorance does not involve a malfunctioning of the
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cognitive faculties (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 205). The person in question would have
followed the general rule that washing involves using soap, and his/her ignorance
consists in not knowing that the washing of food falls under another rule.
However, another question has to do not with knowing─or not
knowing─rules, but with how to apply known rules to concrete cases. More
precisely, the question at stake in such cases is about how to determine whether
something stands under a particular rule or not, since this is what subsumption
under a rule involves (cf. A133/B172). The first Critique gives a clear account of
what is at stake in judging in this sense:
[I]t becomes clear that although the understanding is certainly capable of
being instructed and equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a
special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced (Urteilskraft aber ein
besonderes Talent sei, welches gar nicht belehrt, sondern nur geübt sein will) . .
. A physician therefore, a judge, or a statesman, can have many fine
pathological, juridical, or political rules in his head, of which he can even be a
thorough teacher, and yet can easily stumble in their application, either
because he is lacking in natural power of judgment (though not in
understanding), and to be sure understands the universal in abstracto but
cannot distinguish whether a case in concreto belongs under it, or also
because he has not received adequate training for this judgment through
examples and actual business. (A133-134/B172-173)
As Kant explains here, it is one thing to learn a rule and another to know how
to apply that rule; the latter is a skill that cannot be taught because there are an
indefinite number of cases that will and will not fall under the rule. For example,
Kant tells us, a judge may know very well that all premeditated acts of murder must
be punished, but he or she may not be able to judge that this is a case of murder; for
example, he or she may not be able to distinguish premeditated acts from
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unpremeditated acts, no matter how the evidence is presented. In general, the judge
can know perfectly well the rules of his discipline; he can know the criminal and
civil codes. But if he cannot distinguish when they must be applied he has a kind of
mental deficiency due to this lack of the power of judgment.
Thus, the distinction Kant makes between judgment and understanding is
important. Our understanding can function perfectly well; we can even subsume
empirical intuitions under the categories, for in this special case our grasp of
concepts coincides with our grasp of their rules of applications (their schemata).
Nevertheless, a mental deficiency is to be encountered in anyone who does not
know how to apply empirical rules to particular cases. It is a deficiency for which no
learning can compensate us because the power of judgment is a “natural power” or
“special talent” that cannot be taught. This implies that one either does or does not
possess the faculty of judgment; however, it can be developed to a certain extent
through practice, examples, and experimentation. Examples are particularly
noteworthy, since Kant considers their sole utility to consist in their capacity to
sharpen the power of judgment (cf. A134/B173).10 The Anthropology recalls the
same idea:
Natural understanding can be enriched through instruction with many
concepts and furnished with rules. But the second intellectual faculty,
namely that of discerning whether something is an instance of the rule or not

10 Likewise: “examples are the leading-strings of the power of judgment, which he who lacks the
natural talent for judgment can never do without” (A135/B174).
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– the power of judgment (iudicium) – cannot be instructed, but only exercised
(Anthr. Ak. VII: 199).11
From here Kant determines a specific mental deficiency: s/he who lacks the
power of judgment is stupid (dumm) (A134n/B173n; cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 210).
Stupidity is the mental deficiency proper to s/he who is unable to apply rules to
cases in concreto.
It is worth mentioning that not knowing how to judge is to be distinguished
from judging erroneously. Error─in the theoretical rather than practical sense─is
only to be found in judgments (cf. A293/B350), for judgments are the vehicles by
which we specify the relation of objects to our understanding. In a cognition that
agrees with the laws of the understanding there is no error (cf. A293-294/B350).
Error is caused by an unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding that
makes the latter deviate from its proper action (cf. A294/B350). Because such
influence is not systematic, error─or an erroneous judgment─does not count as an
instance of mental deficiency. Kant adds that negative judgments have the specific
role of preventing error (cf. A709/B737).
This distinction is important because of our tendency to attribute error to the
senses. Kant makes clear that the senses do not err because they do not judge at all:
“Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always

11

In a similar tenor, Kant says: “[a]n understanding that is in itself sound (without mental deficiency)
can still be accompanied by deficiencies with regard to its exercise, deficiencies that necessitate
either a postponement until the growth to proper maturity, or even the representation of one’s person
through that of another in regard to matters of civil nature” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 208).
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judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all” (A293/B350). In his apology
for sensibility, Kant absolves the senses from three accusations: first, “[t]he senses do
not confuse” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 144); second, “[t]he sense do not have command over the
understanding” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 145); and third, “[t]he senses do not deceive” (Anthr.
Ak. VII: 146), precisely because they do not judge at all. The Anthropology explains
through examples how the influence of sensibility on the understanding produces
error; for example we think and say that a tower is round because from the distance
we do not see its corners, or because the distant sea seems higher than the water at
the shore. This influence of sensibility on the understanding makes us take mere
appearances for objects of experience, thereby making us fall into error (Anthr. Ak.
VII: 146).
5.3.2. Can the Imagination be a Source of Mental Deficiency?
Besides the power of judgment, the imagination also plays a fundamental
role in mental deficiency, and it is specifically the reproductive imagination that is at
stake here. However, in contradistinction with the faculty of judging, the role of the
imagination in mental deficiencies is more difficult to determine, since this is an
activity of the mind that operates both involuntarily and constantly. Let us try to
elucidate its main aspects.
We know already that images are particular representations of particular
objects, and that they are produced at the same time as the appearances they
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represent.12 Each one of us has then multiple images for each object of our
cognition. The imagination uses these images in different ways and constantly, and
mental deficiencies may arise when the imagination has preponderance over the
laws of the understanding or functions in a ruleless or unbridled manner. Kant
considers that absent-mindedness is a mental deficiency proper to the reproductive
imagination:
Absent-mindedness is one of the mental deficiencies attached, through the
reproductive imagination, to a representation on which one has expended a
great or continuous attention and from which one is not able to get away;
that is, one is not able to set the course of the power of imagination free
again. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 206)
The Anthropology defines the reproductive imagination as a faculty of the
derivative presentation of an object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to the
mind a previously acquired empirical intuition (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). This is
another way to say that the reproductive imagination brings back to the mind
images of objects. From these images the imagination has the capacity to invent
new (imaged) objects. He who regards these images as (inner or outer) experiences
is a visionary (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). This accounts for the inventive power of
imagination, even if this does not mean that it is creative since it always requires a
prior sense representation that has been given to us; it can never produce a sense
representation that has never been given to our sensibility (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 168).
This is why Kant says:

12

See Chapter 3 for the explanation of the image formation.
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So, no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power of the
imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the material for its
images from the senses. But these images, according to the memories formed
of them, are not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding.
(Anthr. Ak. VII: 168-169)
Through association we can extend the domain of images with which the
imagination plays, up until the point at which one person’s imagination can do
violence to another’s. An example would be the excessive use of imagination in a
work of art. Kant also has in mind abrupt changes of topic during a conversation, or
beginning a new conversation with something unexpected or unfamiliar, like
current events in another country. This explains why talking about the weather is so
often a common conversational starting point, for it does not produce any violence
to the imagination of others (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 176n). While memory brings back
images voluntarily (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 182), fantasy accounts for the involuntary
production of images by the power of the imagination (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). As
Kant says: “[w]e play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but imagination
(as fantasy) plays just as frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently”
(Anthr. Ak. VII: 175).
We can make here a side reference to the disciplines of rational psychology,
theology and cosmology insofar as they give rise to rational illusions, and so can be
conducive to the production of further illusions; thus we can expect that fantasies,
fables, fantastical histories, horror tales and movies, etc., may be directly linked to
the metaphysical illusions through the power of the imagination. Besides, the
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imagination can be excited or soothed, in the one case strengthening and in the
other weakening its vital force; among Kant’s examples here we have intoxicating
food and drink, certain mushrooms, wild rosemary, the chicha of the Peruvians,
opium, wine and beer (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 170).
As in the case of sensibility, the imagination can also influence the
understanding in the production or deployment of its concepts; this can be one of
the sources of surreptitious concepts. Kant touches upon this vast domain and the
obscure origin of such concepts when he writes:
There are many concepts which are the product of covert and obscure
inferences made in the course of experience; these concepts then proceed to
propagate themselves by attaching themselves to other concepts, without
there being any awareness of the experience itself on which they were
originally based or of the inference which formed the concept on the basis of
such experience. Such concepts may be called surreptitious concepts. (Träume
Ak. II: 320n)
Considering that the understanding can exercise certain acts of unification
that result in concepts without any empirical intuition being given to us, and that we
can think up objects for concepts that are not givable in intuition, and that, finally,
even the categories themselves are sometimes used beyond the bounds of empirical
intuition, it is clear that there are many ways in which the power of the imagination
can provide content for our concepts and collaborate in thinking up objects that
cannot be given in intuition. For instance, the concept of a ‘spirit’ is fabricated by
inferring the existence of an intelligible world whose “beings” live among us but
have neither impenetrability nor extension, and thus cannot be given in empirical
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intuition. Much simpler will be to explain the origin of fictitious concepts such as
that of a unicorn or a siren, since they could be composed of the mixture of
characteristic marks of given empirical concepts.
These statements make clear how the imagination can directly or indirectly
contribute to mental deficiencies of which absent-mindedness is one case. They also
make evident that some of the inventions and play of the imagination are not at all
questionable, since from it great artistic, intellectual, scientific and technological
productions arise as well. The question then is how can we establish a boundary
between a normally functioning power of the imagination─with appropriate
fantasies and fictions─from one that exposes the subject to the danger of mental
derangement.
Kant introduces the expression ‘waking dreamer’ (Träumer im Wachen) to
explain the tendency of some otherwise mentally healthy people to produce
chimaeras and similar fictions while daydreaming; in most cases the individual is
conscious that these chimaeras or fictions are products of its own imagination. As
Kant says:
[H]e represents them [chimaeras] at the time as being in himself, whereas
other objects, which he senses, he represents as outside himself. As a
consequence, he counts the former as the products of his own activity, while
he regards the latter as something which he receives from outside and by
which he is affected. (Träume Ak. II: 343)
The criterion by which we distinguish an object of outer sense from what is a
mere product of one’s own imagination is the affection the object of the outer sense
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has on our own body. As already explained, sensations refer to the consciousness of
the affection of objects of the outer sense.13 Thus, the consciousness of this affection
on our own body is what serves as a criterion for distinguishing what comes from an
object of the outer sense and what is a product of our own imagination. As Kant
points out:
Hence, the images in question may very well occupy him greatly while he is
awake, but, no matter how clear the images may be, they will not deceive
him. For although, in this case, he also has a representation of himself and of
his body in his brain, and although he relates his fantastical images to that
representations, nonetheless, the real sensation of his body creates, by means
of the outer senses, a contrast or distinction with respect to those chimaeras.
As a result, he is able to regard his fantastical images as hatched out by
himself and the real sensation as an impression of the senses. (Träume Ak. II:
343) (Emphasis mine)
5.4. Towards an Account of Mental Illness
While the sensations that the objects of the outer sense produce on our
bodies can serve as the criterion for distinguishing the products of our imagination
from what comes from outside us, people suffering from mental illness will not be
able to identify sensations that allow them to distinguish between the inner from
the outer. Kant suggests that mental illness cannot be conceived if there is not
something wrong in our brains; at least this appears to be a guiding assumption of
the Anthropology, as it is in his earlier Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams
of Metaphysics, in which he provides his only full explanation of a case of mental
illness.

13

See Chapter 1 for the explanation on sensation.
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Kant considers spirit-seers to be candidates for the asylum (cf. Träume Ak. II:
348). In Dreams he considers the case of Emmanuel Swedenborg, who believed he
could commune with spirits. Kant speculates that the cause of Swedenborg’s
delusion was a physiological tendency to transpose the figments of his imagination
outside himself; i.e., Swedenborg’s brain mislocated his imaginings in a place outside
his mind. As Kant says, sufferers of this type of mental derangement “transpose the
illusion of their imagination and locate it outside themselves, and do so in relation to
their body, of which also they are aware by means of the outer senses” (Träume Ak.
II: 343-344). The question then is how this transposition occurs. How is it possible
that a person can locate what is inside himself/herself as if it were an object of the
outer sense?
To provide an answer to this question Kant draws on Isaac Newton’s account
of the refraction of light-rays. In Book I, Part I, Axiom viii of his Opticks, Newton says,
“[a]n object seen by Reflexion or Refraction, appears in that place from whence the
Rays after their last Reflexion or Refraction diverge in falling on the Spectator’s Eye”
(Newton 1952, 18). In Definition II, Newton states that the “Refrangibility of the
Rays of Light, is their Disposition to be refracted or turned out of their Way in
passing out of one transparent Body or Medium into another. And a greater or less
Refrangibility of Rays, is their Disposition to be turned more or less out of their Way
in like Incidences of the same Medium” (Newton 1952, 2).
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Kant borrows these ideas to account for what happens in mental illness.
Newton observed that when an object is seen through a prism or reflected in a
mirror, the image of the object is refracted or reflected onto another position, i.e.,
the eye will see the object as located at another place from where it actually is. He
explained this phenomenon by suggesting that the rays that emanated from the
object intersect before entering the eye at a focal point. This intersection indicates
the direction from which the sensation was transmitted to the eye. Kant draws on
the same idea, suggesting that a normal person distinguishes an external object
from the mere products of his or her imagination by locating the focus imaginarius
of his imaginings inside the brain. The focus imaginarius is the point at which the
lines─caused, in this case, by the imagination─intersect or converge when they are
extended (cf. Träume Ak. II: 344). The focus imaginarius is then used by Kant as an
analogy of Newton’s focal point to explain the intersection of the sensations and of
the movement of the nerves in the brain. Kant uses Descartes’ conception of his
ideas materiales; i.e., he speculates that there is a movement of the nerve-tissue
(Nervengewebe) in the brain and that all the representations of our imagination are
accompanied by its vibration.14

14

Kant explains the Cartesian material ideas in his own words by saying they are bodily impressions.
As Kant says:
These conditions of the body, under which alone the thoughts can take place, are called
material ideas <ideas materiales> or material correlates of the ideas . . . so must there also be
impressions in the body that correspond with the thoughts and accompany the idea . . . there
must be impressions in the brain of that which one has thought; there must be something
bodily with thinking. (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 259)
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The Newtonian and Cartesian ideas taken together enable Kant to conceive
that the focus imaginarius has to be different─in the ordinary or normal case─from
the figments of the imagination and from the objects of perception – i.e., that the
place where the focus imaginarius is normally located depends on the kind of object
that is being considered: if the object is an object of sensation, the focus imaginarius
is located outside the brain, whereas if the object is a chimera or a mere product of
the imagination, the focus imaginarius is located inside the brain. In Kant’s own
words:
The concession I ask is this: that the chief difference between the motion of
the nerves in the images of the imagination and the motion of the nerves in
the sensation consists in the fact that the lines indicating the direction of the
motion intersect in the former case inside the brain, whereas in the latter
case they intersect outside it. In the case of the clear sensations of waking
life, the focus imaginarius, at which the object is represented, is placed
outside me, whereas in the case of the images of the imagination, which I may
entertain at the same time as the clear sensations of my waking life, the focus
imaginarius is located within me. For this reason, I cannot, as long as I am
awake, fail to distinguish my imaginings, as the figments of my own
imaginations, from the impression of the senses. (Träume Ak. II: 345)
From these ideas Kant will offer an explanation of mental illness which he
refers to as ‘madness’ (Wahnsinn) and as ‘derangement’ (Verrückung), saying that
what happens in the mentally ill is that s/he transposes the location of the focus
imaginarius concerning the products of his or her own imagination from inside the
brain to outside it, thereby treating the images as if they were real objects of the
outer sense. As Kant says:
If this is admitted [the previous distinction that the normal person makes], I
think I can offer a reasonable explanation of that type of mental disturbance
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which is called madness (Wahnsinn), and which, if it is more serious, is called
derangement (Verrückung). The distinctive feature of this malady consists in
this: the victim of the confusion places mere object of his own imagination
outside himself, taking them to be things which are actually present before
him. (Träume Ak. II: 346)
Thus what explains this type of mentally illness is that the motions that are
supposed to intersect inside the brain intersect outside the brain; the mentally ill
person displaces the focus imaginarius from inside to outside the brain, and thus,
locates the mere products of his imagination as if they were objects of the senses.
“[T]he displacement of the nerve-tissue can cause the focus imaginarius to be
displaced and located at the point from which the sensible impression produced by
a corporeal body, which was actually present, would come” (Träume Ak. II: 347).
Kant adds that this is a deception of the (outer) senses, and that the malady does not
affect the understanding. Mere reasoning cannot help the deranged person in this
case, because even if he can judge well, the impression of the senses precedes
judgment and presents its evidence so vividly that there is no way the
understanding can act against this illness (cf. Träume Ak. II: 347).
We think this early explanation of Swedenborg’s delusions could provide an
explanation of how ‘dementia’ (Wahnsinn), as Kant understands it in the
Anthropology, is produced.15 Thirty-two years later, when Kant attempted his
systematic classification of mental illnesses he described dementia as follows:

15

We must not take, however, the German word ‘Wahnsinn,’ repeated in both explanations, as
evidence. As already mentioned, Kant uses the same German words in different explanations, and
sometimes different words for similar explanations.
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Dementia is that disturbance of the mind in which everything that the insane
person relates is to be sure in conformity with the formal laws of thought
that make experience possible; but, owing to the falsely inventive power of
imagination, self-made representations are regarded as perceptions (Anthr.
Ak. VII: 215).
Besides dementia (Wahnsinn), other types of mental illnesses are amentia
(Unsinnigkeit), insania (Wahnwitz) and vesania (Aberwitz) (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 214215). “Amentia (Unsinnigkeit) is the inability to bring one’s own representations
into even the coherence necessary for the possibility of experience” (Anthr. Ak. VII:
214). We think it is possible that Kant was considering here the case of a person
who is unable to perform correctly the empirical synthesis of apprehension, but
mostly the definition seems to point to cases in which the ‘I think’ is not capable of
accompanying our representations, and, thus, the mentally ill subject would be
someone who cannot make his/her representations into thoughts, which means that
the representations would be nothing for him/her. Under these circumstances no
possible experience could be even envisaged.
Kant also conceives of patients who suffer from ‘vesania’ (Aberwitz), or a
deranged reason. A typical feature of such mental illness is that suffers of it believe
they can unveil the supersensible forces of nature and comprehend the mystery of
the Trinity (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 215). As Kant says:
Vesania (Aberwitz) is the sickness of a deranged reason. The mental patient
flies over the entire guidance of experience and chases after principles that
can be completely exempted from its touchstone imagining that he conceives
the inconceivable. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 215)
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This type of mental illness seems to correspond to the derangement
experienced by those people whose understanding has transgressed the boundaries
of its proper exercise, and who guide themselves by pseudo-rational principles. In
this case, they pretend to apply categories for supposed objects that are really not
objects of a possible experience.
This malady seems to approach in some way to another, namely, Kant’s
conception of ‘enthusiasm’ (Schwärmerei) that, as mentioned above, is an illusion of
the inner sense that consists in taking imaginings for sensations. This illusion is
conceived as mental illness (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161) and its origin is linked to the
illusions of reason insofar as the individual here thinks he has contact with a
community of spirits, including the souls of the departed (cf. Träume Ak. II: 362364). Once again, Kant bases his conception of enthusiasm on the case of Emmanuel
Swedenborg, whom he considers to be the worst of all enthusiasts (cf. Träume Ak. II:
366).16 He says: “[t]o claim (with Swedenborg) that the real appearances of the
world present to the senses are merely a symbol of an intelligible world hidden in
reserve is enthusiasm” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 191-192).17

16

The case of E. Swedenborg shows how the boundaries in types of mental illness are also porous.
See: Rozenberg, Jacques. 1985. La théorie optique de l’hallucination dans les “Rêves d’un visionnarie”
de Kant. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger 175, no. 1 (Janvier-Mars): 15-26.
17

Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772). Swedish scientist, religious teacher and mystic. Writer of
the Arcana Coelestia, among other works. His religious conception is largely incorporated into the
Church of the New Jerusalem.
We do not think it possible to account for an explanation of what Kant named insania.
Therefore we just mention its definition in this footnote: “Insania (Wahnwitz) is a deranged power of
judgment in which the mind is held in suspense by means of analogies that are confused with
concepts of similar things, and thus the power of imagination, in a play resembling understanding,
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Finally, a different type of mental illness is melancholia (Grillenkrankheit),
also called hypochondria. It is also a mental illness but of a different type since it is
neither madness nor needs to take care of the person. Here the patient is well
aware that something is not right with the course of his thoughts (Anthr. Ak. VII:
202). As Kant says:
[The illness of the hypochondriac consists in this: that certain internal
physical sensations do not so much disclose a real disease present in the
body, but rather are mere causes of anxiety about it . . . hypochondria,
considered as melancholia, becomes the cause of imagining physical disease:
the patient is aware that it is imaginary, but every now and then he cannot
refrain from regarding it as something real. Or, conversely, from a real
physical ailment (such as unease from flatulent food after having a meal),
hypochondria will produce imaginings of all sorts of grave external mishaps
and worries about one’s business, which disappear as soon as the digestion
has been completed and flatulence has ceased. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 212-213)
In closing now our dissertation we recall here Kant’s three maxims for
wisdom: to think for oneself, to think into the place of the other (in communication
with human beings) and to always think consistently with oneself (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII:
200). We add three further important suggestions for everyday life among the
many that Kant gives us. First, the ideal of a good meal in good company. “The good
living that still seems to harmonize best with true humanity is a good meal in good
company (and if possible, also alternating company)” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 278). Second,
scholars must not eat alone. “Eating alone (solipsismus convictorii) (the solitary
person at the table) is unhealthy for a scholar who philosophizes; it is not restoration

conjures up the connection of disparate things as universal under which the representations of the
universal are contained” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 215).
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but exhaustion (especially if it becomes solitary feasting): fatiguing work rather than
a stimulating play of thoughts” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 280). Third, laugh. Laugh very much.
Laughter is an affect resulting from the sudden transformation of a
heightened expectation into nothing. This very transformation, which is
certainly nothing enjoyable for the understanding, is nevertheless indirectly
enjoyable and, for a moment, very lively. The cause must thus consist in the
influence of the representation of the body and its reciprocal effect on the
mind; certainly not insofar as the representation is objectively an object of
gratification (for how can a disappointed expectation be gratifying?), but
rather solely through the fact that as a mere play of representations it
produces an equilibrium of the vital powers in the body. (KU Ak. V: 332-333)
We conclude that philosophers must eat good meals in company, and laugh
as much as possible. No doubt this is a good method to prevent the illusions of sense
and of reason to which we are all exposed. If Nietzsche said a philosopher must
know how to dance, why not think that a philosopher must also know how to laugh?
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